The new Debt Sustainability Framework for Market Access Countries (MAC SRDSF) contemplates certain output that would be shared with the Board but that would need to be deleted from Country Documents before publication. A targeted modification to the Transparency Policy—proposed in this paper—is required for such deletions to be applied across market access Country Documents rather than on a case-by-case basis. The MAC SRDSF output to be deleted before publication consists on: (i) the near-term risk assessment; (ii) when debt is assessed to be sustainable, the qualification ”with high probability” or “but not with high probability”, unless such qualification is required for use of Fund resources; and (iii) the mechanical signal on debt sustainability.

This paper finds that reforms introduced by the IMF to promote transparency have created more informed markets and reduced borrowing costs for those emerging market countries that volunteered for them. Using a quarterly panel estimation with fixed country effects, we find that sovereign spreads fall following the adoption of three different transparency reforms. The effects are economically important, especially for those countries with low initial transparency. We use two-stage least squares to address any endogeneity in the timing of reforms exploiting internal IMF timetables that are unrelated to country events. Next, using a panel GARCH specification, we show that spreads move more than normal in the days immediately following publication of IMF country documents.

Transparency in government operations is widely regarded as an important precondition for macroeconomic fiscal sustainability, good governance, and overall fiscal rectitude. Notably, the Interim Committee, at its April and September 1996 meetings, stressed the need for greater fiscal transparency. Prompted by these concerns, this paper represents a first attempt to address many of the aspects of transparency in government operations. It provides an overview of major issues in fiscal transparency and examines the IMF's role in promoting transparency in government operations.

This note provides guidance to staff on the implementation of the Fund’s Transparency Policy. The objectives of the policy include strengthening the Fund’s effectiveness by providing the public with access to Fund views and deliberations, thus informing public debate and building traction for the Fund’s advice, supporting the quality of surveillance and of programs, by subjecting the Fund to outside scrutiny, and enhancing the Fund’s legitimacy by making the institution more accountable. A Transparency Policy Decision (referred to in the remainder of this note as “the Decision”) sets out rules for the modification and publication of all Board documents.

This departmental paper investigates how countries in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) can improve fiscal transparency, thereby raising government efficiency and reducing corruption vulnerabilities.

The global financial crisis has had a significant impact on low-income countries (LICs)’ debt vulnerabilities. Recent debt sustainability analyses (DSAs) indicate that external and fiscal financing requirements have increased. In addition, standard measures of a country’s capacity to repay debt?GDP, exports, and fiscal revenue?are expected to be permanently lower. On average, debt ratios are therefore expected to deteriorate in the near term, particularly for public debt.

Provides guidance to staff on the implementation of the Fund’s Transparency Policy. The objectives of the policy include strengthening the Fund’s effectiveness by providing the public with access to Fund views and deliberations, thus informing public debate and building traction for the Fund’s advice, supporting the quality of surveillance and of programs, by subjecting the Fund to outside scrutiny, and enhancing the Fund’s legitimacy by making the institution more accountable. A Transparency Policy Decision (referred to in the remainder of this note as “the Decision”) sets out rules for the modification and publication of all Board documents. A number of changes to the Decision were adopted by the Executive Board on June 24, 2013 (See Box 1 and 2013 Review of the Fund’s Transparency Policy, May 14, 2013, Background Paper, May 14, 2013, and Supplementary Information and Revised Proposed Decisions, June 17, 2013).