Contents: (1) The Need for a Nat. Strategy; Guiding Principles; Linkage with Other Nat. Strategies; (2) Background and the Current Environment: What Has Been Accomplished Since 9/11?; Continuing Challenges; Legislative and Regulatory Background; (3) Sharing Info. at the Fed. Level; (4) Sharing Info. with State and Local Gov¿ts.; Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group; State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers; (4) Sharing Info. with the Private Sector; (5) Sharing Info. with Foreign Partners; (6) Protecting Privacy and Other Legal Rights in the Sharing of Info.: Core Privacy Principles; Privacy Governance; (7) Institutionalizing the Strategy for Long-Term Success: Protecting the Info. Privacy and Legal Rights of Amer.

"Together we must affirm that domestic terrorism has no place in our society." -President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism (June 2021) National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism (June 2021) conveys the Biden Administration's view of domestic terrorism and strategy on how to deal with it. What is domestic terrorism? As defined by this report, it is based on a range of violent ideological motivations, including racial bigotry and anti-government feeling, and it can take several forms, from lone actors and small groups to violent militias.

Our success in preventing future terrorist attacks depends upon our ability to gather, analyze, and share information and intelligence regarding those who want to attack us, the tactics that they use, and the targets that they intend to attack. Improving information sharing in the post-September 11 world requires an environment that supports the sharing of information across all levels of government, disciplines, and security domains. While this Strategy describes the vision that has guided the Administration for the past six years, it also sets forth our plan to build upon progress and establish a more integrated information sharing capability to ensure that those who need information to protect our Nation from terrorism will receive it and those who have that information will share it. We will improve interagency information sharing at the Federal level, while building information sharing bridges between the Federal Government and our non-Federal partners. The National Strategy for Information Sharing takes its lead from the President's National Security Strategy, which provides the broad vision and goals for confronting the national security challenges of the 21st century. In addition, it is closely aligned with the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and the National Strategy for Homeland Security. This Strategy also supports and supplements the National Implementation Plan, which is the foundational document guiding the efforts of the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning in the National Counterterrorism Center. Finally, this Strategy aligns with the National Intelligence Strategy, published at Presidential direction by the Director of National Intelligence in October 2005. An information sharing framework is recognized as a critical component of intelligence reform in the National Intelligence Strategy.

Our success in preventing future terrorist attacks depends upon our ability to gather, analyze, and share information and intelligence regarding those who want to attack us, the tactics that they use, and the targets that they intend to attack. Our National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, issued in September 2006, recognizes that the War on Terror is a different kind of war, which requires a paradigm shift and the application of all elements of our national power and influence. The intelligence and information sharing structures that once enabled the winning of the Cold War now require greater flexibility and resilience to confront the threats facing our Nation from a transnational terrorist movement determined to destroy our people, our freedoms, and our way of life. For the past six years, this Administration has worked within the Federal Government, and with our State, local, tribal, private sector, and foreign partners to transform our policies, processes, procedures, and-most importantly-our workplace cultures to reinforce the imperative of improved information sharing. The exchange of information should be the rule, not the exception, in our efforts to combat the terrorist threat. Substantial improvements have occurred within individual agencies and disciplines, but there is still more to be done. Improving information sharing in the post-September 11 world requires an environment that supports the sharing of information across all levels of government, disciplines, and security domains. As with our achievements to date, an improved information sharing environment will not be constructed overnight, but rather will evolve over time and will be the fruit of careful cultivation. An improved information sharing environment also will be constructed upon a foundation of trusted partnerships among all levels of government, the private sector, and our foreign allies-partnerships based on a shared commitment to detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism. This Strategy sets forth the Administration's vision of what improvements are needed and how they can be achieved. The Strategy was developed with the understanding that homeland security information, terrorism information, and law enforcement information related to terrorism can come from multiple sources, all levels of government, as well as from private sector organizations and foreign sources. Federal, State, local, and tribal government organizations use such information for multiple purposes. In addition to traditional law enforcement uses, such information is used to (1) support efforts to prevent terrorist attacks, (2) develop critical infrastructure protection and resilience plans, (3) prioritize emergency management, response, and recovery planning activities, (4) devise training and exercise programs, and (5) determine the allocation of funding and other resources for homeland security-related purposes.

