This book examines the emergence of Communist power in China during the interwar period, focusing especially on the role of the Soviet Union and the 1927 Nanchang Uprising. It describes the history behind the alliance between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists, the impact of the USSR's military and political advisers, and the success of the Northern Expedition that resulted in the April 1927 purge of the Communists from the Nationalist Party. It explores the debates between leading communists in Moscow, notably Stalin – who thought that China was ready in 1927 for an urban-based Communist revolution, similar to what had happened in Russia ten years before – and Trotsky who opposed it. It goes on examine the seizure of power in Nanchang by the Communists, the establishment of China's first short-lived soviet republic, and the reasons why the soviet soon collapsed. It explains the consequences of the rising, including the adoption by the Communists of guerilla warfare, the foundation of China's second soviet, and after moving to northwest China during the 1930s, the rise of Communist power throughout all of mainland China which culminated in the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The book stresses the importance of the mythology that evolved around the Nanchang Uprising: since criticism of the Nanchang Uprising would open themselves up to accusations that they were Trotskyites, the Chinese Communists created the myth that the Nanchang Uprising was a success, and later dated the origins of the People’s Liberation Army to this event.

This book examines the emergence of Communist power in China during the interwar period, focusing especially on the role of the Soviet Union and the 1927 Nanchang Uprising. It describes the history behind the alliance between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists, the impact of the USSR's military and political advisers, and the success of the Northern Expedition that resulted in the April 1927 purge of the Communists from the Nationalist Party. It explores the debates between leading communists in Moscow, notably Stalin – who thought that China was ready in 1927 for an urban-based Communist revolution, similar to what had happened in Russia ten years before – and Trotsky who opposed it. It goes on examine the seizure of power in Nanchang by the Communists, the establishment of China's first short-lived soviet republic, and the reasons why the soviet soon collapsed. It explains the consequences of the rising, including the adoption by the Communists of guerilla warfare, the foundation of China's second soviet, and after moving to northwest China during the 1930s, the rise of Communist power throughout all of mainland China which culminated in the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. The book stresses the importance of the mythology that evolved around the Nanchang Uprising: since criticism of the Nanchang Uprising would open themselves up to accusations that they were Trotskyites, the Chinese Communists created the myth that the Nanchang Uprising was a success, and later dated the origins of the People's Liberation Army to this event.

The Chinese Maritime Customs Service, which was led by British staff, is often seen as one of the key agents of Western imperialism in China, the customs revenue being one of the major sources of Chinese government income but a source much of which was pledged to Western banks as the collateral for, and interests payments on, massive loans. This book, however, based on extensive original research, considers the lower level staff of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, and shows how the Chinese government, struggling to master Western expertise in many areas, pursued a deliberate policy of encouraging lower level staff to learn from their Western superiors with a view to eventually supplanting them, a policy which was successfully carried out. The book thereby demonstrates that Chinese engagement with Western imperialists was in fact an essential part of Chinese national state-building, and that what looked like a key branch of Chinese government delegated to foreigners was in fact very much under Chinese government control.

The success of regionalism in Southeast Asia depends on the attitudes of the states within the region but also on the attitude of those outside it. This book is an erudite and stimulating study on the latter. Placing these states in a long term historical context Tarling brings out the way in which the rivalries of those powers within the region and outside it have affected the states within the region. He also shows how divisions within the region, and within states in the region, offered invitations and opportunities for intervention from outside, and so perhaps gave Southeast Asia an importance in international relations it would not otherwise have had. Regional leaders appear in recent decades to have recognised what may be construed as one of the lessons of history; if Southeast Asia can provide security for the Straits route, and stable conditions for trade and investment, it might enjoy both peace and a measure of prosperity. Southeast Asia and the Great Powers is an important read for students and scholars of the history and international relations of Southeast Asia.

This book makes an important contribution to the study of changes in China’s institutions and their impact on the national economy as well as ordinary people’s daily material life from 1800 to 2000. Kent Deng reveals China’s mega-cycle of prosperity-poverty-prosperity without the usual attribution to the 1840 Opium War, or the alleged population pressure, class struggle and oriental despotism. The book challenges the conventional view on ‘rebellions’, ‘revolutions’ and their alleged motivations and outcomes. Its findings separate commonly circulated myth with reality based on solid evidence and careful evaluation. The benchmark used by the author is people’s entitlement and mundane day-to-day material well being, instead of the stereotype of aggregates of industrial hardware and national GDP. China’s Political economy in Modern Times proves that state-building was the prime mover in China’s modern history. Contrary to the popular belief in mass movement, Deng shows convincingly that changes were in most cases imposed by a minority with external help. Therefore, the quality of the state was unpredictable, seen from the anti-state that cost lives and economic growth. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of Chinese Politics, Chinese Economics, Chinese History, and Political Economy.

Throughout the centuries, as Russia strove to build itself into an imperial power equal to those in the West, China and Japan came to occupy a special place in Russians' view of the orient. Never colonised by Russia or the West, China and Japan were linked not only to the greatest of Russian imperial fantasies, but also, conversely, to a deep sense of insecurity regarding Russia's place in the world, a sense of insecurity which deepened as China and Japan began to modernise in the later nineteenth century. Drawing on a wide range of works by Russian writers and thinkers, Lim sets out how Russian perceptions of China and Japan were formed from Muscovy's first contacts with China in the late seventeenth century, through to the aftermath of Russia's defeat by Japan in the early twentieth century.