Terrorism is a psychological weapon; by definition its purpose is to spread terror or fear in order to achieve goals unattainable by more conventional means. It is a weapon of asymmetric warfare whose success or failure is entirely dependent on the psychological reactions of its targets. Despite this, interest in the effects of terrorism from a behavioral and psychological perspective is relatively recent, dating initially from the 1990s and boosted by the events of September 11th 2001. This book presents papers delivered at the NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) Risk Management of Terrorism Induced Stress – Guidelines for the Golden Hours (Who, What and When) held in Odesa, Ukraine, from 16-19 September 2018. The aim of the workshop was to bring together experts from the military, science and policy to revisit old guidelines and inform new research into novel approaches. The focus of the workshop was the so-called ‘Golden Hours’; the period immediately following a traumatic event in which therapeutic interventions are thought to have the most impact. What needs to be done in the immediate aftermath of terror, who is vulnerable and who is resilient, and when is intervention appropriate? The book is divided into sections covering the areas of biology, interventions, special populations, additional perspectives, policy, déjà-vu and future directions. Providing a comprehensive overview of the management of terror-related stress, the book will be of interest to planners and policy makers, as well as mental health professionals working with PTSD and other consequences of terror events.

This book offers a thorough appraisal of Operation Allied Force, NATO's 78-day air war to compel the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, to end his campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The author sheds light both on the operation's strengths and on its most salient weaknesses. He outlines the key highlights of the air war and examines the various factors that interacted to induce Milosevic to capitulate when he did. He then explores air power's most critical accomplishments in Operation Allied Force as well as the problems that hindered the operation both in its planning and in its execution. Finally, he assesses Operation Allied Force from a political and strategic perspective, calling attention to those issues that are likely to have the greatest bearing on future military policymaking. The book concludes that the air war, although by no means the only factor responsible for the allies' victory, certainly set the stage for Milosevic's surrender by making it clear that he had little to gain by holding out. It concludes that in the end, Operation Allied Force's most noteworthy distinction may lie in the fact that the allies prevailed despite the myriad impediments they faced.

In this new Brookings Marshall Paper, Michael O'Hanlon argues that now is the time for Western nations to negotiate a new security architecture for neutral countries in eastern Europe to stabilize the region and reduce the risks of war with Russia. He believes NATO expansion has gone far enough. The core concept of this new security architecture would be one of permanent neutrality. The countries in question collectively make a broken-up arc, from Europe's far north to its south: Finland and Sweden; Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and finally Cyprus plus Serbia, as well as possibly several other Balkan states. Discussion on the new framework should begin within NATO, followed by deliberation with the neutral countries themselves, and then formal negotiations with Russia. The new security architecture would require that Russia, like NATO, commit to help uphold the security of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other states in the region. Russia would have to withdraw its troops from those countries in a verifiable manner; after that, corresponding sanctions on Russia would be lifted. The neutral countries would retain their rights to participate in multilateral security operations on a scale comparable to what has been the case in the past, including even those operations that might be led by NATO. They could think of and describe themselves as Western states (or anything else, for that matter). If the European Union and they so wished in the future, they could join the EU. They would have complete sovereignty and self-determination in every sense of the word. But NATO would decide not to invite them into the alliance as members. Ideally, these nations would endorse and promote this concept themselves as a more practical way to ensure their security than the current situation or any other plausible alternative.