Haythornthwaite brings his reputation as a leading Napoleonic historian to bear on the examination of all parts of the French army: the cavalry, infantry, artillery, Imperial Guard, staff and supporting services. Napoleon's innovations and tactics are described, from Austerlitz to Waterloo, demonstrating the reasons for his success and decline.

“A fascinating study exploring the motivation of French soldiers during the Napoleonic Era, and the process through which they became Napoleon’s men.”—Frederick C. Schneid, author of Napoleon’s Conquest of Europe The men who fought in Napoleon’s Grande Armée built a new empire that changed the world. Remarkably, the same men raised arms during the French Revolution for liberté, égalité, and fraternité. In just over a decade, these freedom fighters, who had once struggled to overthrow tyrants, rallied to the side of a man who wanted to dominate Europe. What was behind this drastic change of heart? In this ground-breaking study, Michael J. Hughes shows how Napoleonic military culture shaped the motivation of Napoleon’s soldiers. Relying on extensive archival research and blending cultural and military history, Hughes demonstrates that the Napoleonic regime incorporated elements from both the Old Regime and French Revolutionary military culture to craft a new military culture, characterized by loyalty to both Napoleon and the preservation of French hegemony in Europe. Underscoring this new, hybrid military culture were five sources of motivation: honor, patriotism, a martial and virile masculinity, devotion to Napoleon, and coercion. Forging Napoleon’s Grande Armée vividly illustrates how this many-pronged culture gave Napoleon’s soldiers reasons to fight. “Hughes offers a tight and well-grounded exposition and analysis of French military culture in the Napoleonic period in which military honour is presented as a dynamic element.” —Journal of European Studies “Hughes’s book not only contributes to our understanding of the military success of Napoleon’s army, but also elegantly employs cultural history methods to better understand army operations and sustained troop motivations.” —Julia Osman, History: Reviews of New Book

Renowned for its accuracy, brevity, and readability, this book has long been the gold standard of concise histories of the Napoleonic Wars. Now in an updated and revised edition, it is unique in its portrayal of one of the world's great generals as a scrambler who never had a plan, strategic or tactical, that did not break down or change of necessity in the field. Distinguished historian Owen Connelly argues that Napoleon was the master of the broken play, so confident of his ability to improvise, cover his own mistakes, and capitalize on those of the enemy that he repeatedly plunged his armies into uncertain, seemingly desperate situations, only to emerge victorious as he "blundered" to glory. Beginning with a sketch of Napoleon's early life, the book progresses to his command of artillery at Toulon and the "whiff of grapeshot" in Paris that netted him control of the Army of Italy, where his incredible performance catapulted him to fame. The author vividly traces Napoleon's campaigns as a general of the French Revolution and emperor of the French, knowledgeably analyzing each battle's successes and failures. The author depicts Napoleon's "art of war" as a system of engaging the enemy, waiting for him to make a mistake, improvising a plan on the spot-and winning. Far from detracting from Bonaparte's reputation, his blunders rather made him a great general, a "natural" who depended on his intuition and ability to read battlefields and his enemy to win. Exploring this neglected aspect of Napoleon's battlefield genius, Connelly at the same time offers stirring and complete accounts of all the Napoleonic campaigns.

This is the book on war that Napoleon never had the time or the will to complete. In exile on the island of Saint-Helena, the deposed Emperor of the French mused about a great treatise on the art of war, but in the end changed his mind and ordered the destruction of the materials he had collected for the volume. Thus was lost what would have been one of the most interesting and important books on the art of war ever written, by one of the most famous and successful military leaders of all time. In the two centuries since, several attempts have been made to gather together some of Napoleon's 'military maxims', with varying degrees of success. But not until now has there been a systematic attempt to put Napoleon's thinking on war and strategy into a single authoritative volume, reflecting both the full spectrum of his thinking on these matters as well as the almost unparalleled range of his military experience, from heavy cavalry charges in the plains of Russia or Saxony to counter-insurgency operations in Egypt or Spain. To gather the material for this book, military historian Bruno Colson spent years researching Napoleon's correspondence and other writings, including a painstaking examination of perhaps the single most interesting source for his thinking about war: the copy-book of General Bertrand, the Emperor's most trusted companion on Saint-Helena, in which he unearthed a Napoleonic definition of strategy which is published here for the first time. The huge amount of material brought together for this ground-breaking volume has been carefully organized to follow the framework of Carl von Clausewitz's classic On War, allowing a fascinating comparison between Napoleon's ideas and those of his great Prussian interpreter and adversary, and highlighting the intriguing similarities between these two founders of modern strategic thinking.

The wars of Napoleon are among the best-known and most exciting episodes in world history. Less well known is the uproar the armies stirred up in their path, and even more, the chaos they left in their wake. The 'knock-on effect' of Napoleon's sweep across Europe went further than is often remembered: his invasion of Spain triggered the collapse of the Spanish Empire in Latin America, and his meddling in the Balkans destabilised the Ottomans. Many places had been riven with banditry and popular tumult from time immemorial, characteristics which worsened in the havoc wrought by the wars. Other areas had known relative calm before the arrival of the French in 1792, but even the most pacific societies were disrupted by these conflagrations. Behind the battle fronts raged other conflicts, 'little wars' - the guerrilla (the term was born in these years) - and bigger ones, where whole provinces rose up in arms. Bandits often stood at the centre of these 'dirty wars' of ambushes, night raids, living hard in tough terrain, of plunder, rapine and early, violent death, which spread across the whole western world from Constantinople to Chile. Everywhere, they threw up unlikely characters - ordinary men who emerged as leaders, bandits who became presidents, priests who became warriors, lawyers who became murdering criminals. In studying these varying fortunes, Michael Broers provides an insight into a lost world of peasant life, a world Napoleon did so much to sweep away.

The Grande Armee of Napoleon Bonaparte is widely acknowledged to be one of the greatest fighting forces ever deployed. With it the French scored a streak of historic victories that gave them an unprecedented grip on power over the European continent. At its peak it was made up of 680,000 men, a huge multi-national force of officers, infantry and cavalry, artillery and support services masterminded by a superior and highly flexible system of corps, divisions, brigades and regiments, commanded by officers in which Napoleon placed a huge degree of trust and autonomy to operate within the outlines of his strategic objectives. Looking closely at how this military machine was constructed and mobilized, Napoleon's Military Machine Operations Manual examines all aspects of the Grande Armee, from individual soldiers, what they wore, ate, slept in and were paid, to the chain of command, recruitment and training, intelligence and comms, and logistics and battle tactics. The legacy of Napoleon’s army is assessed, as is how his organization and management initiatives influenced national armies around the world in ways that can still be seen today.

Armies of the Napoleonic Wars Research Series is a factual in-depth study of the armies, battles, and leaders of the Age of Napoleon. "The principal purpose of the volume is to bring together the most information practical on the raising and formation of Napoleon's war machine, its level of training, combat effectiveness and the opinions of strengths and weaknesses made by the people closest to the army - the officers and ministers themselves." This volume includes extensive, detailed parade states of the army throughout 1813 and is purposely written in a succinct manner which relates to the subject matter. A detailed history of Napoleon's Grand Armee of 1813, this volume is an absolute must for any Napoleonic enthusiast, historian or wargamer; a gold mine of information, insights, and the key for understanding the crucial campaign of 1813.