The Napoleonic Empire played a crucial role in reshaping global landscapes and in realigning international power structures on a worldwide scale. When Napoleon died, the map of many areas had completely changed, making room for Russia's ascendency and Britain's rise to world power.

Until now, there has been no study of the significant errors that Napoleon made himself which, though apparently trivial at the time, proved to be major factors in his downfall. Digby Smith tracks his rise to power, his stewardship of France from 1804–15, and his exile. He highlights his military mistakes, such as his unwillingness to appoint an effective overall supremo in the Iberian Peninsula, and the decision to invade Russia while the Spanish situation was spiralling out of control.

Traces Napoleon's rise to power, early mistakes, and military campaigns, while considering the emperor's darker side and the lengths to which he went to establish himself as a legitimate ruler.

Having suffered a massive reversal of fortunes in Russia Napoleon found himself confronted, in Germany, by the combined forces of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. After the disaster of Leipzig Napoleon’s German allies fell away and he was forced to fall back, beyond the borders of France. Offered a negotiated peace on the basis of a return to the pre-1792 borders, Napoleon chose to continue to fight, trusting in his star. He was, however, desperate for troops and short of horses and cash. Cornered and threatened by three armies invading from the north, northeast, and east, every chance to stop the Allies had to be taken and there was desperate battle after desperate battle. Of all his campaigns, Napoleon’s 1814 campaign was one of his most brilliant. Eventually, after several terrible defeats, the Allies refused to engage him in battle when he confronted them. Instead they pushed their other two armies forward, slowly driving him back as he rushed to block the advance of the other armies on Paris. This strategy proved successful and eventually Napoleon was obliged to abdicate when his marshals refused to fight further.

Napoleon’s forces invaded Spain in 1808, but two years went by before they overran the southern region of Andalucía. Situated at the farthest frontier of Napoleon’s “outer empire,” Andalucía remained under French control only briefly—for two-and-a-half years—and never experienced the normal functions of French rule. In this groundbreaking examination of the Peninsular War, Charles J. Esdaile moves beyond traditional military history to examine the French occupation of Andalucía and the origins and results of the region’s complex and chaotic response. Disillusioned by the Spanish provisional government and largely unprotected, Andalucía scarcely fired a shot in its defense when Joseph Bonaparte’s army invaded the region in 1810. The subsequent French occupation, however, broke down in the face of multiple difficulties, the most important of which were geography and the continued presence in the region of substantial forces of regular troops. Drawing on British, French, and Spanish sources that are all but unknown, Esdaile describes the social, cultural, geographical, political, and military conditions that combined to make Andalucía particularly resistant to French rule. Esdaile’s study is a significant contribution to the new field sometimes known as occupation studies, which focuses on the ways a victorious army attempts to reconcile a conquered populace to the new political order. Combining military history with political and social history, Outpost of Empire delineates what we now call the cultural terrain of war. This is history that moves from battles between armies to battles for hearts and minds.

Napoleon's conquests were spectacular, but behind his wars, is an enduring legacy. A new generation of historians have re-evaluated the Napoleonic era and found that his real achievement was the creation of modern Europe as we know it.