This intelligence guide was prepared in response to requests from law enforcement executives for guidance in intelligence functions in a post-September 11 world. It will help law enforcement agencies develop or enhance their intelligence capacity and enable them to fight terrorism and other crimes while preserving community policing relationships. The world of law enforcement intelligence has changed dramatically since September 11, 2001. State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have been tasked with a variety of new responsibilities; intelligence is just one. In addition, the intelligence discipline has evolved significantly in recent years. As these various trends have merged, increasing numbers of American law enforcement agencies have begun to explore, and sometimes embrace, the intelligence function. This guide is intended to help them in this process. The guide is directed primarily toward state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies of all sizes that need to develop or reinvigorate their intelligence function. Rather than being a manual to teach a person how to be an intelligence analyst, it is directed toward that manager, supervisor, or officer who is assigned to create an intelligence function. It is intended to provide ideas, definitions, concepts, policies, and resources. It is a primera place to start on a new managerial journey. Every law enforcement agency in the United States, regardless of agency size, must have the capacity to understand the implications of information collection, analysis, and intelligence sharing. Each agency must have an organized mechanism to receive and manage intelligence as well as a mechanism to report and share critical information with other law enforcement agencies. In addition, it is essential that law enforcement agencies develop lines of communication and information-sharing protocols with the private sector, particularly those related to the critical infrastructure, as well as with those private entities that are potential targets of terrorists and criminal enterprises. Not every agency has the staff or resources to create a formal intelligence unit, nor is it necessary in smaller agencies. This document will provide common language and processes to develop and employ an intelligence capacity in SLTLE agencies across the United States as well as articulate a uniform understanding of concepts, issues, and terminology for law enforcement intelligence (LEI). While terrorism issues are currently most pervasive in the current discussion of LEI, the principles of intelligence discussed in this document apply beyond terrorism and include organized crime and entrepreneurial crime of all forms. Drug trafficking and the associated crime of money laundering, for example, continue to be a significant challenge for law enforcement. Transnational computer crime, particularly Internet fraud, identity theft cartels, and global black marketeering of stolen and counterfeit goods, are entrepreneurial crime problems that are increasingly being relegated to SLTLE agencies to investigate simply because of the volume of criminal incidents. Similarly, local law enforcement is being increasingly drawn into human trafficking and illegal immigration enterprises and the often associated crimes related to counterfeiting of official documents, such as passports, visas, driver's licenses, Social Security cards, and credit cards. All require an intelligence capacity for SLTLE, as does the continuation of historical organized crime activities such as auto theft, cargo theft, and virtually any other scheme that can produce profit for an organized criminal entity. To be effective, the law enforcement community must interpret intelligence-related language in a consistent manner. In addition, common standards, policies, and practices will help expedite intelligence sharing while at the same time protecting the privacy of citizens and preserving hard-won community policing relationships.~

This paper, the Domestic Approach to National Intelligence, describes certain key roles and relationships that characterize efforts by members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and federal, state, local, tribal and territorial (FSLTT) government organizations to engage with one another to carry out the shared mission of protecting the homeland. These partners work with one another, and through established channels with the private sector (e.g., critical infrastructure owners and operators), as part of a complex web of relationships. Each partner, regardless of level, plays an important role in protecting the homeland with respect to warning, interdiction, prevention, mitigation, and response. The importance of partnerships and collaboration is emphasized in this paper, as is the IC's responsibility to the public to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Descriptions related to organizational responsibilities and/or authorities are provided by the respective agencies. The Domestic Approach to National Intelligence is consistent with the framework and recommendations outlined in the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council's (CICC) National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, the strategies in support of the National Network of Fusion Centers, and information sharing and safeguarding standards outlined by the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE). By describing these roles and relationships in one place, this paper strives to foster an important national dialogue that will promote a better understanding of how the IC engages with key partners in this domestic enterprise and supports the holistic ideals articulated by the Director of National intelligence (DNI).

This book is devoted primarily to papers prepared by American and Russian specialists on cyber terrorism and urban terrorism. It also includes papers on biological and radiological terrorism from the American and Russian perspectives. Of particular interest are the discussions of the hostage situation at Dubrovko in Moscow, the damge inflicted in New York during the attacks on 9/11, and Russian priorities in addressing cyber terrorism.