Americans think of the Korean War as death and hardship in the bitter hills of Korea. It was certainly this, and for those who fought this is what they generally saw. Yet every foot of the struggles forward, every step of the retreats, the overwhelming victories, the withdrawals and last ditch stands had their seagoing support and overtones. The spectacular ones depended wholly on amphibious power -- the capability of the twentieth century scientific Navy to overwhelm land-bound forces at the point of contact. Yet the all pervading influence of the sea was present even when no major landing or retirement or reinforcement highlighted its effect. When navies clash in gigantic battle or hurl troops ashore under irresistible concentration of ship-borne guns and planes, nations understand that sea power is working. It is not so easy to understand that this tremendous force may effect its will silently, steadily, irresistibly even though no battles occur. No clearer example exists of this truth in wars dark record than in Korea. Communist-controlled North Korea had slight power at sea except for Soviet mines. So beyond this strong underwater phase the United States Navy and allies had little opposition on the water. It is, therefore, easy to fail to recognize the decisive role navies played in this war fought without large naval battles.

This book is a long-term study of organisational capabilities as parts of early modern state formation. Sweden was a largely non-maritime society which nevertheless maintained a large navy as part of the armed forces which created a Baltic empire. Many of the resources came from the peasant society which was exploited in an entrepreneurial fashion by a highly ambitious dynasty. For a long time Sweden was organisationally more advanced than its neighbours but the empire ceased to grow and finally collapsed when other Northern powers developed strong states. The book provides detailed information about the strength of the navy in terms of warships, equipment, guns and men and it relates changes in size and structure to changes in policy.