An exercise in cultural sociology, Moral Codes and Social Structure in Ancient Greece seeks to explicate the dynamic currents of classical Hellenic ethics and social philosophy by situating those idea-complexes in their socio-historical and intellectual contexts. Central to this enterprise is a comprehensive historical-sociological analysis of the Polis form of social organization, which charts the evolution of its basic institutions, roles, statuses, and class relations. From the Dark Age period of "genesis" on to the Hellenistic era of "eclipse" by the emergent forces of imperial patrimonialism, Polis society promoted and sustained corresponding normative codes which mobilized and channeled the requisite emotive commitments and cognitive judgments for functional proficiency under existing conditions of life. The aristocratic warrior-ethos canonized in the Homeric epics; the civic ideology of equality and justice espoused by reformist lawgivers and poets; the democratization of status honor and martial virtue that attended the shift to hoplite warfare; the philosophical exaltation of the Polis-citizen bond as found in the architectonic visions of Plato and Aristotle; and the subsequent retreat from civic virtues and the interiorization of value articulated by the Skeptics, Epicureans, and Stoics, new age philosophies in a world remade by Alexander's conquests--these are the key phases in the evolving currents of Hellenic moral discourse, as structurally framed by transformations within the institutional matrix of Polis society.

Provides a model for societal behaviour and morality in ancient Athens.

Vols. 1-8, 1880-87, plates published separately and numbered I-LXXXIII.

This book explains and offers insights into the humanizing effects of the ethnic and cultural sources of moral values. The author provides an alternative to the concept of moral development formulated by Lawrence Kohlberg, arguing that morality is socially constructed, not based on rational principles of individuals. Cortese offers critical analyses of ethnicity and moral judgment, combining two controversial and central areas: morality and race relations. Critiquing the cognitive-developmental model, Cortese examines social class, gender, and ethnic differences in moral judgment and concludes that moral judgment reflects the structure of social relations, not the structure of human cognition. He carefully situates his own argument in relation to both Kolbergian theory and the feminist critique thereof.

What is the good life? Posing this question today would likely elicit very different answers. Some might say that the good life means doing good - improving one's community and the lives of others. Others might respond that it means doing well - cultivating one's own abilities in a meaningful way. But for Aristotle these two distinct ideas - doi...