The present volume is a sequel to Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings (D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht 1971): its purpose is to offer a view of some of the main directions of research in contemporary deontic logic. Most of the articles included in Introductory and Systematic Readings represent what may be called the standard modal approach to deontic logic, in which de on tic logic is treated as a branch of modal logic, and the normative concepts of obligation, permission and prohibition are regarded as analogous to the "alethic" modalities necessity, possibility and impossibility. As Simo Knuuttila shows in his contribution to the present volume, this approach goes back to late medieval philosophy. Several 14th century philosophers observed the analogies between deontic and alethic modalities and discussed the deontic interpretations of various laws of modal logic. In contemporary deontic logic the modal approach was revived by G. H. von Wright's classic paper 'Deontic Logic' (1951). Certain analogies between deontic and alethic modalities are obvious and uncontroversial, but the standard approach has often been criticized on the ground that it exaggerates the analogies and tends to ignore those features of normative concepts which distinguish them from other modalities.

Several years ago I came across a marvelous little paper in which Hector-Neri Castaneda shows that standard versions of act utilitarian l ism are formally incoherent. I was intrigued by his argument. It had long seemed to me that I had a firm grasp on act utilitarianism. Indeed, it had often seemed to me that it was the clearest and most attractive of normative theories. Yet here was a simple and relatively uncontrover sial argument that showed, with only some trivial assumptions, that the doctrine is virtually unintelligible. The gist of Castaneda's argument is this: suppose we understand act utilitarianism to be the view that an act is obligatory if and only if its utility exceeds that of each alternative. Suppose it is obligatory for a certain person to perform an act with two parts - we can call it 'A & B'. Then, obviously enough, it is also obligatory for this person to perform the parts, A and B. If act utilitarianism were true, we appar ently could infer that the utility of A & B is higher than that of A, and higher than that of B (because A & B is obligatory, and the other acts are alternatives to A & B).

These 13 papers collected from several meetings of the Society for Exact Philosophy from 1993-96 take a variety of approaches to the task of integrating normative and defeasible reasoning. While most of the papers propose some version of defeasible deontic logic, a few consider alternatives approaches to solving some of the puzzles of normative reasoning that deontic reasoning has failed to resolve. The authors also describe standard deontic logic. Name index only. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

John Horty effectively develops deontic logic (the logic of ethical concepts like obligation and permission) against the background of a formal theory of agency. He incorporates certain elements of decision theory to set out a new deontic account of what agents ought to do under variousconditions over extended periods of time. Offering a conceptual rather than technical emphasis, Horty's framework allows a number of recent issues from moral theory to be set out clearly and discussed from a uniform point of view.

"Logic and law have a long history in common, but the influence has been mostly one-sided, except perhaps in the 5th and 6th centuries B.C., where disputes at the market place or in tribunals in Greece seem to have stimulated a lot of reflection among sophistic philosophers on such topics as language and truth. Most of the time it was logic that influenced legal thinking, but in the last 50 years logicians began to be interested in normative concepts and hence in law"--

The Handbook of Deontic Logic and Normative Systems presents a detailed overview of the main lines of research on contemporary deontic logic and related topics. Although building on decades of previous work in the field, it is the first collection to take into account the significant changes in the landscape of deontic logic that have occurred in the past twenty years. These changes have resulted largely, though not entirely, from the interaction of deontic logic with a variety of other fields, including computer science, legal theory, organizational theory, economics, and linguistics. This first volume of the Handbook is divided into three parts, containing nine chapters in all, each written by leading experts in the field. The first part concentrates on historical foundations. The second examines topics of central interest in contemporary deontic logic. The third presents some new logical frameworks that have now become part of the mainstream literature. A second volume of the Handbook is currently in preparation, and there may be a third after that.