Americans spend more than $100 billion a year to buy weapons, but no one likes the process that brings these weapons into existence. The problem, McNaugher shows, is that the technical needs of engineers and military planners clash sharply with the political demands of Congress. McNaugher examines weapons procurement since World War II and shows how repeated efforts to improve weapons acquisition have instead increased the harmful intrusion of political pressures into that technical development and procurement process. Today's weapons are more complicated than their predecessors. So are the nation's military forces. The design of new systems and their integration into the force structure demand more care, time, and flexibility. Yet time and flexibility are precisely what political pressures remove from the acquisitions process. In a series of case studies and conceptual discussions, McNaugher tackles concerns at the heart of the debate about acquisition—the slow and heavily bureaucratic approach to development, the preference for ultimate weapons over well-organized and trained forces, and the counterproductive incentives facing the nation's defense firms. He calls for changes that run against the current fashion—less centralization or procurement, less haste in developing new weapons, and greater use of competition as a means of removing the development process from political oversight. Above all, McNaugher shows how the United States tries to buy research and development on the cheap, and how costly this has been. The nation can improve its acquisition process, he concludes, only when it recognizes the need to pay for the full exploration of new technology.

Americans spend more than $100 billion a year to buy weapons, but no one likes the process that brings these weapons into existence. The problem, McNaugher shows, is that the technical needs of engineers and military planners clash sharply with the political demands of Congress. McNaugher examines weapons procurement since World War II and shows how repeated efforts to improve weapons acquisition have instead increased the harmful intrusion of political pressures into that technical development and procurement process. Today's weapons are more complicated than their predecessors. So are the nation's military forces. The design of new systems and their integration into the force structure demand more care, time, and flexibility. Yet time and flexibility are precisely what political pressures remove from the acquisitions process. In a series of case studies and conceptual discussions, McNaugher tackles concerns at the heart of the debate about acquisition—the slow and heavily bureaucratic approach to development, the preference for ultimate weapons over well-organized and trained forces, and the counterproductive incentives facing the nation's defense firms. He calls for changes that run against the current fashion—less centralization or procurement, less haste in developing new weapons, and greater use of competition as a means of removing the development process from political oversight. Above all, McNaugher shows how the United States tries to buy research and development on the cheap, and how costly this has been. The nation can improve its acquisition process, he concludes, only when it recognizes the need to pay for the full exploration of new technology.

Offering a reassessment of the tumultuous culture of politics on the national stage during America's early years, when Jefferson, Burr, and Hamilton were among the national leaders, Freeman shows how the rituals and rhetoric of honor provides ground rules for political combat. Illustrations.

First Published in 1997. In an effort to find the validity of middle ground, this book offers a comprehensive analysis that looks further than the House Committee on National Security's actions on the B-2 bomber, President Clinton's campaign promise to support the Seawolf submarine, and the Pentagon's use of a concurrent and risky management strategy for the $71.6 billion F-22 fighter aircraft program. It provides a dissection of the decision-making process for a representative sample of major weapons systems to invalidate the claims that pork and malfeasance are both pervasive and determinate.

This textbook provides an accessible overview of US defense politics. This edition has been fully updated and revised, with a new chapter on intelligence and new material on unmanned drones, women in the military, the Tea Party, and other key issues.

Our ideas about national security have changed radically over the last five years. It has become a political tool, a "wedge issue," a symbol of pride and fear. It is also the one issue above all others that can make or break an election. And this is why the Democratic Party has been steadily losing power since 2001. In Hard Power, Michael O'Hanlon, an expert on foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, and Kurt Campbell, an authority on international security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, explain how the Democrats lost credibility on issues of security and foreign policy, how they can get it back -- and why they must. They recall the successful Democratic military legacy of past decades, as well as recent Democratic innovations -- like the Homeland Security Office and the idea of nation-building -- that have been successfully co-opted by the Republican administration. And, most importantly, they develop a broad national security vision for America, including specific defense policies and a strategy to win the war on terror.

This three volume Encyclopedia offers the first comprehensive and authoritative survey of the rapidly developing field of international political economy. Its entries cover the major theoretical issues and analytical approaches within the field. The set also provides detailed discussion of the contributions of key individuals and surveys a wide range of empirical conditions and developments within the global political economy, including its major institutions. The Encyclopedia has been designed to be eclectic in approach and wide-ranging in coverage. Theoretical entries range from discussions of the definition and scope of the field, through core methodological questions such as rationalism and the structure-agent problem, to surveys of the major theories and approaches employed in the study of the international political economy.