The topics of World War II and US-China relationship have been of much interest to academics and general pubic alike. This book challenges the conventional wisdom that has been produced on the topics over the past 50 years and offers the readers a new and balanced treatment of the topics. The scope of book covers all the major political-military events from the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941 to the victory over Japan in August 1945. The scholarship in this subject area has long suffered from one serious flaw, i.e., unbalanced treatment. Although the leading works in the English language have aspired to conform to high professional standards, their intrinsic limitation is that they have only consulted English language materials, but have virtually failed to consult Chinese language materials. This phenomenon is unsatisfactory since wartime US-China alliance was a highly complicated "bilateral" relationship which can only be adequately narrated and analyzed by taking into account both countries' data and perspectives. This book addresses this glaring deficiency by employing a large amount of original Chinese source materials, but also by discovering a considerable amount of new English language materials as well as subjecting other often-used English materials to a close scrutiny. This book enables the readers to take a completely fresh look at that important period of US-China relations.

The topics of World War II and US-China relationship have been of much interest to academics and general public alike. This book challenges the conventional wisdom that has been produced on the topics over the past 50 years and offers the readers a new and balanced treatment of the topics. The scope of this book covers all the major political-military events from the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941 to the victory over Japan in August 1945.The scholarship in this subject area has long suffered from one serious flaw, i.e., unbalanced treatment. Although the leading works in the English language have aspired to conform to high professional standards, their intrinsic limitation is that they have only consulted English language materials, but have virtually failed to consult Chinese language materials. This phenomenon is unsatisfactory since wartime US-China alliance was a highly complicated 'bilateral' relationship which can only be adequately narrated and analyzed by taking into account both countries' data and perspectives. This book addresses this glaring deficiency by employing a large amount of original Chinese source materials, but also by discovering a considerable amount of new English language materials as well as subjecting other often-used English materials to a close scrutiny.This book enables the readers to take a completely fresh look at that important period of US-China relations.

Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.

The book is a systematic study of the China-Britain relationship during the 1942–1949 period with a particular focus on the two countries’ discussions over both the 1943 Sino-British treaty and the discarded Sino-British commercial treaty, the future of Hong Kong, and the political status of Tibet. These were dominated by two underlying themes: the elimination of the British imperialist position in China and the establishment of an equal and reciprocal bilateral relationship. The negotiations started promisingly in 1942–1943, but, by 1949, had failed to reach a satisfactory settlement. Behind the failure lay a complex set of domestic considerations and external factors, including the powerful infl uence of the United States. Even after seven decades, the failure still has a contemporary impact. Recent Sino-British disputes over the Hong Kong Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement and incessant Indo-Chinese confl icts and skirmishes over their unsettled borders all attest to the enduring legacy of the years 1942–1949 as setting the scene for subsequent Sino-British and Sino-Indian relations. From this perspective, the history has never left us.

China’s mid-twentieth-century wars pose extraordinary interpretive challenges. The issue is not just that the Chinese fought for such a long time—from the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 1937 until the close of the Korean War in 1953—across such vast territory. As Hans van de Ven explains, the greatest puzzles lie in understanding China’s simultaneous external and internal wars. Much is at stake, politically, in how this story is told. Today in its official history and public commemorations, the People’s Republic asserts Chinese unity against Japan during World War II. But this overwrites the era’s stark divisions between Communists and Nationalists, increasingly erasing the civil war from memory. Van de Ven argues that the war with Japan, the civil war, and its aftermath were in fact of a piece—a singular process of conflict and political change. Reintegrating the Communist uprising with the Sino-Japanese War, he shows how the Communists took advantage of wartime to increase their appeal, how fissures between the Nationalists and Communists affected anti-Japanese resistance, and how the fractious coalition fostered conditions for revolution. In the process, the Chinese invented an influential paradigm of war, wherein the Clausewitzian model of total war between well-defined interstate enemies gave way to murky campaigns of national liberation involving diverse domestic and outside belligerents. This history disappears when the realities of China’s mid-century conflicts are stripped from public view. China at War recovers them.

"A sweeping epic.… Promises to do for the war in the Pacific what Rick Atkinson did for Europe." —James M. Scott, author of Rampage In 1937, the swath of the globe east from India to the Pacific Ocean encompassed half the world’s population. Japan’s onslaught into China that year unleashed a tidal wave of events that fundamentally transformed this region and killed about twenty-five million people. This extraordinary World War II narrative vividly portrays the battles across this entire region and links those struggles on many levels with their profound twenty-first-century legacies. In this first volume of a trilogy, award-winning historian Richard B. Frank draws on rich archival research and recently discovered documentary evidence to tell an epic story that gave birth to the world we live in now.

The People’s Republic of China is the only large country in the world that does not have a “national” military; its military answers only to a political party, the Chinese Communist Party. For a brief period in the mid-twentieth century, China had the makings of a professional, apolitical military force. The Rise and Fall of an Officer Corps tells the story of that moment in the military history of modern China—how it came to be, why it ultimately failed, and what it meant for China at home and abroad. Between 1942 and 1955 a cadre of highly trained, nationalistic, and cosmopolitan Chinese officers created a professional, depoliticized military, a force that could effectively represent the aspirations of China as a world power. Drawing on multiple archival sources and Chinese military journals, author Eric Setzekorn charts the development of this new army as a critical cultural and political force with extensive connections to foreign powers. During this period, military officers were the primary actors in an intergovernmental partnership between the United States and the Republic of China. The partnership gave officers access to educational opportunities and technological transfers that were central to their professional ideals. Setzekorn’s account of the career of General Sun Li-jen, an American-educated Chinese army officer, illustrates the rise of this new sense of professionalism as well as its decline after 1953. Setzekorn then traces the failure of the army-building project to a renewed politicization of military forces, marked by a purge of key military leaders in 1955 by Chiang Kai-shek and his Koumintang (KMT) party. By focusing on this important chapter in Chinese military history, Setzekorn’s work also highlights broader patterns of military transformation during the pivotal period from World War II through the early Cold War. His work is critical to understanding the rise of China as a military and world power.