Europe’s financial crisis cannot be blamed on the Euro, Harold James contends in this probing exploration of the whys, whens, whos, and what-ifs of European monetary union. The current crisis goes deeper, to a series of problems that were debated but not resolved at the time of the Euro’s invention. Since the 1960s, Europeans had been looking for a way to address two conundrums simultaneously: the dollar’s privileged position in the international monetary system, and Germany’s persistent current account surpluses in Europe. The Euro was created under a politically independent central bank to meet the primary goal of price stability. But while the monetary side of union was clearly conceived, other prerequisites of stability were beyond the reach of technocratic central bankers. Issues such as fiscal rules and Europe-wide banking supervision and regulation were thoroughly discussed during planning in the late 1980s and 1990s, but remained in the hands of member states. That omission proved to be a cause of crisis decades later. Here is an account that helps readers understand the European monetary crisis in depth, by tracing behind-the-scenes negotiations using an array of sources unavailable until now, notably from the European Community’s Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Delors Committee of 1988–89, which set out the plan for how Europe could reach its goal of monetary union. As this foundational study makes clear, it was the constant friction between politicians and technocrats that shaped the Euro. And, Euro or no Euro, this clash will continue into the future.

This book is an accessible introduction to European monetary integration which provides a historical background to current debates, as well as an analysis of future developments. Further features of this book include: * a chronology of economic and monetary unification from 1958-1999 * clear non-technical presentation of the economic issues regarding the costs and benefits of creating a monetary union * detailed presentation of the economic and legal framework for the changeover to a single European economy * evaluation of the Maastricht Treaty's plan for monetary union * an overview of the debate between the federalist approach and the inter-governmental co-operation approach towards economic and political integration of Europe * a set of questions and exercises illuminating the more technical parts of the book European Monetary Integration 1958-2002 is an excellent resource for all those who want to discover the facts about European monetary integration which lie behind the heated political rhetoric.

This book surveys the prospects for regional monetary integration in various parts of the world. Beginning with a brief review of the theory of optimal currency areas, it goes on to examine the structure and functioning of the European Monetary Union, then turns to the prospects for monetary integration elsewhere in the world - North America, South America, and East Asia. Such cooperation may take the form of full-fledged monetary unions or looser forms of monetary cooperation. The book emphasizes the economic and institutional requirements for successful monetary integration, including the need for a single central bank in the case of a full-fledged monetary union, and the corresponding need for multinational institutions to safeguard its independence and assure its accountability. The book concludes with a chapter on the implications of monetary integration for the United States and the US dollar.

The clearest and most up-to-date account of the achievements—and setbacks—of the European Union since 1945. Europe has been transformed since the Second World War. No longer a checkerboard of entirely sovereign states, the continent has become the largest single-market area in the world, with most of its members ceding certain economic and political powers to the central government of the European Union. This shift is the product of world-historical change, but the process is not well understood. The changes came in fits and starts. There was no single blueprint for reform; rather, the EU is the result of endless political turmoil and dazzling bureaucratic gymnastics. As Brexit demonstrates, there are occasional steps backward, too. Cutting through the complexity, Richard Pomfret presents a uniquely clear and comprehensive analysis of an incredible achievement in economic cooperation. The Economic Integration of Europe follows all the major steps in the creation of the single market since the postwar establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. Pomfret identifies four stages of development: the creation of a customs union, the deepening of economic union with the Single Market, the years of monetary union and eastward expansion, and, finally, problems of consolidation. Throughout, he details the economic benefits, costs, and controversies associated with each step in the evolution of the EU. What lies ahead? Pomfret concludes that, for all its problems, Europe has grown more prosperous from integration and is likely to increase its power on the global stage.

This book brings together contributions from leading scholars around the world on the most relevant and pressing economic themes surrounding the UK–EU relationship. With chapters spanning from the UK’s accession to the bloc to the aftermath of its decision to leave, the book explores key themes in UK economic growth and EU membership, international trade, foreign direct investment, financial markets and migration. Chapters interrogate the history of the relationship, the depth of foreign direct investment, and responses to the financial crisis. Considering both the history and future of UK and EU relations, the book is a relevant and timely volume that gives welcome context to a fast-changing relationship.

Sir Alan Walters ex-chief economic advisor to PM Margaret Thatcher Whether it succeeds or fails, Europe is everyone's concern. The idea of a united Europe has been entertained, even partially at least, achieved, inter alia, CharlemagI!e, Napoleon, Hitler, and in our da)' by Spaak, Monet and Chancellor Kohl: the first three by military conquest, the last three by "negotiation" and the creation of integrating institutional arrangements. The motives varied from the twisted paranoia of the Nazis to the idealism of SpaaklMonet/Kohl in avoiding conflicts and wars. Under the protection of NATO the European Coal and Steel Community soon was transformed into the EEC by the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The massive reduction of trade barriers, particularly between France and Germany, was rewarded by vigorous growth over the next 15 years. Even as late as 1972, when Britain acceeded to the Treaty of Rome, the EEC was thought to be lar~ely a customs union: in de Gaulle eyes the EEC was simply a collection of sovereISJ:l states who cooperated primarily on trade. Each state however enjoyed a veto; deCIsions had to be unanimous.