The G-20 Data Gaps Initiative has called for the IMF to develop standard measures of tail risk, which we identify in this paper with systemic risk. To understand the conditions under which tail risk is present, it is first necessary to develop a measure of what constitutes a systemic stress, or tail, event. We develop such a measure and uses it to assess the performance of eleven near-term systemic risk indicators as ‘early’ warning of distress among top financial institutions in the United States and the euro area. Two indicators perform particularly well in both regions, and a couple of other simple indicators do well across a number of criteria. We also find that the sizes of institutions do not necessarily correspond with their contribution to spillover risk. Some practical guidance for policies is provided.

The G-20 Data Gaps Initiative has called for the IMF to develop standard measures of tail risk, which we identify in this paper with systemic risk. To understand the conditions under which tail risk is present, it is first necessary to develop a measure of what constitutes a systemic stress, or tail, event. We develop such a measure and uses it to assess the performance of eleven near-term systemic risk indicators as ‘early’ warning of distress among top financial institutions in the United States and the euro area. Two indicators perform particularly well in both regions, and a couple of other simple indicators do well across a number of criteria. We also find that the sizes of institutions do not necessarily correspond with their contribution to spillover risk. Some practical guidance for policies is provided.

In April 2010 Europe was shocked by the Greek financial turmoil. At that time, the global financial crisis, which started in the summer of 2007 and reached systemic dimensions in September 2008 with the Lehman Brothers' crash, took a new course. An adverse feedback loop between sovereign and bank risks reflected into bubble-like spreads, as if financial markets had received a wake-up call concerning the disregarded structural vulnerability of economies at risk.These events inspired the SYRTO project to "think and rethink the economic and financial system and to conceive it as an "ensemble of Sovereigns and Banks with other Financial Intermediaries and Corporations. Systemic Risk Tomography: Signals, Measurement and Transmission Channels proposes a novel way to explore the financial system by sectioning each part of it and analyzing all relevant inter-relationships. The financial system is inspected as a biological entity to identify the main risk signals and to provide the correct measures of prevention and intervention. - Explores the economic and financial system of Sovereigns, Banks, other Financial Intermediaries, and Corporations - Presents the financial system as a biological entity to be explored in order to identify the main risk signals and provide the right measures of prevention and interventions - Offers a new, systemic-based approach to construct a hierarchical, internally coherent framework to be used in developing an effective early warning system

There has recently been a proliferation of new quantitative tools as part of various initiatives to improve the monitoring of systemic risk. The "SysMo" project takes stock of the current toolkit used at the IMF for this purpose. It offers detailed and practical guidance on the use of current systemic risk monitoring tools on the basis of six key questions policymakers are likely to ask. It provides "how-to" guidance to select and interpret monitoring tools; a continuously updated inventory of key categories of tools ("Tools Binder"); and suggestions on how to operationalize systemic risk monitoring, including through a systemic risk "Dashboard." In doing so, the project cuts across various country-specific circumstances and makes a preliminary assessment of the adequacy and limitations of the current toolkit.

This technical note discusses significance of macroprudential policies for Denmark. Macroprudential policy seeks to contain the buildup of macrofinancial imbalances associated with credit booms and asset price bubbles, a function which is particularly important in Denmark, where the space for monetary policy action is limited. This note provides an analysis of existing frameworks used in Denmark for identifying systemic risk of both structural and cyclical nature. The note also suggests additional tools that the authorities could use to further enhance their capacity to evaluate systemic risks.

This note covers considerations that can guide the staff’s policy advice on the use of a broad range of macroprudential tools. It discusses the transmission and likely effectiveness of these tools in mitigating systemic risks and the set of indicators that can be used in surveillance to assess the need for changes in macroprudential policy settings. This note is a supplement to the Staff Guidance Note on Macroprudential Policy.

The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) was proposed by the Basel committee to increase the resilience of the banking sector to negative shocks. The interactions between banking sector losses and the real economy highlight the importance of building a capital buffer in periods when systemic risks are rising. Basel III introduces a framework for a time-varying capital buffer on top of the minimum capital requirement and another time-invariant buffer (the conservation buffer). The CCB aims to make banks more resilient against imbalances in credit markets and thereby enhance medium-term prospects of the economy—in good times when system-wide risks are growing, the regulators could impose the CCB which would help the banks to withstand losses in bad times.