Moral Rationalism and Sharī'a is the first attempt at outlining the scope for a theological reading of Sharī'a, based on a critical examination of why 'Adliyya theological ethics have not significantly impacted Shī'ī readings of Sharī'a. Within Shī'ī works of Sharī 'a legal theory (usūl al-fiqh) there is a theoretical space for reason as an independent source of normativity alongside the Qur’ān and the Prophetic tradition. The position holds that humans are capable of understanding moral values independently of revelation. Describing themselves as 'Adliyya (literally the people of Justice), this allows the Shī 'a, who describe themselves as 'Adiliyya (literally, the People of Justice), to attribute a substantive rational conception of justice to God, both in terms of His actions and His regulative instructions. Despite the Shī'ī adoption of this moral rationalism, independent judgments of rational morality play little or no role in the actual inference of Sharī 'a norms within mainstream contemporary Shī'ī thought. Through a close examination of the notion of independent rationality as a source in modern Shī'ī usūl al-fiqh, the obstacles preventing this moral rationalism from impacting the understanding of Sharī 'a are shown to be purely epistemic. In line with the ‘emic’ (insider) approach adopted, these epistemic obstacles are revisited identifying the scope for allowing a reading of Sharī'a that is consistent with the fundamental moral rationalism of Shī'ī thought. It is argued that judgments of rational morality, even when not definitively certain, cannot be ignored in the face of the apparent meaning of texts that are themselves also not certain. An 'Adliyya reading of Sharī'a demands that the strength of independent rational evidence be reconciled against the strength of any other apparently conflicting evidence, such that independent judgments of rational morality act as a condition for the validity of precepts attributed to a just and moral God.

Moral Rationalism and Sharī'a is the first attempt at outlining the scope for a theological reading of Sharī'a, based on a critical examination of why 'Adliyya theological ethics have not significantly impacted Shī'ī readings of Sharī'a. Within Shī'ī works of Sharī 'a legal theory (usūl al-fiqh) there is a theoretical space for reason as an independent source of normativity alongside the Qur’ān and the Prophetic tradition. The position holds that humans are capable of understanding moral values independently of revelation. Describing themselves as 'Adliyya (literally the people of Justice), this allows the Shī 'a, who describe themselves as 'Adiliyya (literally, the People of Justice), to attribute a substantive rational conception of justice to God, both in terms of His actions and His regulative instructions. Despite the Shī'ī adoption of this moral rationalism, independent judgments of rational morality play little or no role in the actual inference of Sharī 'a norms within mainstream contemporary Shī'ī thought. Through a close examination of the notion of independent rationality as a source in modern Shī'ī usūl al-fiqh, the obstacles preventing this moral rationalism from impacting the understanding of Sharī 'a are shown to be purely epistemic. In line with the ‘emic’ (insider) approach adopted, these epistemic obstacles are revisited identifying the scope for allowing a reading of Sharī'a that is consistent with the fundamental moral rationalism of Shī'ī thought. It is argued that judgments of rational morality, even when not definitively certain, cannot be ignored in the face of the apparent meaning of texts that are themselves also not certain. An 'Adliyya reading of Sharī'a demands that the strength of independent rational evidence be reconciled against the strength of any other apparently conflicting evidence, such that independent judgments of rational morality act as a condition for the validity of precepts attributed to a just and moral God.

This book introduces readers to the legal epistemology that is advocated within Twelver Shiʿite uṣūl al-fiqh (legal theory). It critically surveys the epistemological underpinnings upheld by post-19th century Uṣūlī clerics that impel them to mainly deduce and interpret Sharia using scripture and literalist hermeneutical methods. An evaluation of these underpinnings uncovers the important juxtaposition that exists between the seminarian discourses of uṣūl al-fiqh and philosophy. The book hypothesises that uṣūl al-fiqh has both space and historical precedence to accept alternative epistemological theories that may enable orthodox Shiʿite clerics to display greater dynamism in deducing and interpreting Sharia.

Visions of Sharīʿa offers the first broad examination of ways in which legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) within Twelver Shīʿī thought continues to be a forum for vibrant debates regarding the assumptions, epistemology and hermeneutics of Sharīʿa in contemporary Shīʿī thought.

The study of the sharīʿa has enjoyed a renaissance in the last two decades and it will continue to attract interdisciplinary attention given the ongoing social, political and religious developments throughout the Muslim world. With such a variety of debates, and a corresponding multitude of theoretical methods, students and non-scholars are often overwhelmed by the complexity of the field. Even experts will often need to consult multiple sources to understand these new voices and provide accessible answers to specialist and non-specialist audiences alike. This volume is intended for both the novice and expert as a companion to understanding the evolution of the field of Islamic law, the current work that is shaping this field, and the new directions the sharīʿa will take in the twenty-first/fifteenth century. Contributors are Khaled Abou El Fadl, Asma Afsaruddin Ahmad Ahmad, Sarah Albrecht, Ovamir Anjum, Dale Correa, Robert Gleave, Sohail Hanif, Rami Koujah, Marion Katz, Asifa Quraishi-Landes, David Warren and Salman Younas.

To enrich the existing debates on Islam and sexual diversity, in the present book, I seek the potential discursive spaces on homosexuality in modern Imāmī legal debates. I have undertaken this research on the thesis that modern Imāmī legal tradition on homosexuality is more flexible and dynamic than one might expect. To address this essential issue, I build the study around the following constructive question: what are the discursive spaces on homosexuality in contemporary reflections within modern Shiʿi legal scholarship? Responding to this central query, the study is premised on the notion that Imāmī legal sources consist of a tradition of sacred (textual) sources, intellectual reasoning, a vast stockpile of (often contrasting) interpretations of these sources, and a distinguished methodological repertoire called ijtihad. Following the same methodology, in this work, I describe, analyse, and critique such textual-exegetical and intellectual-rational discursive aspects concerning homosexuality.

The importance of the rule of law is universally recognised and of fundamental value for most societies. Establishing and promoting the rule of law in the Muslim world, particularly in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, has become a pressing but complicated issue. These states have Muslim majority populations, and the religion of Islam has an important role in the traditional structures of their societies. While the Muslim world is taking gradual steps towards the establishment of rule of law systems, most Muslim majority countries may not yet have effective legal systems with independent judiciaries, which would allow the state and institutions to be controlled by an effective rule of law system. One important aspect of the rule of law is freedom of expression. Given the sensitivity of Muslim societies in relation to their sacred beliefs, freedom of expression, as an international human rights issue, has raised some controversial cases. This book, drawing on both International and Islamic Law, explores the rule of law, and freedom of expression and its practical application in the Muslim world.