Modern philosophy finds it difficult to give a satisfactory picture of the place of minds in the world. In Mind and World, one of the most distinguished philosophers writing today offers his diagnosis of this difficulty and points to a cure.

Reading McDowell: On Mind and World brings together an exceptional list of contributors to analyse and discuss McDowell's challenging and influential book, one of the most influential contributions to contemporary philosophy in recent years. In it McDowell discusses issues in epistemology, philosophy of mind and ethics as well as surveying the broader remit of philosophy. Reading McDowell clarifies some of these themes and provides further material for debate across philosophy of mind, ethics, philosophy of language and epistemology. The internationally renowned contributors include: Richard Bernstein, Gregory McCulloch, Hilary Putnam, Charles Taylor, Crispin Wright, Jay Bernstein, Rudiger, Bubner, Robert Pippin, Charles Lamour, Axel Honneth, Barry Stround, Robert Brandom and Michael Williams. In conclusion, John McDowell responds to all the contributions. This critical contribution to analytic philosophy is likely to shape philosophical debate for years to come. It will be of interest to professional philosophers, as well as students of contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind and ethics.

John McDowell's Mind and World has, since its publication in 1994, become a seminal text, putting forward many new ideas on the manner in which concepts mediate the relation between minds and the world. Yet McDowell's ideas are not easy to comprehend. In this book Sandra Dingli both elaborates and simplifies McDowell's ideas in order to give greater clarity to them and to assist in the understanding and appreciation of his work. Dingli selects five particular contemporary philosophical topics which McDowell deals with and investigates in detail the implications of particular points of view, analysing the current literature on each topic and drawing out shortcomings and possibilities for overcoming them. This work is, then, both a critique and complement to McDowell's text. McDowell's project is to dissolve a number of dualisms such as sensibility and understanding, conceptual and non conceptual content, scheme and content, and reason and nature. Dingli critically analyses each of these and claims that a proper understanding of the philosophical method of quietism is important for a correct understanding of this text, concluding that McDowell does not go far enough in his attempt to attain peace for philosophy as traditional dichotomies such as that of realism and anti-realism still appear to exert a grip on his thinking.

The 14 specially commissioned chapters in this superb collection enrich McDowell and Dreyfus's debate over perceptual experience, rationality, reflectiveness, and perception. Mind, Reason and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate should be considered essential reading for both students and scholars of analytic philosophy and phenomenology.

This book collects some of McDowell’s most influential papers of the last two decades. The essays deal with themes such as the interpretation of Aristotle’s and Plato’s ethical writings, questions in moral philosophy that arise out of the Greek tradition, Wittengensteinian ideas about reason in action, and issues central to philosophy of mind.

This innovative new reading of Aristotle's De Anima sheds new light on a most important and difficult ancient philosophical text.

This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind--in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind--in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. Kim construes the mind-body problem as that of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical. Among other points, he redefines the roles of supervenience and emergence in the discussion of the mind-body problem. Arguing that various contemporary accounts of mental causation are inadequate, he offers his own partially reductionist solution on the basis of a novel model of reduction. Retaining the informal tone of the lecture format, the book is clear yet sophisticated.