The complex political situation that has formed in Iraq, and is currently ongoing, has again provided a lot of evidence as to the many changes that have occurred in military strategy. However, the current preparedness of modern military leadership has existed in an imperfect system and is slow to adapt to the situation in Iraq. This has dangerous implications. The recent analysis of previous wars and armed conflicts considers them new forms of warfare. Today we are so far removed from the classical form of warfare, such as World War II, that we cannot compare the role of the military leader in those conflicts with the situation leaders face in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, or Sudan. Therefore, the entire system of military education for leaders demands a revolution change. This project examines the different schools currently used in the Armed Forces of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine and the way they prepare their strategic leaders. The research reveals a distinct disconnect in modern military strategy which is taught in schools, and the way that strategy is practiced in current military operations. Recommendations are provided to adjust the modern system of military education in order to prepare those leaders to leading future wars.

Military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism, particularly those in Iraq and Afghanistan, have challenged the Dept. of Defense¿s (DoD) ability to provide needed ground forces. Section 354 of the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act directed a report on a number of military readiness issues. This report addresses: (1) the extent to which DoD¿s use of nonstandard forces to meet ground force requirements has impacted the force; and (2) the extent to which DoD has faced challenges in managing the training and use of these forces, and taken steps to address any challenges. Includes recommendations. Charts and tables.

From the introduction: "This handbook provides the tactics, techniques, and procedures that may be applied by small unit leaders engaged in counterinsurgency. It is principally focused at the company and below. It describes the nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency, common insurgent approaches, preparation for counterinsurgency, mobilizing the populace, information and intelligence operations, and operations in a counterinsurgency environment. The handbook is not prescriptive but meant to inform. The specific aspects of each conflict combined with small unit leader judgment and initiative will drive how to apply the ideas within the handbook". Chapter 1: Overview; Chapter 2: Common Insurgent Approaches; Chapter 3: Preparation for Counterinsurgency; Chapter 4: Mobilizing the Populace; Chapter 5: Information and Intelligence Operations; Chapter 6: Operations in a COIN Environment; Annex A: Patrol Search; Annex B: Basic Observation Skills; Annex C: The Twenty-Eight Articles - Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency; Annex D: Improvised Explosive Devices. Originally published in 2006. 136 pages. ill.

This field manual establishes doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 40 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies--some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. This is a comprehensive manual that details every aspect of a successful COIN operation from intelligence to leadership to diplomacy. It also includes several useful appendices that provide important supplementary material.

Despite the prevalence of irregular wars, the U.S. Army must also be prepared for the possibility of a high-intensity conventional war. The training required for this war must simulate the expected conditions, those of high-intensity conflict, as closely as possible. As U.S. strategic leaders look to the future and prepare the U.S. Army for the next conflict, they prepare for a war with a level of violence that resembles that of the Korean War. While conditions that simulate combat are dangerous and present inherent risks, the mitigation of that risk prevents the adequate simulation of a high-intensity combat situation. Therefore, this thesis studied how risk mitigation practices in U.S. Army tactical infantry training affect Soldiers' preparedness for high-intensity combat operations. By examining U.S. Army infantry training at the tactical level, U.S. Army safety and risk mitigation doctrine, cognitive and perceptual biases, and historical case studies, this thesis suggests that U.S. Army risk management practices neither hinder nor help combat preparedness. Instead, the abdication of a commander's authority to execute risk mitigation in the training environment affects combat readiness.Executive Summary * I. IS THE U.S. ARMY PREPARED FOR THE NEXT WAR? * A. INTRODUCTION * B. THE PROBLEM * C. RESEARCH QUESTION * D. EXISTING ARGUMENTS: THE DICHOTOMY OF RISK IN TRAINING * II. TRAINING A U.S. ARMY INFANTRY COMPANY FOR COMBAT * A. LEADERSHIP, PERSONNEL, AND TRAINING TASK DEVELOPMENT * 1. The Role of the Company Commander * 2. Company Organization and Information Flow * 3. Mission Essential Task List Development * 4. The Army Force Generation Model * 5. Training--Creating "Pre-Battle Veterans" * B. TECHNOLOGY--"THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF WAR" BALANCING LETHALITY, MOBILITY, AND PROTECTION * 1. Ground Delivery Platforms * 2. Optics and Night Vision * 3. Personal Protective Equipment * C. OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE TRAINING * 1. Time and Task Saturation--"The Deluge of Requirements" * 2. Peacetime Control Mechanisms / Range Regulations * 3. Organizational Complacency--"This Is the Way We've Always Done it" * 4. Conclusion--The Effect of Training Obstacles * III. RISK MITIGATION, MISSION COMMAND, AND ERODING COMBAT READINESS * A. RISK AND SAFETY DOCTRINE * 1. Risk Management Doctrine * 2. Safety Doctrine and Regulation * B. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RISK PERCEPTION * C. MISSION COMMAND AND RISK IN THE COMBAT ENVIRONMENT * 1. Training Misalignment with Mission Command * 2. A Degradation in Readiness through the Lens of Live Fire Surface Danger Zones (SDZs). * 3. Lack of Preparation-- "Training Scar Tissue" * D. CONCLUSION * IV. HISTORICAL CASES OF TACTICAL U.S. ARMY INFANTRY UNITS IN HIGH-INTENSITY CONFLICT * A. 1-21 INFANTRY (TASK FORCE SMITH) AT THE START OF THE KOREAN WAR * 1. Leadership * 2. Training * 3. Technology * 4. Conclusion * B. 1st BATTALION, 7th CAVALRY REGIMENT IN THE BATTLE OF IA DRANG * 1. Leadership * 2. Technology * 3. Training * 4. Conclusion * C. 75th RANGER REGIMENT DURING THE SEIZURE OF RIO HATO AIRFIELD * 1. Leadership * 2. Training * 3. Technology * 4. Conclusion * D. CONCLUSION-- LEADERSHIP IS THE LINCHPIN FOR COMBAT PREPARATION * V. CONCLUSION-- THE OUTSOURCING OF RISK MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY UNDERMINES MISSION COMMAND * A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES TO CURRENT PRACTICES AND U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE * 1. U.S. Army Safety Doctrine Must Clarify the Role of Range Control * 2. U.S. Army Installations and Training Commands Should Streamline the Safety Waiver Process * 3. Educate Leaders on the Effects of Cognitive and Perceptual Bias When Managing Risk * 4. Senior Leaders Must Commit to Mission Command in the Training Environment * B. QUESTIONS UNANSWERED AND REQUIRING ADDITIONAL EXAMINATION

The Marine Corps University symposium, "Counterinsurgency Leadership in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond" held on September 23, 2009 at the National Press Club, Washington, DC explored ways to improve counterinsurgency leadership, with particular attention to the leaders of American, Afghan, and Iraqi forces. The Symposium was sponsored by Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps University Foundation.

Offering the wisdom of practitioners from the military, law enforcement, fire and rescue, as well as prominent scholars this guide integrates theory and research with practical experience to help the reader prepare for the unique psychological, social, and physical challenges of leading in dangerous contexts. Whether a young soldier preparing for war, seasoned combat commander, SWAT team leader, EMT supervisor, law enforcement patrol unit leader, or fire department lieutenant, those involved in life-and-death situations face common challenges, and the authors draw on their own experiences and that of others to help first responders effectively function in dangerous environments.