This book analyses how and to what extent ex-communist states have adjusted their defence strategies since joining the EU and NATO, and how differences and similarities between their strategies can be explained. Between 1999 and 2013, four phases of enlargement took place when the European Union (EU) and NATO allowed 11 new former communist states to enter both organisations. These states share some common attributes and experiences related to strategic culture and common experiences during the Cold War era that can potentially explain similarities in behaviour and preferences among them. However, the strategic adjustments among these states are far from uniform. In an effort to explain these differences, the book introduces three intervening variables: (1) differences in relative power and position in the international system, (2) national geographical characteristics; and (3) historical experiences related to formative periods of state-building processes as well as wars and armed conflicts. Empirically, the book strives to present and analyse the defence strategies of each of the new allies by conducting a structured focused comparison of official strategic documents from the twenty-first century for each of the 11 cases. Theoretically and methodologically, it introduces an analytical framework enabling us to explain both similarities and differences in the formulation of the strategies of the 11 states, and to shed light on their external and internal efforts to promote their strategic interest by operationalising the dependent variable - defence strategy. The analytical framework combines elements of structural realism with classical realism, and constructivist research on unit-level characteristics related to relative power and perceptions of strategic exposure. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, European Union policy, NATO and International Relations in general.

The question of burden sharing has always been important in NATO with an acute relevance today as the US will cut its defence budget over a ten-year period and is no longer automatically willing to lead military operations. This volume considers Europe's role in political force for the future exploring eight European case studies.

In this volume, prominent civilian and military experts in defense, representing the maritime-continental coalition, military reform, and noninterventionist schools of thought, outline the changes in military strategy, policy, and force structure that they believe the United States must adopt if it is to cope successfully with threats to national security in the 1980s and 1990s. The authors analyze US interests and objectives, the changing strategic environment, and the major security threats facing the United States in the coming decades. They also discuss what they believe is the proper mix of political, economic, and military instruments for dealing with fixture threats. The alternative strategies they present are wide-ranging and comprehensive, running the gamut from a strategic withdrawal from global commitments to proposals for increasing US power projection and forcible entry capabilities in the Third World. In many ways the chapters are critical of current and past approaches to military strategy. The authors believe it is essential that strategists understand the existing critiques of current U.S. military strategy in order to make the correct policy decisions for the future.

At the EU's Helsinki summit in 1999, European leaders took a decisive step toward the development of a new Common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) aimed at giving the EU a stronger role in international affairs backed by a credible military force. This report analyzes the processes leading to the ESDP by examining why and how this new European consensus came about. It touches upon the controversies and challenges that still lie ahead. What are the national interests and driving forces behind it, and what steps need to be taken to realize Europe's ambitions to achieve a workable European crisis mgmt. capability?

In the postD9/11 era of heightened security awareness, conflicting strategies for containing and combating security risks have strained relations between the United States and the European Union despite common goals. Atlantic Bridges argues that the U.S. must resist the temptation to focus its diplomatic efforts on bilateral agreements with those European countries in closest alignment to it, and instead use its dependable and durable partners among the central and eastern European states to develop more predictable and productive relations with the EU for the sake of long-term stability.

What is military strategy today? In an era when European states seek to de-escalate and avoid armed conflict, and where politicians fear the consequences of protracted operations or tactical hazards, does military strategy have any relevance? This is the first volume to examine current military risks and threats for NATO from a military strategy vantage point. Which strategies are needed? Is ways—ends—means thinking possible as a strategic template today? The contributors probe the relative importance, utility and options of military strategy across NATO as it confronts a variety of challenges old and new, as hybrid threats, new nuclear risks and conventional force combine in complex ways. They also examine what military strategy and military integration really mean, when NATO’s multilateral framework is being weakened by degrees of self-interest. They analyse the USA’s political and military role in Europe, and assess military strategic responses to Russian aggression in Ukraine and the Middle East. Moreover, they study the role of member states’ military strategy set against Article 5 and non-Article 5 risks and threats, and explore how European states devise and implement military strategic options. This book makes a clear assessment of political level strategy and its implications for military integration.