This paper studies how a central bank's preference for robustness against model misspecification affects the design of monetary policy in a New-Keynesian model of a small open economy. Due to the simple model structure, we are able to solve analytically for the optimal robust policy rule, and we separately analyze the effects of robustness against misspecification concerning the determination of inflation, output and the exchange rate. We show that an increased central bank preference for robustness makes monetary policy respond more aggressively or more cautiously to shocks, depending on the type of shock and the source of misspecification.

We study an optimal robust monetary policy for a small open economy. The robust control approach assumes that economic agents cannot assign probabilities to a set of plausible models and rather focuses on the worst possible misspecification from a benchmark model. Our findings suggest that, first, conducting a global robust optimal monetary policy is limited as deviations from the benchmark model lead to multiple equilibria. Second, when the central bank considers uncertainty only in the IS Curve or in the UIP, the space of unique solutions is expanded. In fact, the central bank reacts more aggressively to demand and real exchange rate shocks when it is robust to misspecifications in the IS curve only. Finally, our results suggest that the global robust optimal monetary policy is limited due to inflation persistency and the low exchange rate pass-through. The importance of anchoring inflation expectations is highlighted.

Introducing habit formation into an open economy macro economic model with price stickiness, we examine the characteristics of an optimal monetary policy. We find that, first, the optimal policy rule entails interest rate smoothing and responds to the lagged values of the foreign interest rate and domestic technology shocks as well as their current values. Second, habit formation enriches the dynamics of the economy with a persistent, hump-shaped response of consumption to shocks. Finally, when habit formation does matter, the optimal policy rule achieves a greater welfare improvement over alternative policy rules by achieving lower macroeconomic variability.

United States monetary policy has traditionally been modeled under the assumption that the domestic economy is immune to international factors and exogenous shocks. Such an assumption is increasingly unrealistic in the age of integrated capital markets, tightened links between national economies, and reduced trading costs. International Dimensions of Monetary Policy brings together fresh research to address the repercussions of the continuing evolution toward globalization for the conduct of monetary policy. In this comprehensive book, the authors examine the real and potential effects of increased openness and exposure to international economic dynamics from a variety of perspectives. Their findings reveal that central banks continue to influence decisively domestic economic outcomes—even inflation—suggesting that international factors may have a limited role in national performance. International Dimensions of Monetary Policy will lead the way in analyzing monetary policy measures in complex economies.

The most popular simple rule for the interest rate, due to Taylor, is meant to inform monetary policy in closed economies. On the other hand, its main open-economy alternative, Ball's rule based on a monetary conditions index (MCI), may perform poorly in the face of specific types of exchange rate shocks, and thus cannot offer guidance for the day-to-day conduct of monetary policy. In this paper, a comprehensive set of simple monetary policy rules (including the MCI-based and Taylor versions) is specified and evaluated, all suitable for small open economies in general, and for the United Kingdom in particular. The asymptotic properties of a two-sector open-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model calibrated on UK data are compared under the different rules. It is found that an inflation-forecast-based rule (IFB), i.e., one that reacts to deviations of expected inflation from target, performs well. Adding a separate response to the level of the real exchange rate (contemporaneous and lagged) appears to reduce the difference in adjustment between output gaps in the two sectors of the economy, but the improvement is only marginal. Importantly, an IFB rule, with or without exchange rate adjustment, appears robust to different shocks, in contrast to naive or Ball's MCI-based rules.