DIVSequel to Two-Person Game Theory introduces necessary mathematical notation (mainly set theory), presents basic concepts and models, and provides applications to social situations. /div

Clear, accessible treatment of mathematical models for resolving conflicts in politics, economics, war, business, and social relationships. Topics include strategy, game tree and game matrix, and much more. Minimal math background required. 1970 edition.

Classics in Game Theory assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field that followed on the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton, 1944). The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in a in 1928, is a subfield of mathematics and economics that models situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each other. In the "heroic era" of research that began in the late 1940s, the foundations of the current theory were laid; it is these fundamental contributions that are collected in this volume. In the last fifteen years, game theory has become the dominant model in economic theory and has made significant contributions to political science, biology, and international security studies. The central role of game theory in economic theory was recognized by the award of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1994 to the pioneering game theorists John C. Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten. The fundamental works for which they were honored are all included in this volume. Harold Kuhn, himself a major contributor to game theory for his reformulation of extensive games, has chosen eighteen essays that constitute the core of game theory as it exists today. Drawn from a variety of sources, they will be an invaluable tool for researchers in game theory and for a broad group of students of economics, political science, and biology.

These two new collections, numbers 28 and 29 respectively in the Annals of Mathematics Studies, continue the high standard set by the earlier Annals Studies 20 and 24 by bringing together important contributions to the theories of games and of nonlinear differential equations.

Combinatorial game theory is the study of two-player games with no hidden information and no chance elements. The theory assigns algebraic values to positions in such games and seeks to quantify the algebraic and combinatorial structure of their interactions. Its modern form was introduced thirty years ago, with the publication of the classic Winning Ways for Your Mathematical Plays by Berlekamp, Conway, and Guy, and interest has rapidly increased in recent decades. This book is a comprehensive and up-to-date introduction to the subject, tracing its development from first principles and examples through many of its most recent advances. Roughly half the book is devoted to a rigorous treatment of the classical theory; the remaining material is an in-depth presentation of topics that appear for the first time in textbook form, including the theory of misère quotients and Berlekamp's generalized temperature theory. Packed with hundreds of examples and exercises and meticulously cross-referenced, Combinatorial Game Theory will appeal equally to students, instructors, and research professionals. More than forty open problems and conjectures are mentioned in the text, highlighting the many mysteries that still remain in this young and exciting field. Aaron Siegel holds a Ph.D. in mathematics from the University of California, Berkeley and has held positions at the Mathematical Sciences Research Institute and the Institute for Advanced Study. He was a partner at Berkeley Quantitative, a technology-driven hedge fund, and is presently employed by Twitter, Inc.

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This book integrates the fundamentals, methodology, and major application fields of noncooperative and cooperative games including conflict resolution. The topics addressed in the book are discrete and continuous games including games represented by finite trees; matrix and bimatrix games as well as oligopolies; cooperative solution concepts; games under uncertainty; dynamic games and conflict resolution. The methodology is illustrated by carefully chosen examples, applications and case studies which are selected from economics, social sciences, engineering, the military and homeland security. This book is highly recommended to readers who are interested in the in-depth and up-to-date integration of the theory and ever-expanding application areas of game theory.