This is the first comprehensive analysis ever of the build-up of NATO's defence of the Baltic Approaches during the Cold War, including war plans and exercise reports, emphasizing the perspective of the miilitary actors rather than their political masters' views. The overall theme is the creation of tactics for littoral warfare - war in confined waters as opposed to the more common blue ocean perspective. The research regards how NATO perceived the goals of the enemy; what the purposes were of the NATO organisations, what military instruments they had to organise, how cooperation was organised among units from sovereign states, and how they tested their military capabilities. The book analyses war plans and tactics of the Danish and West German navies and their planned support from air forces. We follow the modernisations of the navies from guns to missiles. Tactical discussions among military top officers are laid bare, and intelligence reports about the Warsaw Pact and its military capabiliities are presented. Exercises are analysed based on the military reports. The book is a must for any one interested in the tactical considerations of military leaders, the details of war planning, and the evaluations of the military capability.

The theme of the book is the creation of tactics for littoral warfare – as opposed to the more common blue ocean perspective. Themes are how NATO perceived the goals of the enemy; the purposes of the NATO organisations, the military instruments they had to organise, the organization of cooperation among units from sovereign states, and how they tested their military capabilities. Research is based on war plans and tactics of the Danish and West German navies and their planned support from air forces. We follow the modernisations of the navies from guns to missiles. Tactical discussions among military top offi cers are laid bare, and intelligence reports about the Warsaw Pact and its military capabilities are presented. Exercises are analysed based on the military reports.

This book explores the evolution and future relevance of NATO from the perspective of the member-states. Addressing the overarching question of the relevance of transatlantic relations in the 21st century, the volume has three core objectives. The first is to reinforce the view that international alliances serve not only an external-oriented goal, but also a domestic-oriented aim, which is to control others’ behaviour. The second is to show that tensions amongst NATO allies have become more acute and, therefore, more dangerous. The third is to discuss current transatlantic relations through the adoption of a "second image" perspective; that is, one that emphasizes the multiple vertical linkages that connect NATO to the politics and the policies of each ally. The chapters presented here are built on a dual approach: on the one hand, they look at the place the Alliance occupies in the domestic public debate and the strategic culture of specific member states; on the other, they analyze how each of these countries contributes to NATO’s operations and what interests and visions they share for the Alliance’s future. This book will be of much interest to students of NATO, international organizations, foreign policy, and security studies in general.

In 1999 the EU decided to develop its own military capacities for crisis management. This book brings together a group of experts to examine the consequences of this decision on Nordic policy establishments, as well as to shed new light on the defence and security issues that matter for Europe as a whole.

In this new Brookings Marshall Paper, Michael O'Hanlon argues that now is the time for Western nations to negotiate a new security architecture for neutral countries in eastern Europe to stabilize the region and reduce the risks of war with Russia. He believes NATO expansion has gone far enough. The core concept of this new security architecture would be one of permanent neutrality. The countries in question collectively make a broken-up arc, from Europe's far north to its south: Finland and Sweden; Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and finally Cyprus plus Serbia, as well as possibly several other Balkan states. Discussion on the new framework should begin within NATO, followed by deliberation with the neutral countries themselves, and then formal negotiations with Russia. The new security architecture would require that Russia, like NATO, commit to help uphold the security of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other states in the region. Russia would have to withdraw its troops from those countries in a verifiable manner; after that, corresponding sanctions on Russia would be lifted. The neutral countries would retain their rights to participate in multilateral security operations on a scale comparable to what has been the case in the past, including even those operations that might be led by NATO. They could think of and describe themselves as Western states (or anything else, for that matter). If the European Union and they so wished in the future, they could join the EU. They would have complete sovereignty and self-determination in every sense of the word. But NATO would decide not to invite them into the alliance as members. Ideally, these nations would endorse and promote this concept themselves as a more practical way to ensure their security than the current situation or any other plausible alternative.