"The book details the course of that historiographical debate, beginning with the earliest accounts on appeasement from l938 through 1940.".

Designed to fill an overlooked gap, this book, originally published in 1972, provides a single unified introduction to bibliographical sources of British military history. Moreover it includes guidance in a number of fields in which no similar source is available at all, giving information on how to obtain acess to special collections and private archives, and links military history, especially during peacetime, with the development of science and technology.

Very few diaries of directors and senior managers of the Big Four railways have survived to enter the public domain. There are, however, two notable Southern Railway diarists whose records have been available in archives for some years, but have been largely ignored by historians; Southern Railway General Manager Gilbert Szlumper and Director Leopold Amery. Their remarkable diaries are addressed in this insightful book, which gives a slightly different view of the company in contrast to the almost sanitized histories by some writers.The surviving diaries of Szlumper are far from complete. They begin in 1936 and continue into the war years, but there are several gaps. Throughout, Szlumper comments on individuals and developments, revealing little-known facts and the circumstances that meant he could never truly achieve his potential. Formally retiring in 1942, he died in 1969, after which his diaries entered the public domain.Leopold Amery was director of the Southern Railway from 1932. A Birmingham Member of Parliament for many years, he was a statesman of some stature, his high offices including Secretary of State for the Colonies in the 1920s. In his autobiography, Amery writes very little on the railway, although he does comment on its family atmosphere. His diaries, which are in the public domain in a Cambridge University archive, have been published in two volumes but Amerys fascinating business activities were omitted by the publisher, and like Szlumper he comments on individuals and developments.The diary information of these two exceptional men has been supplemented by information from the railway, state archives and other sources, and many of the photographs have never been published before.

This book addresses the interface of the British Foreign Office, foreign policy and commerce in the twentieth century. Two related questions are considered: what did the Foreign Office do to support British commerce, and how did commerce influence British foreign policy? The editors of this work collect a range of case studies that explore the attitude of the Foreign Office towards commerce and trade promotion, against the backdrop of a century of relative economic decline, while also considering the role of British diplomats in creating markets and supporting UK firms. This highly researched and detailed examination is designed for readers aiming to comprehend the role that commerce played in Britain’s foreign relations, in a century when trade and commerce have become an inseparable element in foreign and security policies.

Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasing Hitler's Germany has been widely condemned. However, historians (and politicians) have been divided about the viability of alternative courses of action. Andrew David Stedman's illuminating new study of British foreign policy before World War II systematically analyses the various alternatives to appeasement - from isolationism to collective security to outright war - and examines their origins, risks and feasibility. It surveys the advocates of other strategies - including key thinkers and decision-makers such as Churchill, Eden, Amery, Beaverbrook and Halifax - and outlines the complexities of the decisions they faced, which have previously been largely overlooked. Marking a valuable new contribution to appeasement historiography, this is the first work to synthesise all the alternatives available to Chamberlain, as well as illuminating policy debate within the British government. Stedman provides a vigorous analysis of Chamberlain's assessment of each rival policy, and shows why ultimately, he opted for appeasement. Also contributing to debates on the use of appeasement in the modern world, this book will be essential reading for historians of World War II and the twentieth century, as well as scholars of International Relations