"The NATO-Russian relations remain to be one of the major strands of global security in the twenty-first century. Given the more complex threats to global security today, the rising energy demand and dependency of Europe, and increasing foreign trade between the parties, Russia's relations with the West, as a major fossil-fuel exporter and nuclear country, have become increasingly important. The new security environment of post-September 11 has prepared a common ground for a closer partnership between old enemies. However, the attempts from both sides have been unable to move beyond a certain level of cooperation. This thesis presents an analysis as to the likelihood of a true NATO-Russia strategic partnership by exploring the perspectives of Russia and NATO, long standing obstacles and differences, and opportunities in the twenty-first century. It seeks to answer the broad question of whether it is possible for Russia and NATO to make a clean sweep of lingering legacies of deep-seated antagonism and distrust, move beyond cultural, religious, and historical differences, and lay the foundations of a healthy lasting partnership"--Abstract.

The NATO-Russian relations remain to be one of the major strands of global security in the twenty-first century. Given the more complex threats to global security today, the rising energy demand and dependency of Europe, andincreasing foreign trade between the parties, Russia's relations with the West, as a major fossil-fuel exporter and nuclear country, have become increasingly important. The new security environment of post--September 11 hasprepared a common ground for a closer partnership between old enemies. However, the attempts from both sides have been unable to move beyond a certain level of cooperation. This thesis presents an analysis as to the likelihood of a true NATO-Russia strategic partnership by exploring the perspectives of Russia and NATO, long standing obstacles and differences, and opportunities in the twenty-first century. It seeks to answer the broad question of whether it is possible for Russia and NATO to make a clean sweep of lingering legacies of deep-seated antagonism and distrust, move beyond cultural, religious, and historical differences, and lay the foundations of a healthy lasting partnership.

Since the end of the Cold War NATO has redefined its raison d’etre, extending its membership, broadening its political goals and widening its zone of operation. It has also sought to enhance its co-operation with Russia, for example through the NATO-Russia Council, though moves here have coincided with factors which make co-operation more difficult, such as growing uncertainty about the transition to democracy in Russia, a feeling among some people in Russia that NATO enlargement and the simultaneous diminution of Russia’s influence were related, and, more recently, Russia’s attempts to reassert its influence over its neighbouring states. This book examines the current state of relations between NATO and Russia, examining a number of key areas, and assesses the prospects for future development. It concludes that all parties have a powerful interest in building and maintaining security, and that the growth of the zone of democracy holds out the best hope for solving some of Russia’s most seminal security concerns.

There has never been a more important time to understand Russia's relationship with Europe and it is the subsequent sense of unease both in Russia and Europe which provides the focus for this investigation and which will make it of use to specialist and general readers alike.

How and why did NATO, a Cold War military alliance created in 1949 to counter Stalin's USSR, become the cornerstone of new security order for post-Cold War Europe? Why, instead of retreating from Europe after communism's collapse, did the U.S. launch the greatest expansion of the American commitment to the old continent in decades? Written by a high-level insider, Opening NATO's Door provides a definitive account of the ideas, politics, and diplomacy that went into the historic decision to expand NATO to Central and Eastern Europe. Drawing on the still-classified archives of the U.S. Department of State, Ronald D. Asmus recounts how and why American policy makers, against formidable odds at home and abroad, expanded NATO as part of a broader strategy to overcome Europe's Cold War divide and to modernize the Alliance for a new era. Asmus was one of the earliest advocates and intellectual architects of NATO enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism in the early 1990s and subsequently served as a top aide to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, responsible for European security issues. He was involved in the key negotiations that led to NATO's decision to extend invitations to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and finally, the U.S. Senate's ratification of enlargement. Asmus documents how the Clinton Administration sought to develop a rationale for a new NATO that would bind the U.S. and Europe together as closely in the post-Cold War era as they had been during the fight against communism. For the Clinton Administration, NATO enlargement became the centerpiece of a broader agenda to modernize the U.S.-European strategic partnership for the future. That strategy reflected an American commitment to the spread of democracy and Western values, the importance attached to modernizing Washington's key alliances for an increasingly globalized world, and the fact that the Clinton Administration looked to Europe as America's natural partner in addressing the challenges of the twenty-first century. As the Alliance weighs its the future following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. and prepares for a second round of enlargement, this book is required reading about the first post-Cold War effort to modernize NATO for a new era.

A gripping account of U.S.-Russian relations since the end of the Soviet Union The Limits of Partnership offers a riveting narrative on U.S.-Russian relations since the Soviet collapse and on the challenges ahead. It reflects the unique perspective of an insider who is also recognized as a leading expert on this troubled relationship. American presidents have repeatedly attempted to forge a strong and productive partnership only to be held hostage to the deep mistrust born of the Cold War. For the United States, Russia remains a priority because of its nuclear weapons arsenal, its strategic location bordering Europe and Asia, and its ability to support—or thwart—American interests. Why has it been so difficult to move the relationship forward? What are the prospects for doing so in the future? Is the effort doomed to fail again and again? Angela Stent served as an adviser on Russia under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, and maintains close ties with key policymakers in both countries. Here, she argues that the same contentious issues—terrorism, missile defense, Iran, nuclear proliferation, Afghanistan, the former Soviet space, the greater Middle East—have been in every president's inbox, Democrat and Republican alike, since the collapse of the USSR. Stent vividly describes how Clinton and Bush sought inroads with Russia and staked much on their personal ties to Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin—only to leave office with relations at a low point—and how Barack Obama managed to restore ties only to see them undermined by a Putin regime resentful of American dominance and determined to restore Russia's great power status. The Limits of Partnership calls for a fundamental reassessment of the principles and practices that drive U.S.-Russian relations, and offers a path forward to meet the urgent challenges facing both countries.

"NATO and Russia are developing a new relationship as a critical part of integrating Russia into the West. The allies and Russia will meet together as equals in a NATO-Russia Council-to consult, cooperate, and, in some critical areas, decide on common action. The authors of this report, with a wealth of academic and senior government experience in the United States and Russia, argue that action-what NATO and Russia actually do together-is more important than "architecture," that is, how the new Council is constructed and operates. Despite continuing differences (e.g., on NATO enlargement) the authors argue that NATO-Russian relations can and should be organized to promote greater stability, take into account other European states' interests, promote joint decisionmaking, and pursue a practical agenda of common tasks both in Europe and beyond. NATO and Russia should immediately begin modest "demonstration projects," using early successes to promote future cooperation. Efforts should be in areas where NATO and Russia have shared interests, including aspects of counterterrorism, emergency response, nonproliferation, peacekeeping (including doctrine and exercises), and military exchanges."--Rand abstracts.