If there is such a thing as essential reading in metaphysics or in philosophy of language, this is it. Ever since the publication of its original version, Naming and Necessity has had great and increasing influence. It redirected philosophical attention to neglected questions of natural and metaphysical necessity and to the connections between these and theories of reference, in particular of naming, and of identity. From a critique of the dominant tendency to assimilate names to descriptions and more generally to treat their reference as a function of their Fregean sense, surprisingly deep and widespread consequences may be drawn. The largely discredited distinction between accidental and essential properties, both of individual things (including people) and of kinds of things, is revived. So is a consequent view of science as what seeks out the essences of natural kinds. Traditional objections to such views are dealt with by sharpening distinctions between epistemic and metaphysical necessity; in particular by the startling admission of necessary a posteriori truths. From these, in particular from identity statements using rigid designators whether of things or of kinds, further remarkable consequences are drawn for the natures of things, of people, and of kinds; strong objections follow, for example to identity versions of materialism as a theory of the mind. This seminal work, to which today's thriving essentialist metaphysics largely owes its impetus, is here published with a substantial new Preface by the author.

Original essays on reference and referring by leading scholars that combine breadth of coverage with thematic unity. These fifteen original essays address the core semantic concepts of reference and referring from both philosophical and linguistic perspectives. After an introductory essay that casts current trends in reference and referring in terms of an ongoing dialogue between Fregean and Russellian approaches, the book addresses specific topics, balancing breadth of coverage with thematic unity. The contributors, all leading or emerging scholars, address trenchant neo-Fregean challenges to the direct reference position; consider what positive claims can be made about the mechanism of reference; address the role of a theory of reference within broader theoretical context; and investigate other kinds of linguistic expressions used in referring activities that may themselves be referring expressions. The topical unity and accessibility of the essays, the stage-setting introductory essay, and the comprehensive index combine to make Reference and Referring, along with the other books in the Topics in Contemporary Philosophy series, appropriate for use in advanced undergraduate and graduate courses.

Names in Focus delves deep into the vast field of Finnish onomastics, covering place names, personal names, animal names, commercial names and names in literature. It provides the history and current trends in this area of research, and also supplements international terminology with the Finnish point of view on the subject. Brimming with examples and clear explanations, the book can be enjoyed by the most studious of researchers as well as the casual reader who has a genuine interest in the study of names.

One of the most comprehensive baby name reference guides available, featuring more than 30,000 baby names, has been revised and expanded. Each chapter focuses on names from specific countries, regions, and ethnicities, including details about traditional naming customs. Each entry contains various spellings and pronunciations, as well as the name's meaning, history, etymology, and derivations.

In The Autonomy of Reference: On the Relational Structure of Nominals, Zoltán Vecsey defends a moderate autonomy thesis concerning the explanatory status of nominal reference. The autonomy thesis is based on the observation that the relational term of reference exhibits a specific resistance to systematizing attempts. The resistance can be observed on two complementary fronts. On the one hand, reference cannot be introduced into the vocabulary of theoretical linguistics in a de novo manner because every reasonable introductory technique must be built on such expressions that are already functioning in a relational mode. On the other hand, and for similar reasons, the term cannot simply be removed from the vocabulary of theoretical linguistics because every reasonable technique of removal must be built on expressions that are still functioning in a relational mode. Although reference is an autonomous aspect of meaning, in that it shows resistance to these attempts of systematisation, it should not be banished from linguistic theory as an unscientific phenomenon. Vecsey argues that this explanatory technique of reverse engineering, which has already been effectively used in the research practices of logic and mathematics, brings theoretical legitimacy to the term of reference.