A collection of leading models of how the human brain encodes for the memory of the items that surround us.

A mechanistic theory of the representation and use of semantic knowledge that uses distributed connectionist networks as a starting point for a psychological theory of semantic cognition.

The advent of modern investigative techniques to explore brain function has led to major advances in understanding the neural organization and mechanisms associated with semantic memory. This book presents current theories by leading experts in the field on how the human nervous system stores and recalls memory of objects, actions, words and events. Chapters range from models of a specific domain or memory system (e.g., lexical-semantic, sensorimotor, emotion) to multiple modality accounts; from encompassing memory representations, to processing modules, to network structures, focusing on studies of both normal individuals and those with brain disease. Recent advances in neuro-exploratory techniques allow for investigation of semantic memory mechanisms noninvasively in both normal healthy individuals and patients with diffuse or focal brain damage. This has resulted in a significant increase in findings relevant to the localization and mechanistic function of brain regions engaged in semantic memory, leading to the neural models included here.

Humans have a unique ability to understand the beliefs, emotions, and intentions of others—a capacity often referred to as mentalizing. Much research in psychology and neuroscience has focused on delineating the mechanisms of mentalizing, and examining the role of mentalizing processes in other domains of cognitive and affective functioning. The purpose of the book is to provide a comprehensive overview of the current research on the mechanisms of mentalizing at the neural, algorithmic, and computational levels of analysis. The book includes contributions from prominent researchers in the field of social-cognitive and affective neuroscience, as well as from related disciplines (e.g., cognitive, social, developmental and clinical psychology, psychiatry, philosophy, primatology). The contributors review their latest research in order to compile an authoritative source of knowledge on the psychological and brain bases of the unique human capacity to think about the mental states of others. The intended audience is researchers and students in the fields of social-cognitive and affective neuroscience and related disciplines such as neuroeconomics, cognitive neuroscience, developmental neuroscience, social cognition, social psychology, developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, and affective science. Secondary audiences include researchers in decision science (economics, judgment and decision-making), philosophy of mind, and psychiatry.

Semantic priming - the improvement in speed or accuracy to respond to a word when it is preceded by a semantically related word - is addressed in this volume, which provides a succinct and in-depth overview of this important phenomenon.

Handbook of Categorization in Cognitive Science, Second Edition presents the study of categories and the process of categorization as viewed through the lens of the founding disciplines of the cognitive sciences, and how the study of categorization has long been at the core of each of these disciplines. The literature on categorization reveals there is a plethora of definitions, theories, models and methods to apprehend this central object of study. The contributions in this handbook reflect this diversity. For example, the notion of category is not uniform across these contributions, and there are multiple definitions of the notion of concept. Furthermore, the study of category and categorization is approached differently within each discipline. For some authors, the categories themselves constitute the object of study, whereas for others, it is the process of categorization, and for others still, it is the technical manipulation of large chunks of information. Finally, yet another contrast has to do with the biological versus artificial nature of agents or categorizers. - Defines notions of category and categorization - Discusses the nature of categories: discrete, vague, or other - Explores the modality effects on categories - Bridges the category divide - calling attention to the bridges that have already been built, and avenues for further cross-fertilization between disciplines

The issues of mental causation, consciousness, and free will have vexed philosophers since Plato. This book examines these unresolved issues from a neuroscientific perspective. In contrast with philosophers who use logic rather than data to argue whether mental causation or consciousness can exist given unproven first assumptions, Tse proposes that we instead listen to what neurons have to say. Because the brain must already embody a solution to the mind--body problem, why not focus on how the brain actually realizes mental causation? Tse draws on exciting recent neuroscientific data concerning how informational causation is realized in physical causation at the level of NMDA receptors, synapses, dendrites, neurons, and neuronal circuits. He argues that a particular kind of strong free will and downward mental causation are realized in rapid synaptic plasticity. Recent neurophysiological breakthroughs reveal that neurons function as criterial assessors of their inputs, which then change the criteria that will make other neurons fire in the future. Such informational causation cannot change the physical basis of information realized in the present, but it can change the physical basis of information that may be realized in the immediate future. This gets around the standard argument against free will centered on the impossibility of self-causation. Tse explores the ways that mental causation and qualia might be realized in this kind of neuronal and associated information-processing architecture, and considers the psychological and philosophical implications of having such an architecture realized in our brains.