In this book a rigorous, systematic, mathematical analysis is presented for oligopoly with multi-product firms in static as well as dynamic frameworks in the light of recent developments in theories of games, oligopoly and industrial organization. The general results derived in this book on oligopoly with multi-product firms contain, as special cases, all previous results on oligopoly with single product as well as oligopoly with product differentiation and single product firms. A constructive nu- merical method is given for finding the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, which may be extremely valuable to those who are interested in numerical analysis of the effects of various industrial policies. A sequential adjustment process is also formulated for finding the equilibrium. Dynamic adjustment processes have two versions, one with a discrete time scale and the other with a continuous time scale. The stability of the equilibrium is thoroughly investigated utilizing powerful mathematical results from the stability and linear algebra literature. The methodology developed for analyzing stability proves to be useful for dynamic analysis of economic models.

Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.

James Friedman provides a thorough survey of oligopoly theory using numerical examples and careful verbal explanations to make the ideas clear and accessible. While the earlier ideas of Cournot, Hotelling, and Chamberlin are presented, the larger part of the book is devoted to the modern work on oligopoly that has resulted from the application of dynamic techniques and game theory to this area of economics. The book begins with static oligopoly theory. Cournot's model and its more recent elaborations are covered in the first substantive chapter. Then the Chamberlinian analysis of product differentiation, spatial competition, and characteristics space is set out. The subsequent chapters on modern work deal with reaction functions, advertising, oligopoly with capital, entry, and oligopoly using noncooperative game theory. A large bibliography is provided.

"The discrete choice approach provides an ideal framework for describing the demands for differentiated products and can be used for studying most product differentiation models in the literature. By introducing extra dimensions of product heterogeneity, the framework also provides richer models of firm location and product selection."--BOOK JACKET.

This state-of-the-art collection of papers on the theory of Cournotian competition focuses on two main subjects: oligopolistic Cournot competition and contests. The contributors present various applications of the Cournotian Equilibrium Theory, addressing topics such as equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional behavior and welfare. Special emphasis is placed on the aggregative nature of the games that are relevant to such theory. This contributed volume was written to celebrate the 80th birthday of Prof. Koji Okuguchi, a pioneer in oligopoly theory.