This article proposes a method to estimate relative ministerial weights in parliamentary democracies. Specifically, we present a bargaining model of government formation and estimate structural parameters of the model using data for (i) who the formateurs are, (ii) what each party's voting weight is, and (iii) what ministerial seats each party obtains. We also measure the effects of voting weights and formateur advantage on bargaining results. We apply our proposed method to the case of Japan. Our estimation results show that political players value pork-related posts (such as the Minister of Construction) much more than prestigious ones (such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs). We also find that there is a significant formateur advantage, whereas voting weights do not have a significant scale effect, which is consistent with the findings for European democracies.

Portfolio allocation in presidential systems is a central tool that presidents use to deal with changes in the political and economic environment. Yet, we still have much to learn about the process through which ministers are selected and the reasons why they are replaced in presidential systems. This book offers the most comprehensive, cross-national analysis of portfolio allocation in the Americas to date. In doing so, it contributes to the development of theories about portfolio allocation in presidential systems. Looking specifically at how presidents use portfolio allocation as part of their wider political strategy, it examines eight country case studies, within a carefully developed analytical framework and cross-national comparative analysis from a common dataset. The book includes cases studies of portfolio allocation in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, the United States, Peru and Uruguay, and covers the period between the transition to democracy in each country up until 2014. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of political elites, executive politics, Latin American politics and more broadly comparative politics.

Governing cabinets are composed of ministers who come and go even as governments march on. They work for the chief executive, the prime minister or the president, for their parties and for the constituent groups from which they come. They are chosen for their role and dismissed from it for all sorts of reasons that vary across time and country. This book examines the process of selection, shuffling and removal of ministers in national cabinets around the world. Drawing on original data over several decades, it offers a series of case studies of countries from around the world with differing institutional and cultural structures including presidential and semi-presidential systems, and parliamentary, unitary and federal systems, some of which have experienced periods under authoritarian regimes. Featuring 14 case studies on North and South America, Asia, Africa, Australia and New Zealand, this book complements the earlier volume The Selection of Ministers in Europe (Routledge, 2009). This volume will be an important reference for students and scholars of political science, government, executives, comparative politics and political parties.

The book provides a comprehensive view on the internal life of parties and investigates the dynamics of intra-party politics in different party environments to explain in which circumstances the party leader is more or less bound by the wills of party factions. Analyzing almost 500 intra-party documents from Italy, Germany and France, it presents a theory of intra-party politics that illuminates internal decision-making processes and sheds light on the outcomes of factional conflicts on the allocation of payoffs within the party, on the risk of a party split and on the survival of the party leader. Using text analysis, the results show that consensual dynamics can allow to preserve party unity and that directly elected leaders can exploit their larger autonomy either to reward followers or to prevent splits. This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of Party Politics, Political Institutions, European Politics and more broadly to Comparative Politics, Political Theory and Text Analysis.

This volume discusses the formation of government cabinets within twenty European democracies, providing the institutional background to the selection and de-selection of ministers. Exploring the historical and constitutional context to cabinet formation, this volume proceeds to provide vital data on the strategic issues that affect the selection of ministers. Covering states from all over Europe, the authors examine trends from the post-war period up to the present day, with specific focus on recent decades for the newer democracies in political transition. The volume includes: pioneering new research into the hiring and firing of government ministers vital information on appointments, dismissals and resignations within government cabinets succinct constitutional data relating to ministerial selections across a number of European states The book is the first output of the Selection and De-selection of Political Elites international network of scholars (SEDEPE) and will provide a major source of information for all scholars interested in the formation, maintenance and termination of cabinets and the nature of ministerial government. The Selection of Ministers in Europe. Hiring and Firing will also be of broader interest to students of European Government and Political Institutions.

Understanding the formation of governments has always been central to political science. Traditionally this topic has been considered from a rational choice theory perspective and the empirical testing of these theories; however neither approach alone is able to explain a large proportion of actual coalition formations. This comparative volume brings together a rational choice theory perspective and the empirical testing of these theories to study government formation. It provides in-depth studies of government formations in Europe that cannot be accounted for by existing coalition theory in order to identify potential explanatory factors that have been neglected so far. These ‘coalition puzzles’ are reconstructed by country experts based on secondary sources, newspaper accounts, internal party documents, and interviews in an effort to understand why particular governments were formed. In conclusion, this book assesses whether new factors can be integrated into rational choice theories or whether these analyses point to the need for a different paradigm. This important volume will be of interest to students and scholars of political science, European politics and comparative politics.

The election on 9 May 2018 ended six decades of rule by the ruling coalition in Malaysia (Barisan Nasional or BN, formerly the Alliance). Despite this result, the BN’s longevity and resilience to competition is remarkable. This book explores the mechanisms behind the emergence, endurance, fight for survival and decline of the party’s dominance. Using a systematic analysis of key resources (budgets, posts, and seats), Washida challenges the conventional argument that a punitive threat to exclude opposition supporters from distributive benefits sustained the loyalty of the masses as well as the elites. He also calls into question whether the mere existence of party organization in and of itself enables leaders to credibly commit to power-sharing. Instead he posits a theory of mobilization agency, in which a party leader needs to design an effective incentive mechanism. In addition, he explains how the BN had manufactured legislative dominance by tactical gerrymandering and malapportionment. The insights drawn from the Malaysian case can help deepen our understanding of the rise and fall of authoritarian parties and distributive politics in general. Chapters 1 and 7 of this book are freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF at http://www.taylorfrancis.com under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license.