The spectacular development of medical knowledge over the last two centuries has brought intrusive advances in the capabilities of medical technology. These advances have been remarkable over the last century, but especially over the last few decades, culminating in such high technology interventions as heart transplants and renal dialysis. These increases in medical powers have attracted societal interest in acquiring more such knowledge. They have also spawned concerns regarding the use of human subjects in research and regarding the byproducts of basic research as in the recent recombinant DNA debate. As a consequence of the development of new biomedical knowledge, physicians and biomedical scientists have been placed in positions of new power and responsibility. The emergence of this group of powerful and knowledgeable experts has occasioned debates regarding the accountability of physicians and biomedical scientists. But beyond that, the very investment of resources in the acquisition of new knowledge has been questioned. Societies must decide whether finite resources would not be better invested at this juncture, or in general, in the alleviation of the problems of hunger or in raising general health standards through interventions which are less dependent on the intensive use of high technology. To put issues in this fashion touches on philosophical notions concerning the claims of distributive justice and the ownership of biomedical knowledge.

The spectacular development of medical knowledge over the last two centuries has brought intrusive advances in the capabilities of medical technology. These advances have been remarkable over the last century, but especially over the last few decades, culminating in such high technology interventions as heart transplants and renal dialysis. These increases in medical powers have attracted societal interest in acquiring more such knowledge. They have also spawned concerns regarding the use of human subjects in research and regarding the byproducts of basic research as in the recent recombinant DNA debate. As a consequence of the development of new biomedical knowledge, physicians and biomedical scientists have been placed in positions of new power and responsibility. The emergence of this group of powerful and knowledgeable experts has occasioned debates regarding the accountability of physicians and biomedical scientists. But beyond that, the very investment of resources in the acquisition of new knowledge has been questioned. Societies must decide whether finite resources would not be better invested at this juncture, or in general, in the alleviation of the problems of hunger or in raising general health standards through interventions which are less dependent on the intensive use of high technology. To put issues in this fashion touches on philosophical notions concerning the claims of distributive justice and the ownership of biomedical knowledge.

Biocracy, a term invented by physiologist Walter Bradford Cannon, refers to the influence of biological science on society and its public policies. Beginning with the prophetic essay “Biopolitics: Science, Ethics, and Public Policy,†this book addresses various aspects of the relationships among the life sciences, society, and government. Included in the topics considered are some of the more critical issues of our time: the social responses to life science innovations; health and homeostasis as social concepts; the relationship between history and biology and that between the life sciences and the law; biocratic interpretations of ethical behavior and biopolitical conflicts; and the options, risks, and international consequences of biotechnology. Caldwell’s book is a collection of articles that he wrote on this subject over a period of twenty-five years. Of the ten chapters, four have previously appeared in scholarly journals but have undergone extensive editorial revisions appropriate to this publication. The remaining six chapters have been presented at various professional meetings but have not hitherto been available in print.

An interdisciplinary exploration of whether modern genetics and bioengineering are leading us to a posthuman future.

Interest in theories of virtue and the place of virtues in the moral life con tinues to grow. Nicolai Hartmann [7], George F. Thomas [20], G.E.M. Anscombe [1], and G.H. von Wright [21], for example, called to our atten tion decades ago that virtue had become a neglected topic in modem ethics. The challenge implicit in these sorts of reminders to rediscover the contribu tion that the notion of virtue can make to moral reasoning, moral character, and moral judgment has not gone unattended. Arthur Dyck [3], P.T. Geach [5], Josef Pieper (16], David Hamed [6], and, most notably, Stanley Hauerwas [8-11], in the theological community, have analyzed or utilized in their work virtue-based theories of morality. Philosophical probings have come from Lawrance Becker [2], Philippa Foot [4], Edmund Pincoffs [17], James Wallace [22], and most notably, Alasdair MacIntyre [12-14]. Draw ing upon and revising mainly ancient and medieval sources, these and other commentators have ignited what appears to be the beginning of a sustained examination of virtue.