This book, first published in 1978, provides an analysis of British monetary policy and considers what techniques of monetary control were most appropriate to the context of the U.K. during the 1970s and 1980s. David Gowland answers crucial questions surrounding economic management in the period between 1971 and 1976, in particular whether rapid monetary expansion was the cause of the acceleration of U.K. inflation. With an analysis of the government’s experimentation with policy at its core, this is a unique study which will be of interest to students of monetary policy and recent British economic history.

This book, first published in 1978, provides an analysis of British monetary policy and considers what techniques of monetary control were most appropriate to the context of the U.K. during the 1970s and 1980s. David Gowland answers crucial questions surrounding economic management in the period between 1971 and 1976, in particular whether rapid monetary expansion was the cause of the acceleration of U.K. inflation. With an analysis of the government’s experimentation with policy at its core, this is a unique study which will be of interest to students of monetary policy and recent British economic history.

Intended as a successor to Monetary Policy and Credit Control (Croom Helm, 1978; Routledge Revivals, 2013), this book, first published in 1982 with a revised edition in 1984, traces the changes in approach to monetary control in the U.K. throughout the 1970s, and the consequences for policy and the British economy. The book considers the widely-publicised proposals for ‘reserve base’ or ‘monetary base’ control of the financial system, including a critique of the 1980 Bank of England Green Paper. David Gowland concludes with an analysis of the 1979 Conservative Government’s monetary policy. This is a very interesting title, of great relevance to students and academics researching recent British economic history and varying governmental approaches to monetary policy.

The Theory of Money and Finance, by the same author, provided an introduction to the basic theory and concluded by introducing the idea of monetary disequilibrium, with the money supply process operating through bank credit creation. First published in 1981, this book develops that theme and provides empirical evidence in support of such an approach.

Intended as a successor to Monetary Policy and Credit Control (Croom Helm, 1978; Routledge Revivals, 2013), this book, first published in 1982 with a revised edition in 1984, traces the changes in approach to monetary control in the U.K. throughout the 1970s, and the consequences for policy and the British economy. The book considers the widely-publicised proposals for ‘reserve base’ or ‘monetary base’ control of the financial system, including a critique of the 1980 Bank of England Green Paper. David Gowland concludes with an analysis of the 1979 Conservative Government’s monetary policy. This is a very interesting title, of great relevance to students and academics researching recent British economic history and varying governmental approaches to monetary policy.

First published in 1936, this book gives the reader an insight into the tendencies and spirit of the monetary reform movement as a whole, as accomplished or proposed since the First World War. The author marks the consideration of the overall reform as being more important than specifically looking at the actual proposals and measures involved, and the views he attributes to the various monetary reform schools are therefore composite views of the various factions of those schools. As a comparatively recent convert to the idea of monetary reform, at the time of writing, the author offers a balanced view of the subject as he also has extensive experience of the ideas of the orthodox monetary system. However, he does not believe that monetary reform alone can achieve the desired end without considerable economic planning. Indeed, he suggests that the monetary reform movement he discusses desperately needs to adopt a broader perspective and thus, he suggests a compromise.