Includes The First World War At Sea Illustrations Pack with 189 maps, plans, and photos. Although written under anonymously, the writer of the famous quartet of famous First World War sea-reportage novels, was identified as Rev. Montague T. Hainsselin. He was appointed to the chaplaincy of the Royal Navy in 1903, although he had been almost born into the Navy having raised in Plymouth. He served on many ships in his long career, from battlecruisers to the huge superdreadnoughts in the Mediterranean, Home and Channel Fleets. During the First World War he served in the Home Fleet based in Scapa Floe and was present at the only major sea-battle of the war at Jutland. Few men were been appointed so well as the Chaplain to report the inner workings of the Royal Navy from the lowliest stoker in the boiler room to the officers commanding entire behemoths of steel. Observant and witty, Rev. Hainsselin offers a view of the Royal Navy at War that has rarely been surpassed. Reviews of IN THE NORTHERN MISTS “Nothing, so far as one can remember, gives as good an idea as this book does of life in the Royal Navy in time of war.”—World. “Full of intimate touches, and full of good stories of quarter-deck and lower-deck.... The Padre is a man of infinite humour, as all truly religious men are. There is not a line of preaching in his book, an there is many a good yarn, but, for all that, it is a good book, it is a book of manliness and cleanliness and godliness. Read his one little incursion into religion, ‘Strad Cords,’ and you will love him for a practical muscular Christian.”—Daily Express. “The unnamed Padre ... tells us a great deal about the little ways of the Services, the psychology of its members, and the spirit that animates them; and always in a style so entertaining as well as sympathetic that these pages from his note-hook should prove one of the most popular and appreciated of books that the war has directly or indirectly inspired.”—Scotsman.

This is the history of the founding in 1882 and operation through two world wars of America's first permanent intelligence agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence. In this study Dr. Jeffery M. Dorwart shows how and why a tiny late 19th century U.S. Navy bureau created to collect information about foreign warship design became during two world wars a complex and sometimes troubled domestic and worldwide intelligence agency. More significantly, this history of O.N.I. demonstrates how the founders and first generations of U.S. naval officers trained to man warships at sea confronted what seemed an inherent dilemma in new missions that interfered with providing technical and operational information to their navy. Dorwart explains the forces that created this dilemma and how ONI officers responded in different ways to their intelligence mission. This history recounts how from the very beginning ONI duty during the last decades of the 19th century seemed conflicting. Some found the new assignment very rewarding in collecting and collating data for the U.S. to build a "New Navy" of steel and steam-powered warships armed with the latest rifled ordnance. But other naval officers saw assignment to this tiny office as a monotonous dead-end assignment endangering their careers as shipboard operators. Dorwart shows how the first and second world wars and interwar period dramatically accelerated the naval intelligence office's dilemma. The threats in both oceans from powerful enemy navies equipped with the latest technology and weaponry gave an urgency to the collection of information on the strategies, warships, submarines, and aircraft development of potential and actual naval enemies. But at the same time ONI was asked to provide information of possible domestic threats from suspected enemy spies, terrorists, saboteurs or anti-war opponents. This led ONI officers to wiretap, break and enter, pursue surveillance of all types of people from foreign agents to Americans suspected of opposition to strengthening the U.S. Navy or becoming involved in world wars. This history explains that many ONI directors and officers were highly motivated to collect as much information as possible about the naval-military capabilities and strategies of Germany, Italy, Japan, and even allies. ONI officers understood that code-breaking was part of their job as well. But this all led some to become deeply involved in domestic spying, wiretapping, breaking and entering on private property. These extralegal and at times illegal operations, Dorwart argues, confused some ONI officers, leading to too much information that clouded vital intelligence such as Japanese plans to attack American naval bases. In the end, this study demonstrates the dilemma confronted between 1882 and 1945 by dedicated U.S. naval officers attached to or collecting information worldwide for the Office of Naval Intelligence.

An acclaimed military historian examines the vital role of British naval intelligence from the mid-nineteenth century to the end of the Cold War. In this comprehensive account, Andrew Boyd brings a critical new dimension to our understanding of British naval intelligence. From the capture of Napoleons signal codes to the satellite-based systems of the Cold War era, he provides a coherent and reliable overview while setting his subject in the larger context of the British state. It is a fascinating study of how naval needs and personalities shaped the British intelligence community that exists today. Boyd explains why and how intelligence was collected and assesses its real impact on policy and operations. Though he confirms that naval intelligence was critical to Britains victory in both World Wars, he significantly reappraises its role in each. He reveals that coverage of Germany before 1914 and of the three Axis powers in the interwar period was more comprehensive and effective than previously suggested; and while British power declined rapidly after 1945, the book shows how intelligence helped the Royal Navy to remain a significant global force for the rest of the twentieth century.

