This book analyses how China overcame its meagre reputation in the early 1990s to become an aggressively growing military power and rising threat to the international system. The author focuses on China’s new multilateral foreign policy approach, ambitious military build-up programme and economic cooperation initiatives. This book presents a much-needed comparative perspective of China in terms of foreign policy, seeking to develop analytical tools to assess China’s motivations and moves. The author suggests that understanding China’s new foreign policy, its tactics in multilateral organisations, and approaches to conflict resolutions are elementary to grasp the new realities of international relations, particularly relevant to newly established institutions in the evolving Asian political system which require basic knowledge for analysing the politics in this continent. This book uses an innovative approach, a qualitative analysis of China’s foreign policy addressing criteria of reputation management, to overcome the perceived ‘China threat’.

Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese authorities have gradually come to embrace multilateralism to realize their basic foreign policy objectives in maintaining a peaceful international environment and enhancing China's international status and influence. This embrace is largely based on pragmatic considerations. There is no denial, however, that elements of liberalism and constructivism gradually enter into the considerations of Chinese leaders. They accept, for example, that non-traditional security issues can only be tackled through genuine multilateralism. This volume carefully examines China's increased participation in multilateral organizations and mechanisms and its efforts to initiate and develop its own discourses on global affairs straddling Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the Latin American continents. China's presence in international multilateral organizations has been providing developing countries a better chance to maintain a balance of power. Since China has no ambitious plan to transform the existing international order, its increasing enthusiastic engagement of multilateralism is likely to be accepted by the international community.

"China's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 was hailed as the natural conclusion of a long march that started with the reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping in the 1970s. However, China's participation in the WTO since joining has been anything but smooth, and its self-proclaimed "socialist market economy" system has alienated many of its global trading partners - as recent tensions with the United States exemplify. Prevailing diplomatic attitudes tend to focus on two diametrically opposing approaches to dealing with the emerging problems: the first is to demand that China completely overhaul its economic regime; the second is to stay idle and accept that the WTO must accommodate different economic regimes, no matter how idiosyncratic and incompatible. In this book, Mavroidis and Sapir propose a third approach. They point out that, while the WTO (as well as its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]) has previously managed the accession of socialist countries or of big trading nations, it has never before dealt with a country as large or as powerful as China. Therefore, in order to simultaneously uphold its core principles and accommodate China's unique geopolitical position, the authors argue that the WTO needs to translate some of its implicit legal understanding into explicit treaty language. Focusing on two core complaints - that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) benefit from unfair trade advantages, and that domestic companies (both private as well as SOEs) impose forced technology transfer on foreign companies as a condition for accessing the Chinese market - they lay out their specific proposals for successful legislative amendment"--.

As economic power diffuses across more countries and China becomes more dependent on the world economy, Chinese leaders are being forced to abandon their largely passive approach to global governance. This report analyzes China’s interests and behavior to evaluate both the recent history of its interactions with the postwar international order and possible future trajectories. It also draws implications from that analysis for future U.S. policy.

This book examines the strategic interactions among China, the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asian States in the context of China’s rise and globalization after the cold war. Engaging the mainstream theoretical debates in international relations, the author introduces a new theoretical framework—institutional realism—to explain the institutionalization of world politics in the Asia-Pacific after the cold war. Institutional realism suggests that deepening economic interdependence creates a condition under which states are more likely to conduct a new balancing strategy—institutional balancing, i.e., countering pressures or threats through initiating, utilizing, and dominating multilateral institutions—to pursue security under anarchy. To test the validity of institutional realism, Kai He examines the foreign policies of the U.S., Japan, the ASEAN states, and China toward four major multilateral institutions, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and East Asian Summit (EAS). Challenging the popular pessimistic view regarding China’s rise, the book concludes that economic interdependence and structural constraints may well soften the "dragon’s teeth." China’s rise does not mean a dark future for the region. Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacificwill be of great interest to policy makers and scholars of Asian security, international relations, Chinese foreign policy, and U.S. foreign policy.

The global implications of China's rise as a global actor In 2005, a senior official in the George W. Bush administration expressed the hope that China would emerge as a “responsible stakeholder” on the world stage. A dozen years later, the Trump administration dramatically shifted course, instead calling China a “strategic competitor” whose actions routinely threaten U.S. interests. Both assessments reflected an underlying truth: China is no longer just a “rising” power. It has emerged as a truly global actor, both economically and militarily. Every day its actions affect nearly every region and every major issue, from climate change to trade, from conflict in troubled lands to competition over rules that will govern the uses of emerging technologies. To better address the implications of China's new status, both for American policy and for the broader international order, Brookings scholars conducted research over the past two years, culminating in a project: Global China: Assessing China's Growing Role in the World. The project is intended to furnish policy makers and the public with hard facts and deep insights for understanding China's regional and global ambitions. The initiative draws not only on Brookings's deep bench of China and East Asia experts, but also on the tremendous breadth of the institution's security, strategy, regional studies, technological, and economic development experts. Areas of focus include the evolution of China's domestic institutions; great power relations; the emergence of critical technologies; Asian security; China's influence in key regions beyond Asia; and China's impact on global governance and norms. Global China: Assessing China's Growing Role in the World provides the most current, broad-scope, and fact-based assessment of the implications of China's rise for the United States and the rest of the world.