Rebel groups and insurgencies have been an important topic of study for several decades, particularly with the rise and success of groups like Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, Hamas, and the Islamic State. When rebel groups such as these are discussed in the media and in popular culture, they are generally portrayed purely as violent organizations bent on imposing strict religious doctrines on an unwilling population. Often missing in these discussions are the nuances of how rebel groups actually act and operate. There are numerous cases of rebel groups gaining territory and governing over their constituents effectively and efficiently-sometimes better than the official state government. Using across-case and within-case analysis of Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), this thesis explains why Islamist militant groups choose to provide governance and public goods to a population instead of primarily using coercive violence to achieve their goals. Ultimately, this thesis finds that rebel legitimacy and territorial control along with overall group capability are the most important factors behind rebel governance.Rebel groups and insurgencies have been an important topic of study for several decades, particularly with the rise and success of groups like Hezbollah, al Qaeda, Hamas, and the Islamic State. When rebel groups such as these are discussed in the media and in popular culture, they are generally portrayed solely as violent and ruthless organizations bent on imposing strict religious doctrines on an unwilling population. Often missing in these discussions are the nuances of how rebel groups actually act and operate. Although 70 percent of rebel groups do not provide public goods or services, there are numerous cases of rebel groups gaining territory and governing over their constituents effectively and efficiently-sometimes better than the official state government.Apart from the Islamic State, al Qaeda and its affiliates have been the most concerning insurgent groups for the United States and its allies for two decades. Western countries and their Middle Eastern allies have experienced thousands of civilian and military casualties at the hands of al Qaeda, and the study of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains vital to the security of Western countries and their allies. The United States has also remained concerned with the strength and operations of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon since the 1980s, in part due to the United States' close relationship with Israel. Interestingly, despite their designation as terrorist organizations, all three groups have displayed strong elements of rebel governance and have provided goods and services to their constituents.

By focusing on four specific hotbeds of instability-Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq-Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Andrea J. Dew carefully analyze tribal culture and clan associations, examine why "traditional" or "tribal" warriors fight, identify how these groups recruit, and where they find sanctuary, and dissect the reasoning behind their strategy. Their new introduction evaluates recent developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the growing prevalence of Shultz and Dew's conception of irregular warfare, and the Obama Defense Department's approach to fighting insurgents, terrorists, and militias. War in the post-Cold War era cannot be waged through traditional Western methods of combat, especially when friendly states and outside organizations like al-Qaeda serve as powerful allies to the enemy. Bridging two centuries and several continents, Shultz and Dew recommend how conventional militaries can defeat these irregular yet highly effective organizations.

This is the first book to examine and compare how rebels govern civilians during civil wars in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. Drawing from a variety of disciplinary traditions, including political science, sociology, and anthropology, the book provides in-depth case studies of specific conflicts as well as comparative studies of multiple conflicts. Among other themes, the book examines why and how some rebels establish both structures and practices of rule, the role of ideology, cultural, and material factors affecting rebel governance strategies, the impact of governance on the rebel/civilian relationship, civilian responses to rebel rule, the comparison between modes of state and non-state governance to rebel attempts to establish political order, the political economy of rebel governance, and the decline and demise of rebel governance attempts.

Why do only some incipient rebel groups become viable challengers to governments? Only those that control local rumor networks survive.

This book focuses on the different types of combatants in conflicts in Africa, exploring the fine lines between what might be classified as a militia in one conflict, a rebel in another, or a terrorist in a third. Drawing on the work of Carl von Clausewitz, this book provides a conceptually stable and analytically sound new typology on combatants. Analysing the relationships between state and society, and drawing on Clausewitz's Trinity of passion, chance, and reason, the book presents a set of five types of armed actors: Professionals, Praetorians, Militias, Insurgents, and Mercenaries. Each type is developed through a close reading of foundational theoretical texts, reviews of contemporary studies, and a historical analysis of their unique characteristics. Unlike a reductionist binary perspective, this typology accounts for the dynamic, complex, and evolving relationships of these actors with the state and society. A typology of combatants in conflicts in Africa can provide avenues for more in-depth analysis of such conflicts and holds implications for Security Sector Reform projects and other peace-building programmes. As such, this book will be an essential reference for scholars and students of African Politics and Military and Security Studies.

This book sheds new light on the security challenges for failed states posed by violent non-state armed actors (VNSAs). By focusing on the Syrian Civil War, it explores the characteristics, ideologies and strategies of the Islamic State (ISIS) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG), as well as the regional and geopolitical impacts of these VNSAs. The contributors also cover topics such as the re-imagination of borders, the YPG’s demands for national sovereignty, and the involvement of regional and global powers in the Syrian crisis. “This timely volume by regional scholars and experts examines various aspects of the emergence and expansion of violent non-state actors in the Syrian/Iraqi conflict. The wealth of detail and approaches enhance our understanding of the transformation and dynamics of contemporary conflicts within and beyond the region.” Keith Krause, The Graduate Institute, Geneva “This book opens fascinating glimpses into contrasting forms of “state-like” governance established by non-state actors, ISIS and the Kurdish PYD. [...] It is an important source for students of the Syrian conflict, civil wars, failed states and hybrid governance.”Raymond Hinnebusch, Director Centre for Syrian Studies, University of St. Andrews “This book is an excellent resource for those looking for an interdisciplinary account of VNSAs during the Syrian civil war. It makes a nice contribution to the study of violent non state actors and poses a set of new and pressing questions.” Max Abrahms, Northeastern University.