This book employs game theory to warfare and in particular to military operations. It aims at scrutinizing the validity of the two ideas that have governed the literature on war and warfighting: One is the Clausewitzian Fog of War, which suggests that he who is able to "see" through the gunsmoke and observe his opponent’s moves before he has to commit to some strategy himself, should be able to gain an advantage over that enemy; the other is the tradition of understanding military conflict as a zero-sum game. Combined, these ideas seem to imply that war always gives rise to a second-mover advantage. This book questions the validity of this presumption at the operational level of military planning. It provides a simple but rigorous game-theoretic framework in order to analyse operational alternatives for a whole range of typical conflicts Western military forces are facing, including the most recent ones such as Anti-Access/Area-Denial and supporting host nations' counterinsurgency campaigns.

This publication describes the theory and philosophy of military planning as practiced by the U.S. Marine Corps. The intent is to describe how we can prepare effectively for future action when the future is uncertain and unpredictable. In so doing, this publication provides all Marines a conceptual framework for planning in peace, in crisis, or in war. This approach to planning is based on our common understanding of the nature of war and on our warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare as described in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting.

This manual provides guidance for the organization, planning, and conduct of the full range of military operations on urbanized terrain. This publication was prepared primarily for commanders, staffs, and subordinate leaders down to the squad and fire team level. It is written from a Marine air-ground task force perspective, with emphasis on the ground combat element as the most likely supported element in that environment. It provides the level of detailed information that supports the complexities of planning, preparing for, and executing small-unit combat operations on urbanized terrain. It also provides historical and environmental information that supports planning and training for combat in built-up areas

This handbook describes operational design and its interaction with joint operation planning. It is based partly on joint doctrine contained in JP 5-0 , Joint Operation Planning, and JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, but it provides more details on operational design than currently exist in these publications. The handbook also highlights “best practices” derived from Service, joint, and multinational operations and joint exercises. In particular, this handbook increases the depth of discussion on operational design by incorporating new design-related ideas developed and refined in Service and joint academic institutions during the past three years. This handbook has two primary purposes. The first is to provide useful details to commanders and planners on joint operational design and its interaction with the joint operation planning process. The second is to stimulate thinking about the best ways to incorporate new, design-related ideas into emerging joint doctrine, training, and education. This handbook provides a platform the joint community can use to examine and debate design issues and establish a common frame of reference for collaboration on assimilating value-added ideas. This handbook focuses on operational design and related aspects of joint operation planning within strategic and operational-level context. The handbook is relevant to joint force commanders (JFC), joint force Service and functional component commanders, and their respective staffs. However, the staff is the intended target audience, especially those involved in planning joint operations.