This Element concerns itself with a particular aspect of the problem posed to monotheistic religious thought by suffering, namely the suffering of non-human creatures in nature. It makes some comparisons between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and then explores the problem in depth within Christian thought. After clarification of the nature of the problem, the Element considers a range of possible responses, including those based on a fall-event, those based on freedom of process, and those hypothesising a constraint on the possibilities for God as creator. Proposals based on the motif of self-emptying are evaluated. Two other aspects of the question concern God's providential relationship to the evolving creation, and the possibility of resurrection lives for animals. After consideration of the possibility of combining different explanations, the Element ends its discussion by looking at two innovative proposals at the cutting-edge of the debate.

The preeminent example of monotheism, the God of the Hebrew Bible, is the end product of a long process. The world from which this literature emerged was polytheistic. The nature and arrangement of the literature diminishes polytheistic realities and enhances the effort to portray a single divine being. The development of this divine character through the course of a sustained narrative with a sequential plot aided the move toward monotheism by allowing for the placement of diverse, even conflicting, portrayals of the deity at distant points along the plot line. Through the sequence of events the divine character becomes more withdrawn from the sphere of human activity, more aged in appearance and behavior, and increasingly disembodied. All these characteristics lend themselves to the presentation of disparate narrative portrayals as a singular subject in this Element.

This book will be of interest to college faculty and advanced students interested in the relationship between religion and science, particularly at Christian colleges and seminaries. Its value is to offer an innovative Christian theological approach to the daunting problem that Darwinian animal suffering poses to belief in God.

The rise of monotheistic religious faith in ancient Israel and post-exilic Judaism inspired the imperative for social justice on behalf of the poor and the oppressed. Though some authors have maintained that monotheism inspires tyranny, this author maintains that real monotheistic faith affirms justice and human equality. This can be evidenced by a consideration of the Old Testament prophets and Law. Especially with the law we may observe a progression in the attempt to provide increasing rights for the poor and the oppressed.

Suffering and evil in the world provide the basis for the most difficult challenge to monotheistic belief. This Element discusses how the three great monotheisms – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – respond to the problem of suffering and evil. Different versions of the problem, types of answers, and recurring themes in philosophical and religious sources are analyzed. Objections to the enterprise of theodicy are also discussed as are additional objections to the monotheistic God more broadly. This treatment culminates in a recommendation for how monotheism can best respond to the most serious formulation of the problem, the argument from gratuitous evil.

Contemporary thought typically places a strong emphasis on the exclusive and competitive nature of Abrahamic monotheisms. This instinct is certainly borne out by the histories of religious wars, theological polemic, and social exclusion involving Jews, Christians, and Muslims. But there is also another side to the Abrahamic coin. Even in the midst of communal rivalry, Jews, Christians, and Muslim practitioners have frequently turned to each other to think through religious concepts, elucidate sacred history, and enrich their ritual practices. Scholarship often describes these interactions between the Abrahamic monotheisms using metaphors of exchange between individuals-as if one tradition might borrow a theological idea from another in the same way that a neighbor might borrow a recipe. This Element proposes that there are deeper forms of entanglement at work in these historical moments.

This Element examines how the Western philosophical-theological tradition between Plato and Aquinas understands the relation between God and being. It gives a historical survey of the two major positions in the period: a) that the divine first principle is 'beyond being' (Example Plato, Plotinus, Pseudo-Dionysius), and b) that the first principle is 'being itself' (Example Augustine, Avicenna, Aquinas). The Element argues that we can recognize in the two traditions, despite their apparent contradiction, complementary approaches to a shared project of inquiry into transcendence.