What is success in war? Who defines success? A review of past theorists such as Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Jomini and Clausewitz along with modern scholars such as William Martel, Azar Gat, and J. Boone Bartholomees produces a model for understanding success. First, success must be defined using political terms. Since war is a political endeavor at the strategic level, success in war must be defined using political language. Politicians and military leaders must define the objectives of war and convince the population that the political condition has improved using whatever political language is required for the given situation. Military tactical language is not sufficient for defining success at the political level. Second, the political leaders must define the desired objective for the military campaign. Political leaders understand politics and the nature of the population. Military leaders should help political leaders define success in war. Politicians understand the population and military leaders understand the theory and history of war. Third, the political condition that exists at the end of the war determines whether the war was successful. Victory in battle is important but is not always necessary for success. War must improve the political condition. Finally, a review of two US conflicts in Lebanon against the success model demonstrates its utility. The political and military leaders in Lebanon 1958 followed the theory of the model and achieved a successful outcome for the conflict. The political and military leaders of Lebanon 1983 did not adhere to the theory of the success model and were unable to achieve success. Although adherence to the model will not ensure future success, it can be used to help political and military leaders better prepare for future conflict.

Fifty-five of the world's greatest military and political leaders share their formulas for success What is the key to success? To begin with, said Thomas Jefferson, "one must determine never to be idle." According to Calvin Coolidge, "Persistence and determination are omnipotent." For General Norman Schwarzkopf, successful leadership was, above all, a product of integrity. "Leadership is a potent combination of strategy and character. But if you must be without one, be without the strategy." While the individual leaders profiled in this inspiring book had their own personal formula for success, all shared certain essential attributes. From Alexander the Great to Colin Powell, Sitting Bull to Ronald Reagan, these remarkable people possessed discipline, courage, tenacity and a willingness to take risks and learn from their mistakes. And despite vast geographical and cultural differences across far-reaching periods in time, these leaders' examples continue to teach us important lessons about achieving greatness. Discover how: Tecumseh forged an Indian confederacy stretching from Missouri to Canada General Patton's formula for war --speed, simplicity, and boldness -- led his troops to victory Queen Elizabeth I brought Britain into an age of unprecedented prosperity and growth Ulysses S. Grant turned the tide in the Civil War Winston Churchill led his nation through World War II and won the Nobel Prize for literature

Joseph Nye coined the term "soft power" in the late 1980s. It is now used frequently—and often incorrectly—by political leaders, editorial writers, and academics around the world. So what is soft power? Soft power lies in the ability to attract and persuade. Whereas hard power—the ability to coerce—grows out of a country's military or economic might, soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. Hard power remains crucial in a world of states trying to guard their independence and of non-state groups willing to turn to violence. It forms the core of the Bush administration's new national security strategy. But according to Nye, the neo-conservatives who advise the president are making a major miscalculation: They focus too heavily on using America's military power to force other nations to do our will, and they pay too little heed to our soft power. It is soft power that will help prevent terrorists from recruiting supporters from among the moderate majority. And it is soft power that will help us deal with critical global issues that require multilateral cooperation among states. That is why it is so essential that America better understands and applies our soft power. This book is our guide.

Success in war has always been difficult to measure. What is judged successful by military leaders may not be judged so by political leadership, nor by the wider public, at least in a Western-style democracy. The public is generally inclined to applaud military victory, but it instinctively reserves the right to ask afterwards: Was it really worth it? In Political Victory, Brian Crozier looks at modern wars involving democracies to evaluate victory and defeat by the success or failure of political outcomes.Crozier begins with the two world wars, where in both cases the German aggressor was defeated by three key democracies: the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. In World War I military victory was squandered by treaty terms that led to the advent of Hitler and Nazism. By contrast, the total defeat of Nazism in 1945 left the Western Allies in charge of some two-thirds of Germany's population, thus enabling the victors to convert the vanquished to democracy. Crozier also deals with the break up of empires following World War II, comparing how Britain avoided full-scale war in contrast with France's violent confrontations in Southeast Asia and Algeria.America's involvement in Vietnam is analyzed in the wider context of the Cold War and the mounting challenge of international communism to Western democracies. His assessment stresses the lack of popularity in America for the idea of democratizing a region to which the U.S. has no historical or sentimental attachment. Among the smaller conflicts considered in this volume are the Suez crisis of 1956, the Falkland Island war between Britain and Argentina, and the fateful Soviet involvement in Afghanistan that helped bring about the collapse of the Soviet system. Crozier concludes with analyses of the 1991 Gulf War and the Western intervention in the former Yugoslavia.Crozier's final chapters focus on looming threats around the world with particular emphasis on international terrorism and the challenge of radical Islam. Both historical and timely, Political Victory will be of interest to military historians, political scientists, and foreign affairs specialists.

Spanning countries and centuries, a “how-not-to” guide to leadership that reveals the most maladroit military commanders in history—now in paperback. For this book, fifteen distinguished historians were given a deceptively simple task: identify their choice for the worst military leader in history and then explain why theirs is the worst. From the clueless Conrad von Hötzendorf and George A. Custer to the criminal Baron Roman F. von Ungern-Sternberg and the bungling Garnet Wolseley, this book presents a rogues’ gallery of military incompetents. Rather than merely rehashing biographical details, the contributors take an original and unconventional look at military leadership in a way that appeals to both specialists and general readers alike. While there are plenty of books that analyze the keys to success, The Worst Military Leaders in History offers lessons of failure to avoid. In other words, this book is a “how-not-to” guide to leadership.

A leader, military, political or in any other profession, is inevitably a lonely person, and yet a successful leader, especially in the military profession, must be a very sensitive person to be able to lead successfully through the motivation, dedication and loyalty of those he leads. In the military profession, of course, this acquires even greater salience since the profession, at one level, demands a willingness and readiness to make the supreme sacrifice, and, at another, involves victory or defeat of the country that nurtures its military power. We need strategists at all levels; and the chiefs of the armed forces of 2040 are already in active service. They would have to provide military professional advice to the political leadership at crucial times under enormous uncertainties where actionable intelligence would not be available, and their own knowledge and experience would have to guide them. This volume brings together eminent experts well versed in the theory and practice of leadership and the knowledge that needs to be available to them. The issues explored in this volume are equally applicable to other professions, especially in the corporate world.

Success in war ultimately depends upon the consolidation of political order. Consolidating the new political order is not separate from war, rather Nadia Schadlow argues that governance operations are an essential component of victory. Despite learning this the hard way in past conflicts from the Mexican War through Iraq and Afghanistan, US policymakers and the military have failed to institutionalize lessons about post-conflict governance and political order for future conflicts. War and the Art of Governance distills lessons from fifteen historical cases of US Army military intervention and governance operations from the Mexican War through the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Improving outcomes in the future will require US policymakers and military leaders to accept that the political dimension is indispensable across the full spectrum of war. Plans, timelines, and resources must be shaped to reflect this reality before intervening in a conflict, not after things start to go wrong. The American historical experience suggests that the country's military will be sent abroad again to topple a regime and install a new government. Schadlow provides clear lessons that must be heeded before next time.