Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, NATO, the United Nations, and a range of other states and nongovernmental organizations have become increasingly involved in nation-building operations. Nation-building involves the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms, with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors. This guidebook is a practical ?how-to? manual on the conduct of effective nation-building. It is organized around the constituent elements that make up any nation-building mission: military, police, rule of law, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development. The chapters describe how each of these components should be organized and employed, how much of each is likely to be needed, and the likely cost. The lessons are drawn principally from 16 U.S.- and UN-led nation-building operations since World War II and from a forthcoming study on European-led missions. In short, this guidebook presents a comprehensive history of best practices in nation-building and serves as an indispensable reference for the preplanning of future interventions and for contingency planning on the ground.

Why do some countries remain poor and dysfunctional while others thrive and become affluent? The expert contributors to this volume seek to identify reasons why prosperity has increased rapidly in some countries but not others by constructing and comparing cases. The case studies focus on the processes of nation building, state building, and economic development in comparably situated countries over the past hundred years. Part I considers the colonial legacy of India, Algeria, the Philippines, and Manchuria. In Part II, the analysis shifts to the anticolonial development strategies of Soviet Russia, Ataturk's Turkey, Mao's China, and Nasser's Egypt. Part III is devoted to paired cases, in which ostensibly similar environments yielded very different outcomes: Haiti and the Dominican Republic; Jordan and Israel; the Republic of the Congo and neighboring Gabon; North Korea and South Korea; and, Papua New Guinea and Indonesia. All the studies examine the combined constraints and opportunities facing policy makers, their policy objectives, and the effectiveness of their strategies. The concluding chapter distills what these cases can tell us about successful development - with findings that do not validate the conventional wisdom.

The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan set standards for postconflict nation-building that have not since been matched. Only in recent years has the United States has felt the need to participate in similar transformations, but it is now facing one of the most challenging prospects since the 1940s: Iraq. The authors review seven case studies--Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan--and seek lessons about what worked well and what did not. Then, they examine the Iraq situation in light of these lessons. Success in Iraq will require an extensive commitment of financial, military, and political resources for a long time. The United States cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies and cannot afford to leave the job half completed.

. . . a detailed and well-argued book. . . They provide an excellent historical narrative that explodes the twin myths that nation building is a new phenomenon and that the post-war recovery in Japan and Germany constitutes examples of successful nation building that can be replicated elsewhere. . . this book is essential reading for anyone engaged in this issue. Aidan Hehir, Political Studies Review Nation Building , Good Governance and Democratization are the main slogans guiding efforts to help societies in trouble. But nearly all such contemporary endeavors fail. This book is invaluable in exposing the causes for disappointing results and thus provides foundations for much improved policies. It is obligatory reading for all concerned with improving governance. Yehezkel Dror, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and author of The Capacity to Govern: A Report to the Club of Rome (2002) Reporting on the failure of international intervention, Jenkins and Plowden offer an illuminating analysis of an old but always ignored truth: institutions can be imported, not exported. Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, Getulio Vargas Foundation, São Paulo, Brazil Anyone contemplating giving aid to developing countries for economic development and governmental modernisation should read this wide-ranging and sharp analysis of why past programmes have brought disappointment and disillusion, and what can be done in the future to ensure more effective use of such aid. It goes beyond economics, encompassing history, culture, social factors and above all politics. It reflects the accumulated wisdom and scholarship of two experienced practical administrators and consultants, who have seen at first hand what can go wrong. G.W. Jones, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK This study by Jenkins and Plowden breaks new ground in the treatment of these issues. They get behind the generalities that often bedevil debates on governance and document in telling detail the myriad ways in which aid donors have systematically attempted to transfer and transplant an idealised (and largely Westernised) blueprint of governance to societies which were either unable or unwilling to receive them. Because their study is rooted not only in a careful survey of a comprehensive literature, but also in an informed understanding of the preferences and practices of the main aid donor organisations, it adds up to a devastating critique of the inadequacies and failures of this crucial aid strategy. A penetrating, well argued assessment of governance and public management reform in a global context, this timely book makes a much needed critical contribution to what has too often been an unthinking and superficial debate. It should be required reading for all students of comparative governance and public management. Martin Minogue, University of Manchester, UK Governance and Nationbuilding describes how aid donors have attempted to improve the performance of government in developing countries and countries in crisis. Kate Jenkins and William Plowden review the widespread lack of success, tracing the history of international government intervention, the roles of donors and recipient countries, the ways in which expert advice and support have been provided, and the donors own evaluation of their work. The authors outline and analyse the many obstacles to success, highlighting how the lack of effective learning from experience has led to repeated failures to improve the quality of government. The authors draw on the donors own assessments of the issues and on their own experience in the British Government and many other countries. They recommend a new approach to improving government: much less grandiose and more modest expectations on the part of the donors, and a new and enhanced role for recipient countries. This is a hard-hitting analysis of the problems and potential proposals for change by two experts in the field. Both have not only advised governments