In this report the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy finds that the National Security Strategy should address more fundamental questions about the UK's role in the world and its relationship with the USA and other allies. The Strategy also needs to be subject to a much wider public debate. The Committee says that: there is no evidence that the NSS has influenced decisions made since the Strategic Defence and Security Review; there should be an "overarching strategy", a document designed to guide government decision-making and crisis management both at home and on the international stage; the Government's assertion that there will be no reduction in the UK's influence on the world stage is wholly unrealistic in the medium to long term and the UK needs to plan for a changing, and more partnership-dependent, role in the world. The Government's unwillingness to provide the Committee with all the information it has asked for about the National Security Risk Assessment means that it is unable to give Parliament any assurances about its adequacy. The report also notes concern that the National Security Council's oversight of security issues is not sufficiently broad and strategic, given that it was deeply involved in operations in Libya and failed to discuss the national security implications of the Eurozone crisis or the possibility of Scottish independence.

The Work Of The Joint Committee On The National Security Strategy In 2013-14 (HC 169, HL 1257) covers the work of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, which was established with a broad role; to consider the National Security Strategy. In practice, the Committee has considered not only the National Security Strategy (NSS) document 'A Strong Britain In An Age Of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy' published by the Government in 2010 (see below), but also the wider strategy that underlies government decision making on matters affecting national security. The report gives an account of activities over the past year, highlighting in particular the evidence session with the Prime Minister in January 2014; draws attention to areas of continuing concern; and outlines objectives for the remainder of the Parliament.

This report notes mounting concern that UK Armed Forces may be falling below the minimum utility required to deliver the commitments that they are currently being tasked to carry out let alone the tasks they are likely to face between 2015 to 2020 when it is acknowledged that there will be capability gaps. The Committee is concerned that UK Armed Forces will be continually operating at the maximum level envisaged by the Defence Planning Assumptions. The Committee is not convinced that this aspiration can be achieved by co-operation with our allies given the challenges of aligning political with operational needs. The SDSR identified seven military tasks and the Defence Planning Assumptions that underpin them. However the Review fails to show how decisions such as those on the Aircraft Carriers and Nimrod MRA4 will lead to the Armed Forces being able to undertake those military tasks. The Committee has serious concerns over the realisation of what is called "Future Force 2020", the Government's intended shape of the Armed Forces from 2020, particularly as the provision of the necessary resources is only a Government aspiration, not Government policy. The MoD must reform, and ensure substantially improved transparency and control over, its finance and budgetary practices. When committing to undertake new operations the Government should state from the outset where that operation fits in the Defence Planning Assumptions and which of the military tasks it is meeting. The Committee is concerned that the Government seems to have postponed the sensible aspiration of bringing commitments and resources into line, in that it has taken on the new commitment of Libya while reducing the resources available to MoD.

British leaders use spies and Special Forces to interfere in the affairs of others discreetly and deniably. Since 1945, MI6 has spread misinformation designed to divide and discredit targets from the Middle East to Eastern Europe and Northern Ireland. It has instigated whispering campaigns and planted false evidence on officials working behind the Iron Curtain, tried to foment revolution in Albania, blown up ships to prevent the passage of refugees to Israel, and secretly funnelled aid to insurgents in Afghanistan and dissidents in Poland. MI6 has launched cultural and economic warfare against Iceland and Czechoslovakia. It has tried to instigate coups in Congo, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and elsewhere. Through bribery and blackmail, Britain has rigged elections as colonies moved to independence. Britain has fought secret wars in Yemen, Indonesia, and Oman -- and discreetly used Special Forces to eliminate enemies from colonial Malaya to Libya during the Arab Spring. This is covert action: a vital, though controversial, tool of statecraft and perhaps the most sensitive of all government activity. If used wisely, it can play an important role in pursuing national interests in a dangerous world. If used poorly, it can cause political scandal -- or worse. In Disrupt and Deny, Rory Cormac tells the remarkable true story of Britain's secret scheming against its enemies, as well as its friends; of intrigue and manoeuvring within the darkest corridors of Whitehall, where officials fought to maintain control of this most sensitive and seductive work; and, above all, of Britain's attempt to use smoke and mirrors to mask decline. He reveals hitherto secret operations, the slush funds that paid for them, and the battles in Whitehall that shaped them.

A comprehensive, detailed and updated account of UK national security law in all its aspects, National Security Law, Procedure and Practice is the only book to collate and explain all the elements of law, both substantive and procedural, and the practical issues which may arise in national security litigation. The specialised nature of the subject makes this book a vital text, not only for those seeking an overview of national security law, but also for experienced practitioners instructed to act in proceedings in which national security issues may arise. The intense media and public scrutiny which accompanies many national security cases makes this book of interest to a wider audience seeking to understand the legal context of such cases. This new edition draws on the professional experience of a team of expert contributors and covers all recent legislation, case law and guidance. It provides a detailed explanation of the National Security Act 2023, which repeals and replaces the existing law relating to state threats. The new Act introduces significant new offences and executive powers, including the power to impose state threat prevention and investigation measures ('STPIMs'), and creates a new scheme for the registration of foreign political influence activities. The second edition also includes analysis of the landmark Supreme Court decision in Shamima Begum, which re-evaluates the respective roles of the government and the courts in national security matters and has ramifications throughout the work; a comprehensive explanation of the National Security and Investment Act 2021; a fully revised chapter on sanctions law; and an updated explanation of the continued impact of EU law on UK national security law. This second edition of National Security Law, Procedure and Practice will be an invaluable resource for judges, policymakers, legislators, oversight bodies, academic experts and students in a variety of legal fields.

This reports finds that the Coalition Government has developed in public a more mature and measured relationship with the US, although there has been no fundamental change in the nature of the tie. The Committee declares the relationship to be in good health. In particular, the Committee said that it was not aware of any evidence that the House of Commons vote in August 2013 against potential military action in Syria had damaged the UK's relationship with the US. Rather, the Committee concluded that the episode illustrated general features of the UK-US relationship, namely that developments in the UK could influence US policy; and that the underlying tie was resilient. Today's publication follows up a report produced by the previous Foreign Affairs Committee at the end of the last Parliament, which recommended that the UK Government should adopt a more hard-headed and less deferential approach to the US. The Coalition Government seemed to have taken up this recommendation. The Committee criticises the UK Government's poor provision of information about the UK-US Joint Strategy Board, which was created during President Obama's State Visit to the UK in May 2011. Among strategic issues that it considered, the Committee agreed with the Government that the proposed EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) could have significant positive strategic impact for the UK and the transatlantic relationship.

This is the first in-depth study of the foreign and defence policies of the Coalition, a government that saw the Conservatives restored to power for the first time since the Iraq War and the Liberal Democrats enter government for the first time. It explores the idea of Britain as a ‘Great Power’ since 1945 to show how the Coalition’s policies fitted into wider historical understandings of Britain’s role in the world. Drawing on a range of evidence from the time of the Coalition, it shows that this period was one of continued change in British foreign policy. The Coalition conducted the first strategic defence review since 1998, significantly reduced the funding allocations for defence and foreign affairs, raised overseas aid spending to record levels, engaged in overseas military action in two sovereign states (and were denied a chance to participate in another), as well as a wide array of other policies. This book argues that evaluating these events and the historical background of the Coalition is critical to understanding the current crises gripping British politics.