We present evidence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy for the U.S. banking system. We use confidential data on the internal ratings of U.S. banks on loans to businesses over the period 1997 to 2011 from the Federal Reserve’s survey of terms of business lending. We find that ex-ante risk taking by banks (as measured by the risk rating of the bank’s loan portfolio) is negatively associated with increases in short-term policy interest rates. This relationship is less pronounced for banks with relatively low capital or during periods when banks’ capital erodes, such as episodes of financial and economic distress. These results contribute to the ongoing debate on the role of monetary policy in financial stability and suggest that monetary policy has a bearing on the riskiness of banks and financial stability more generally.

Traditional theory suggests that more profitable banks should have lower risk-taking incentives. Then why did many profitable banks choose to invest in untested financial instruments before the crisis, realizing significant losses? We attempt to reconcile theory and evidence. In our setup, banks are endowed with a fixed core business. They take risk by levering up to engage in risky ‘side activities’(such as market-based investments) alongside the core business. A more profitable core business allows a bank to borrow more and take side risks on a larger scale, offsetting lower incentives to take risk of given size. Consequently, more profitable banks may have higher risk-taking incentives. The framework is consistent with cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run up to the recent financial crisis.

Since 2007, central banks of industrialized countries have counteracted financial instability, recession, and deflationary risks with unprecedented monetary policy operations. While generally regarded as successful, these measures also led to an exceptional increase in the size of central bank balance sheets. The book first introduces the subject by explaining monetary policy operations in normal times, including the key instruments (open market operations, standing facilities, reserve requirements, and the collateral framework). Second, the book reviews the basic mechanics of financial crises as they have hit economies many times. The book then explains what central banks need to do to when financial markets and banks are impaired to fulfil their monetary policy and financial stability mandates. Besides demonstrating the need for non-conventional monetary policy measures, the book also highlights their dangers, such as moral hazard and increased central bank risk taking. The book draws a number of lessons from the crisis on non-conventional monetary policy operations, assessing what measures have worked well, and how a framework should be designed in future normal times such as to contribute to make financial crises less likely. Central bank monetary policy operations have traditionally been considered as a matter of practice, while the macroeconomic modelling of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is regarded as a discipline relying on substantial theory ('monetary economics'). However, monetary policy operations can equally benefit from a theory, and from a normative framework to guide policy choices. The limited interest that monetary policy operations have found for many decades in academic economics may well have contributed to the many misunderstandings on central bank actions over recent years. This book provides a basis for a better theoretical understanding of real-world monetary policy operations.

We study how low interest rates in the United States affect risk taking in the market of crossborder leveraged corporate loans. To the extent that actions of the Federal Reserve affect U.S. interest rates, our analysis provides evidence of a cross-border spillover effect of monetary policy. We find that before the crisis, lenders made ex-ante riskier loans to non- U.S. borrowers in response to a decline in short-term U.S. interest rates, and, after it, in response to a decline in longer-term U.S. interest rates. Economic uncertainty and risk appetite appear to play a limited role in explaining ex-ante credit risk. Our results highlight the potential policy challenges faced by central banks in affecting credit risk cycles in their own jurisdictions.

We study the impact of the US quantitative easing (QE) on both the emerging and advanced economies, estimating a global vector error-correction model (GVECM) and conducting counterfactual analyses. We focus on the effects of reductions in the US term and corporate spreads. First, US QE measures reducing the US corporate spread appear to be more important than lowering the US term spread. Second, US QE measures might have prevented episodes of prolonged recession and deflation in the advanced economies. Third, the estimated effects on the emerging economies have been diverse but often larger than those recorded in the US and other advanced economies. The heterogeneous effects from US QE measures indicate unevenly distributed benefits and costs.

Provides an in-depth overview of the Federal Reserve System, including information about monetary policy and the economy, the Federal Reserve in the international sphere, supervision and regulation, consumer and community affairs and services offered by Reserve Banks. Contains several appendixes, including a brief explanation of Federal Reserve regulations, a glossary of terms, and a list of additional publications.