In their initial effort to end the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger attempted to lever concessions from Hanoi at the negotiating table with military force and coercive diplomacy. They were not seeking military victory, which they did not believe was feasible. Instead, they backed up their diplomacy toward North Vietnam and the Soviet Union with the Madman Theory of threatening excessive force, which included the specter of nuclear force. They began with verbal threats then bombed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong base areas in Cambodia, signaling that there was more to come. As the bombing expanded, they launched a previously unknown mining ruse against Haiphong, stepped-up their warnings to Hanoi and Moscow, and initiated planning for a massive shock-and-awe military operation referred to within the White House inner circle as DUCK HOOK. Beyond the mining of North Vietnamese ports and selective bombing in and around Hanoi, the initial DUCK HOOK concept included proposals for “tactical” nuclear strikes against logistics targets and U.S. and South Vietnamese ground incursions into the North. In early October 1969, however, Nixon aborted planning for the long-contemplated operation. He had been influenced by Hanoi's defiance in the face of his dire threats and concerned about U.S. public reaction, antiwar protests, and internal administration dissent. In place of DUCK HOOK, Nixon and Kissinger launched a secret global nuclear alert in hopes that it would lend credibility to their prior warnings and perhaps even persuade Moscow to put pressure on Hanoi. It was to be a “special reminder” of how far President Nixon might go. The risky gambit failed to move the Soviets, but it marked a turning point in the administration's strategy for exiting Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger became increasingly resigned to a “long-route” policy of providing Saigon with a “decent chance” of survival for a “decent interval” after a negotiated settlement and U.S. forces left Indochina. Burr and Kimball draw upon extensive research in participant interviews and declassified documents to unravel this intricate story of the October 1969 nuclear alert. They place it in the context of nuclear threat making and coercive diplomacy since 1945, the culture of the Bomb, intra-governmental dissent, domestic political pressures, the international “nuclear taboo,” and Vietnamese and Soviet actions and policies. It is a history that holds important lessons for the present and future about the risks and uncertainties of nuclear threat making.

The signing of the Paris Agreement in 1973 ended not only America's Vietnam War but also Richard Nixon's best laid plans. After years of secret negotiations, threats of massive bombing and secret diplomacy designed to shatter strained Communist alliances, the president had to settle for a peace that fell far short of his original aims.

In 1974 Richard Nixon's defense secretary, James Schlesinger, announced that the United States would change its nuclear targeting policy from "assured destruction" to "limited nuclear options." In this account of the Schlesinger Doctrine based on newly declassified documents and extensive interviews with key actors, Terry Terriff challenges the Nixon administration's official explanation of why and how this policy innovation occurred.

"The new evidence uncovers a number of behind-the-scenes plays - such as Nixon's secret nuclear alert of October 1969 - and sheds more light on Nixon's goals in Vietnam and his and Kissinger's strategies of Vietnamization, the "China card," and "triangular diplomacy." The excerpted documents also reveal significant new information about the purposes of the linebacker bombings, Nixon's manipulation of the pow issue, and the conduct of the secret negotiations in Paris - as well as other key topics, events, and issues. All of these are effectively framed by Kimball, whose introductions to each document provide historical context."

Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? This book argues that they are useful for deterrence but not for offensive purposes.

“Nixon raises all the timely questions about the present state of the world, and then answers them both systematically and thoroughly.” —The New York Times In this acclaimed national bestseller, Richard Nixon offers a comprehensive strategy for the West—a vital plan of action that will help ensure peace, prosperity, and freedom in the next century. From glasnost and summitry to arms control and “Star Wars,” from Nicaragua and China to Europe and Japan, he gives seasoned, no-nonsense advice on all tough foreign policy issues. The former President draws on a lifetime of experience in international affairs to examine the crucial challenges facing the United States and the West and how best to go forward in the 21st century.

In this revealing book Nobel Laureate Glenn T. Seaborg tells what it was like to be chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission during the Nixon presidency. He draws extensively from his meticulously kept diary, enabling the reader to be a fly on the wall during meetings with Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and other key policy makers. During the Nixon period, the debate over how to deal with the Soviets on nuclear issues and arms control remained central. On the domestic scene efforts to promote and regulate the growth of a nuclear power industry were complicated by a rising tide of environmental protest. Dr. Seaborg describes how the Atomic Energy Commission, shorn of much of the political immunity of its early years, sought to maintain its programmes and ultimately its very existence, while besieged by competing pressures from the White House, other government agencies, anti-nuclear activists, industry, state governments, and Congress.