Operations Research (OR) emerged in an effort to improve the effectiveness of newly inducted weapons and equipment during World War II. While rapid growth ofOR led to its becoming an important aid to decision making in all sectors including defense, its contribution in defense remained largely confined to classified reports. Very few books dealing with applications of quantitative decision making techniques in military have been published presumably due to limited availability ofrelevant information. The situation changed rapidly during the last few years. The recognition of the subject of Military Operations Research (MOR) gave tremendous boost to its development. Books and journals on MOR started appearing. The number of sessions on MOR at national and international conferences also registered an increase. The volume of teaching, training and research activities in the field of MOR at military schools and non-military schools enhanced considerably. Military executives and commanders started taking increasing interest in getting scientific answers to questions pertaining to weapon acquisition, threat perception and quantification, assessment of damage or casualties, evaluation of chance of winning a battle, force mix, deployment and targeting of weapons against enemy targets, war games and scenario evaluation. Most of these problems were being tackled on the basis of intuition, judgment and experience or analysis under very simple assumptions. In an increasingly sophisticated and complex defense scenario resulting in advances in equipment and communications, the need for supplementing these practices by scientific research in MOR became imperative.

'History of Operations Research in the United States Army,' a comprehensive 3-volume set with each volume covering a different time span, offers insights into the natural tension between military leaders and civilian scientists, the establishment and growth of Army Operations Research (OR) organizations, the use of OR techniques, and the many contributions that OR managers and analysts have made to the growth and improvement of the Army since 1942.

"Operations research (OR) is a core discipline in military and defense management. Coming to the forefront initially during World War II, OR provided critical contributions to logistics, supply chains, and strategic simulation, while enabling superior decision-making for Allied forces. OR has grown to include analytics and many applications, including artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and big data, and is the cornerstone of management science in manufacturing, marketing, telecommunications, and many other fields. This new edition of the Handbook of Military and Defense Operations Research continues to present the voices leading OR and analytics to new heights in security through research, practical applications, case studies, and lessons learned in the field"--

This book explores the theoretical foundations and applications of military operational logistics (OpLog). OpLog theory has two facets: qualitative and quantitative.The qualitative facet is imbedded in the theory of operational level of war or operational art. It includes principles, imperatives and tenets, which are stated and analyzed in the first few chapters. The quantitative facet relates to the scientific aspects of OpLog. It is manifested by formal network models representing structural and operational features of an OpLog system. The book examines the two facets and integrates them into a unified presentation. Important OpLog applications a re described and discussed. Chapter 1 presents a general introduction to military logistics. Chapter 2 discusses the px;font-family: monospace;">general structure and characteristics of logistics and describes its three levels – strategic, operational and tactical. Chapter 3 describes the foundation of OpLog. Chapter 4 deals with OpLog planning. Chapter 5 addresses the issue of logistic information, and Chapter 6 deals with forecasting logistic demands. Chapters 7 and 8 are new additions to this second edition. They address logistics aspects of two contemporary operational topics – insurgencies and humanitarian assistance.Chapter 9 describes the first version of the logistic network model. Chapter 10 addresses an important OpLog characteristic – Flexibility. Chapter 11 discusses two major challenges in OpLog practice: force accumulation, 4419px; font-family: monospace;">and medical treatment and evacuation. Chapter 12 presents an inter-temporal network optimization model designed to determine deployment and employment of 3333px;font-family: monospace;">the OpLog support chain during military operations.

Operations research (OR) emerged during World War II as an important means of assisting civilian and military leaders in making scienti?cally sound improvements in the design and performance of weapons and equipment. OR techniques were soon extended to address questions of tactics and strategy during the war and, after the war, to matters of high-level political and economic policy. Until now, the story of why and how the U.S. Army used OR has remained relatively obscure, surviving only in a few scattered o?cial documents, in the memories of those who participated, and in a number of notes and articles that have been published about selected topics on military operations research. However, none of those materials amounts to a comprehensive, coherent history. In this, the ? rst of three planned volumes, Dr. Charles R. Shrader has for the ?rst time drawn together the scattered threads and woven them into a well-focused historical narrative that describes the evolution of OR in the U.S. Army, from its origins in World War II to the early 1960s. He has done an admirable job of ferreting out the surviving evidence, shaping it into an understandable narrative, and placing it within the context of the overall development of American military institutions. Often working with only sparse and incomplete materials, he has managed to provide a comprehensive history of OR in the U.S. Army that o?ers important insights into the natural tension between military leaders and civilian scientists, the establishment and growth of Army OR organizations, the use (and abuse) of OR techniques, and, of course, the many important contributions that OR managers and analysts have made to the growth and improvement of the Army since 1942. In this volume, Dr. Shrader carries the story up to 1962, the beginning of the McNamara era and of America’s long involvement in Vietnam. The subsequent volumes will cover Army OR during the McNamara era; its application in support of military operations in Vietnam; and its significant contributions to the Army’s post–Vietnam recovery and reorganization, ultimately leading to a victory (after only 100 hours of combat) in the first Gulf War in 1991 and the emergence of the U.S. Army as second to none in modern weaponry, tactical prowess, and strategic vision.