Wherever international commerce flows in world politics, military power often flows with it - sometimes as a protector of commerce, sometimes as its promoters and sometimes as a tool of aggression against it. How are military power and international trade related? Do military power and commerce expand together or does military power decline as commerce (and perhaps interdependence) increases? Does this relationship vary across countries and, if so how? Power, Conflict and Trade is a study of the relationship between military power and international commerce among the Great Powers prior to World War I. After building an argument for a direct relationship between military power and commerce - one grounded in a mercantilist view of state power- and exploring their numerous connections, the book estimates models of the relationship among the Great Powers and explores a great deal of their commercial and military data, all of which is situated in the context of their mutual rivalries. Another question investigated is whether the peacetime conflicts and rivalries of the Great Powers affected their trade relations adversely. There is strong support for the argument that military power and commerce move together in world politics, though there is evidence for an inverse relationship as well.

The Handbook on the Political Economy of War highlights and explores important research questions and discusses the core elements of the political economy of war.

This book examines the use of military force as a coercive tool by the United States, using lessons drawn from the post-Cold War era (1991–2018). The volume reveals that despite its status as sole superpower during the post-Cold War period, US efforts to coerce other states failed as often as they succeeded. In the coming decades, the United States will face states that are more capable and creative, willing to challenge its interests and able to take advantage of missteps and vulnerabilities. By using lessons derived from in-depth case studies and statistical analysis of an original dataset of more than 100 coercive incidents in the post-Cold War era, this book generates insight into how the US military can be used to achieve policy goals. Specifically, it provides guidance about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, the US armed forces can work in concert with economic and diplomatic elements of US power to create effective coercive strategies. This book will be of interest to students of US national security, US foreign policy, strategic studies and International Relations in general.

esistance capabilities of US adversaries.

Wherever international commerce flows in world politics, military power often flows with it - sometimes as a protector of commerce, sometimes as its promoters and sometimes as a tool of aggression against it. How are military power and international trade related? Do military power and commerce expand together or does military power decline as commerce (and perhaps interdependence) increases? Does this relationship vary across countries and, if so how? Power, Conflict and Trade is a study of the relationship between military power and international commerce among the Great Powers prior to World War I. After building an argument for a direct relationship between military power and commerce - one grounded in a mercantilist view of state power- and exploring their numerous connections, the book estimates models of the relationship among the Great Powers and explores a great deal of their commercial and military data, all of which is situated in the context of their mutual rivalries. Another question investigated is whether the peacetime conflicts and rivalries of the Great Powers affected their trade relations adversely. There is strong support for the argument that military power and commerce move together in world politics, though there is evidence for an inverse relationship as well.

Commanding Military Power offers a new explanation of why some armed forces are stronger than others. Ryan Grauer advances a 'command structure theory' which combines insights from organization theory, international relations, and security studies literatures to provide a unique perspective on military power. Specifically, armed forces organized to facilitate swift and accurate perception of and response to battlefield developments will cope better with war's inherent uncertainty, use resources effectively, and, quite often, win. Case studies of battles from the Russo-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War and Korean War, based on new archival research, underscore the argument, showing that even smaller and materially weaker militaries can fight effectively against and defeat larger and better endowed adversaries when they are organizationally prepared to manage uncertainty. That organization often matters more than numbers and specific tools of war has crucial implications for both contemporary and future thinking about and efforts to improve martial strength.