A United States general describes his command of the deployment of U.S. troops and supplies to the Persian Gulf in the war with Iraq and recommends his methods of leadership and resource management for use in the business world.

This collection of essays reflects the proceedings of a 1991 conference on "The United States Air Force: Aerospace Challenges and Missions in the 1990s," sponsored by the USAF and Tufts University. The 20 contributors comment on the pivotal role of airpower in the war with Iraq and address issues and choices facing the USAF, such as the factors that are reshaping strategies and missions, the future role and structure of airpower as an element of US power projection, and the aerospace industry's views on what the Air Force of the future will set as its acquisition priorities and strategies. The authors agree that aerospace forces will be an essential and formidable tool in US security policies into the next century. The contributors include academics, high-level military leaders, government officials, journalists, and top executives from aerospace and defense contractors.

The fog of war is inevitably followed by the "fog of analysis." This has certainly been true of the most important military conflict of the post-Cold War era, the Gulf War between Iraq and the allied coalition led by the United States. A variety of studies of this conflict have appeared, many within just months of the end of hostilities and many with the obvious weaknesses resulting from the rush to publish. Now in this fourth volume of the acclaimed Lessons of Modern War series, military analyst Anthony H. Cordesman, with defense consultant Abraham R. Wagner, has produced what must be considered the definitive study of the Gulf War.Anthony Cordesman draws careful conclusions based on extensive research from a wide variety of sources, including newly declassified documents; official military reports; informal review and commentary by U.S. military services and British, French, Egyptian, and Saudi officers; interviews; and field research in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and southern Iraq as well as Cordesman's own firsthand observations of the unfolding battle for Kuwait in his capacity as military analyst for ABC News and a year of research on the war as fellow at the Wilson Center. Abraham Wagner contributes his unique experience in intelligence and command-and-control issues.The book examines in unprecedented detail the efforts of all the members of the coalition, not just the United States. The authors are careful to distinguish between the general lessons about warfare that can be drawn from the Gulf War and those that are unique to this conflict. Throughout the book, the authors offer enough data to enable the reader to consider alternatives to Cordesman and Wagner's own highly authoritative conclusions.The many lessons presented in this book cover the whole range of political, strategic, tactical, technical, and human elements of this conflict. The authors' analysis is based on the dynamic interaction of all of these factors, not just static bean-counting. The central lesson is that this highly complex web of human and technological developments has resulted in a new "military revolution" of profound significance for the history of modern war. "Lessons of Modern War, Volume IV: The Gulf War" explodes many myths, offers sometimes controversial conclusions, and is essential reading for anyone concerned about the "revolution in military affairs''; peacekeeping; Gulf and energy security issues; and the new, but still dangerous, world in which we live.

Twenty years ago, the Persian Gulf War captured the attention of the world as the first test of the U.S. Army since the Vietnam War and the first large-scale armor engagement since World War II. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and his subsequent ouster by the U.S.-led coalition are keys to understanding today's situation in the Middle East. The coalition partnerships cemented in that initial operation and in the regional peacekeeping operations that followed provided the basis for a growing series of multinational efforts that have characterized the post-Cold War environment. Moreover, the growing interoperability of U.S. air, sea, and land forces coupled with the extensive employment of more sophisticated weapons first showcased in Desert Storm have become the hallmark of American military operations and the standard that other nations strive to meet.

Provides an account, from the point of view of the U.S. Army forces employed, of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the withdrawal of coalition forces from southeastern Iraq. It focuses on the Army's part in this war, particularly the activities of the Headquarters, Third Army, and the Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT). It looks especially at the activities of the VII Corps, which executed ARCENT's main effort in the theater ground force schwerpunkt -- General Schwarzkopf's "Great Wheel." This is not an official history; the author speaks in his own voice and makes his own judgments. Maps.