Drawing on neuroscientific research and metacognitive theory, this groundbreaking volume examines the theoretical implications that are elicited when neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) are identified. The relationship between consciousness and the brain has concerned philosophers for centuries, yet a tacit assumption in much empirically minded consciousness research seems to be that if we can only develop a map of correlations, no further questions remain to be asked. Beyond Neural Correlates of Consciousness starts where others stop, by asking what these correlations may tell us about the nature of consciousness. The book contains chapters considering the upshots of finding the neural correlates of consciousness in light of the most prominent contemporary theories in the field. This illuminates the theoretical consequences of succeeding in the quest for the neural correlates of consciousness from the perspective of global workspace theory, higher-order thought theory, local recurrency theory, and REFCON models, in addition to considering how this quest is shaped by different conscious phenomena, such as dreaming, altered states of consciousness, and different levels of consciousness. This insightful text features sophisticated theories that goes beyond correlational inferences and neural mapping, and will be of interest to students and researchers of consciousness, particularly those interested in interpreting neural correlates.

The advances in neuroimaging technologies have led to substantial progress in understanding the neural mechanisms of cognitive functions. Thinking and reasoning have only recently been addressed by using neuroimaging techniques. The present book comprehensively explores current approaches and contributions to understanding the neural mechanisms of thinking in a concise and readable manner. It provides an insight into the state of the art and the potentials, but also the limitations of current neuroimaging methods for studying cognitive functions. The book will be a valuable companion for everyone interested in one of the most fascinating topics of cognitive neuroscience.

Where do spontaneous thoughts come from? It may be surprising that the seemingly straightforward answers "from the mind" or "from the brain" are in fact an incredibly recent understanding of the origins of spontaneous thought. For nearly all of human history, our thoughts - especially the most sudden, insightful, and important - were almost universally ascribed to divine or other external sources. Only in the past few centuries have we truly taken responsibility for their own mental content, and finally localized thought to the central nervous system - laying the foundations for a protoscience of spontaneous thought. But enormous questions still loom: what, exactly, is spontaneous thought? Why does our brain engage in spontaneous forms of thinking, and when is this most likely to occur? And perhaps the question most interesting and accessible from a scientific perspective: how does the brain generate and evaluate its own spontaneous creations? Spontaneous thought includes our daytime fantasies and mind-wandering; the flashes of insight and inspiration familiar to the artist, scientist, and inventor; and the nighttime visions we call dreams. This Handbook brings together views from neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, phenomenology, history, education, contemplative traditions, and clinical practice to begin to address the ubiquitous but poorly understood mental phenomena that we collectively call 'spontaneous thought.' In studying such an abstruse and seemingly impractical subject, we should remember that our capacity for spontaneity, originality, and creativity defines us as a species - and as individuals. Spontaneous forms of thought enable us to transcend not only the here and now of perceptual experience, but also the bonds of our deliberately-controlled and goal-directed cognition; they allow the space for us to be other than who we are, and for our minds to think beyond the limitations of our current viewpoints and beliefs.

Emotions and Affect in Human Factors and Human–Computer Interaction is a complete guide for conducting affect-related research and design projects in H/F and HCI domains. Introducing necessary concepts, methods, approaches, and applications, the book highlights how critical emotions and affect are to everyday life and interaction with cognitive artifacts. The text covers the basis of neural mechanisms of affective phenomena, as well as representative approaches to Affective Computing, Kansei Engineering, Hedonomics, and Emotional Design. The methodologies section includes affect induction techniques, measurement techniques, detection and recognition techniques, and regulation models and strategies. The application chapters discuss various H/F and HCI domains: product design, human–robot interaction, behavioral health and game design, and transportation. Engineers and designers can learn and apply psychological theories and mechanisms to account for their affect-related research and can develop their own domain-specific theory. The approach outlined in this handbook works to close the existing gap between the traditional affect research and the emerging field of affective design and affective computing. - Provides a theoretical background of affective sciences - Demonstrates diverse affect induction methods in actual research settings - Describes sensing technologies, such as brain–computer interfaces, facial expression detection, and more - Covers emotion modeling and its application to regulation processes - Includes case studies and applied examples in a variety of H/F and HCI application areas - Addresses emerging interdisciplinary areas including Positive Technology, Subliminal Perception, Physiological Computing, and Aesthetic Computing

An argument for a Copernican revolution in our consideration of mental features—a shift in which the world-brain problem supersedes the mind-body problem. Philosophers have long debated the mind-body problem—whether to attribute such mental features as consciousness to mind or to body. Meanwhile, neuroscientists search for empirical answers, seeking neural correlates for consciousness, self, and free will. In this book, Georg Northoff does not propose new solutions to the mind-body problem; instead, he questions the problem itself, arguing that it is an empirically, ontologically, and conceptually implausible way to address the existence and reality of mental features. We are better off, he contends, by addressing consciousness and other mental features in terms of the relationship between world and brain; philosophers should consider the world-brain problem rather than the mind-body problem. This calls for a Copernican shift in vantage point—from within the mind or brain to beyond the brain—in our consideration of mental features. Northoff, a neuroscientist, psychiatrist, and philosopher, explains that empirical evidence suggests that the brain's spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure are central to aligning and integrating the brain within the world. This spatiotemporal structure allows the brain to extend beyond itself into body and world, creating the “world-brain relation” that is central to mental features. Northoff makes his argument in empirical, ontological, and epistemic-methodological terms. He discusses current models of the brain and applies these models to recent data on neuronal features underlying consciousness and proposes the world-brain relation as the ontological predisposition for consciousness.

This volume contains papers that deal with the structure and functions of the human prefrontal cortex, including a review of recent work on its neuroanatomy, neurochemistry, neural development and degeneration, and neuropsychology. In addition, papers focus on novel and competing theories of human prefrontal cortical functions, utilising convergent evidence from the fields of comparative neuropsychology, cognitive sciences, artificial intelligence, neuropsychiatry, and cognitive neuropsychology. The book provides a broad overview on the subject of the human prefrontal cortex and integration of human prefrontal cortical functioning, and offer in-depth comparisons of alternative testable theories of human prefrontal cortical functions.

What is Thinking? – Trying to Define an Equally Fascinating and Elusive Phenomenon Human thinking is probably the most complex phenomenon that evolution has come up with until now. There exists a broad spectrum of definitions, from subs- ing almost all processes of cognition to limiting it to language-based, sometimes even only to formalizable reasoning processes. We work with a “medium sized” definition according to which thinking encompasses all operations by which cog- tive agents link mental content in order to gain new insights or perspectives. Mental content is, thus, a prerequisite for and the substrate on which thinking operations are executed. The largely unconscious acts of perceptual object stabilization, ca- gorization, emotional evaluation – and retrieving all the above from memory inscriptions – are the processes by which mental content is generated, and are, therefore, seen as prerequisites for thinking operations. In terms of a differentia specifica, the notion of “thinking” is seen as narrower than the notion of “cognition” and as wider than the notion of “reasoning”. Thinking is, thus, seen as a subset of cognition processes; and reasoning processes are seen as a subset of thinking. Besides reasoning, the notion of thinking includes also nonexplicit, intuitive, and associative processes of linking mental content. According to this definition, thinking is not dependant on language, i. e. also many animals and certainly all mammals show early forms of thinking.