This book challenges current thinking about the outbreak of World War I and the course of German foreign policy since Bismarck’s chancellorship. In 1914, Germany's opening offensives against France were to be accompanied by a simultaneous offensive by her ally, Austria-Hungary, against Russia. The Austrian offensive was intended to hold the Russians until Germany defeated the French—six weeks, no more. Then, the German army would turn east to support the Austrians. The Austrian offensive was a catastrophic failure. After only days of fighting Russia, Germany was obliged to send troops to support Austria lest she capitulate while most of the German army was still in France. The Austrian army’s severe deficiencies were a constant drain on the German effort throughout the war. After the war, German memoirists and historians claimed that the German leadership had been unaware of these deficiencies before the war broke out. These claims have been accepted by historians down to today. The book presents recently re-discovered documentary evidence that the German general staff and Germany’s political leadership had known of the Austrian army’s weaknesses for decades before the war. The book also reveals a new perspective of Bismarck’s diplomacy beginning shortly after he engineered the Dual Alliance between the two countries in 1879. It demonstrates that as early as 1882 Bismarck became aware that the Austrian army was far weaker than assumed when he concluded the alliance. It was primarily his concern about Austria’s weakness that spurred Bismarck’s energetic diplomacy, seeking alliances and understandings with other countries in the region, and which became the main consideration that guided his foreign policy from then on. For if Austria suffered a defeat, Germany would find itself alone between two dangerous powers: France and Russia. The consequences of his policies resulted in peace down to his departure in 1890. His successors, for a variety of reasons addressed in the book, were not as careful, ignored Austria’s weaknesses despite the warnings of the military attachés, and permitted Austria to become involved in a war. The result was tragically foreseeable.

Alexandroff explains how diplomacy is at the heart of patterns of foreign policy behaviour. Using the interactions of the European Great Powers between 1870 and 1890 as an example, he critically examines currently prevalent theories of international behaviour and proposes the logic of diplomacy as a better explanation of this behaviour. '...one of the book's strengths is that it encompasses the whole spectrum of diplomatic behavior from cooperation to conflict, rather than the more frequent focus simply on extremes such as alliances or military war. The work also does an excellent job at placing its approach in the context of the existing macro-level quantitative international relations projects.' -- The American Political

A well-researched answer by a Columbia University political scientist to the question: Who started the First World War?

Originally published in 1957, the original blurb reads: ‘From these studies of the secret diplomacy surrounding the entry of Turkey and Italy into the First World War, emerges a picture of the complex machinery behind the obvious wheels of international politics. The activities of statesmen and diplomats are related to the ramifications of big business, banks, oil and armament companies. The story of each move and counter-move, told mostly in the actors’ own words and with many quotations from actual memoranda and dispatches, is based on sources which are quite new. The Russian collections of confidential correspondence, which include foreign diplomatic dispatches intercepted and deciphered in Russia, and the latest Documenti Diplomatici Italiani are practically unknown to the British public. This material has been integrated with that taken from all the available collections of British, French, German, Austro-Hungarian and American diplomatic documents, official publications, contemporary periodicals and economic and financial data, and such mines of information as the diaries, recollections and private letters of those involved. This unusual combination of source material allows some general conclusions to be drawn as to the laws and logic of the diplomacy of power politics. The most striking fact, perhaps, is the diplomatic war among allies. The book brings out the deep-seated conflicts of interests in the German-Austro-Hungarian coalition, and those dividing Britain, France, Russia and Italy in the Near East, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Another point of special interest is the inter-group and party struggle inside the countries for or against war; and another is the genesis of some of the fateful Secret Treaties which bedevilled the peace settlements of 1919-20.’ Today it can be read and enjoyed in its historical context.

Military alliances drive international politics. They embody conflict and cooperation among states and shape the international political landscape. Despite the profound effect alliances have on the course of international politics, many gaps remain in our understanding of their formation, continuance, and cohesion. In this book, Patricia Weitsman introduces a comprehensive theory that unifies current ideas about alliances and examines the relationship between threat and alliance politics under conditions of both war and peace. Examining military alliances before and during World War I, Weitsman provides a new interpretation of the politics of the great powers of this period. She reveals that states frequently form alliances to keep peace among the allied countries, not simply to counter shared external threats. Though alliances may be perceived by others to present a unified and threatening front, countries often face significant threats from within their own alliances. It is this paradox that underscores Weitsman's theory: although alliances are frequently forged to sustain peace, they may, in fact, increase the prospects of war.