An instant bestseller when it was first published in 1946, this memoir recounts the author's nearly forty years of service in naval intelligence, beginning in 1908. One of the first to venture into the realm of psychological warfare, Ellis Zacharias was awarded the Legion of Merit with two gold stars for his contributions. Among the highlights of his impressive career was the role he played in convincing the Japanese to accept surrender in 1945, a subject he deals with in fascinating detail in this book. Zacharias gives readers access to rare psychological profiles that he prepared for the Office of Naval Intelligence on leading political and military figures in Japan. His book also recounts his exploits as a young naval attaché with the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo in the early 1920s. In the early months of the war readers join him in the thick of combat in the Pacific, first aboard a cruiser under his command and later in a battleship. Of particular interest are descriptions of his one-man radio broadcasts beamed at Japan between V-E and V-J days that received kudos from Adm. Ernest J. King for helping bring about the surrender.

This unique reference presents 59 biographies of people who were key to the sea services being reasonably prepared to fight the Japanese Empire when the Second World War broke out, and whose advanced work proved crucial. These intelligence pioneers invented techniques, procedures, and equipment from scratch, not only allowing the United States to hold its own in the Pacific despite the loss of most of its Fleet at Pearl Harbor, but also laying the foundation of today’s intelligence methods and agencies. One-hundred years ago, in what was clearly an unsophisticated pre-information era, naval intelligence (and foreign intelligence in general) existed in rudimentary forms almost incomprehensible to us today. Founded in 1882, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)—the modern world’s “oldest continuously operating intelligence agency”—functioned for at least its first forty years with low manning, small budgets, low priority, and no prestige. The navy’s early steps into communications intelligence (COMINT), which included activities such as radio interception, radio traffic analysis, and cryptology, came with the 1916 establishment of the Code and Signals Section within the navy’s Division of Communications and with the 1924 creation of the “Research Desk” as part of the Section. Like ONI, this COMINT organization suffered from low budgets, manning, priority, and prestige. The dictionary focuses on these pioneers, many of whom went on, even after World War II, to important positions in the Navy, the State Department, the Armed Forces Security Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. It reveals the work and innovations of well and lesser-known individuals who created the foundations of today’s intelligence apparatus and analysis.

In his November 19, 2005 presidential address, President George W. Bush summarized U.S. military policy as, "Our situation can be summed up this way: as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." EMBEDDED offers a firsthand account by a young Marine military advisor serving on the frontlines with the Iraqi Army of the effectiveness of America's efforts to help the Iraqis stand on their own. As a Division I track athlete and a magna cum laude graduate of the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School, Wes Gray was given a full scholarship to the Ph.D. program in finance at the University of Chicago, the top ranked program in the world. However, after passing his comprehensive exams and while weighing offers from Wall Street, he had an epiphany: the right thing to do before taking on the challenges of the business world was to serve his nation and fulfill a lifelong dream of becoming a United States Marine. In 2006, 1st. Lt. Gray was deployed as a Marine Corps military advisor to live and fight with an Iraqi Army battalion for two hundred and ten days in the Haditha Triad, a small population center in the dangerous and austere al-Anbar Province of western Iraq.What he encountered was an insurgent fire pit recently traumatized by the infamous “Haditha Massacre,” in which 24 Iraqi civilians – men, women and children – were shot at close range by U.S. Marines at close range in retaliation for the death of a Marine lance corporal in a roadside bombing. Despite the tensions triggered by the shootings, Gray was able to form a bond with the Iraqi soldiers because he had an edge that very few U.S. service members possess 3⁄4 the ability to communicate because of his proficiency in Iraqi Arabic. His language skills and deep understanding of Iraqi culture were quickly recognized by the Iraqi soldiers who considered him an Arab brother and fondly named him “Jamal.” By the end of his advisor tour, he was a legend within the Iraqi Army. During his time in Iraq, Wes kept a detailed record of his observations, experiences, and interviews with Iraqi citizens and soldiers in vivid and brutally honest detail. Ranging from tension filled skirmishes against the insurgents to insights into the dichotomy between American and Iraqi cultures, he offers a comprehensive portrait of Iraq and the struggles of its people and soldiers to stand up and make their country a nation once again. His book is a Marine intelligence officer’s compelling report about the status and prospects of America's strategy for success in Iraq.