Morality is not declining in the modern world. Instead, a new morality is replacing the previous one. Centered on individual self-fulfillment, and linked to administrative government, it permits things the old morality forbid, like sex for pleasure, but forbids things the old morality allowed, like intolerance and equality of opportunity.

A fresh look at two centuries of humanitarian history through a moral economy approach focusing on appeals, allocation, and accounting.

The world we live in is constantly changing. Climate change, transforming gender conceptions, emerging issues of food consumption, novel forms of family life and technological developments are altering central areas of our forms of life. This raises questions of how to cope with and understand the moral changes implicit in such alterations. This volume is the first to address moral change as such. It brings together anthropologists and philosophers to discuss how to study and theorize the change of norms, concepts, emotions, moral frameworks and forms of personhood.

The technological advances of contemporary society have outpaced our moral understanding of the problems that they create. How will we deal with profound ecological changes, human cloning, hybrid people, and eroding cyberprivacy, just to name a few issues? In this book, Lorenzo Magnani argues that existing moral constructs often cannot be applied to new technology. He proposes an entirely different ethical approach, one that blends epistemology with cognitive science. The resulting moral strategy promises renewed dignity for overlooked populations, both of today and of the future.

In this volume, Marks offers a defense of amorality as both philosophically justified and practicably livable. In so doing, the book marks a radical departure from both the new atheism and the mainstream of modern ethical philosophy. While in synch with their underlying aim of grounding human existence in a naturalistic metaphysics, the book takes both to task for maintaining a complacent embrace of morality. Marks advocates wiping the slate clean of outdated connotations by replacing the language of morality with a language of desire. The book begins with an analysis of what morality is and then argues that the concept is not instantiated in reality. Following this, the question of belief in morality is addressed: How would human life be affected if we accepted that morality does not exist? Marks argues that at the very least, a moralist would have little to complain about in an amoral world, and at best we might hope for a world that was more to our liking overall. An extended look at the human encounter with nonhuman animals serves as an illustration of amorality's potential to make both theoretical and practical headway in resolving heretofore intractable ethical problems.

From the editors of the widely influential The Stone Reader comes the most thorough and engaging guide to modern ethical thought available. Since 2010, The Stone— an enormously popular column in the New York Times— has interpreted and reinterpreted age-old inquires that speak to our contemporary condition. Having done for modern ethics what The Stone Reader did for modern philosophy, this portable volume features an assortment of essays culled from the archives of an online Times series that has attracted millions of readers through accessible examinations of longstanding topics like consciousness, religious belief, and morality. Presenting the most thorough and accessible guide to modern ethical thought available, New York Times editor Peter Catapano and best-selling philosopher Simon Critchley curate a fascinating culture of debate and deliberation that would have otherwise gone undiscovered. From questions of gun control and drone warfare to the morals of vegetarianism and marriage, this book emancipates ethics from the province of ivory-tower classrooms to become a centerpiece of discussions for years to come.

This Element has two aims. The first is to discuss arguments philosophers have made about the difference God's existence might make to questions of general interest in metaethics. The second is to argue that it is a mistake to think we can get very far in answering these questions by assuming a thin conception of God, and to suggest that exploring the implications of thick theisms for metaethics would be more fruitful.