In order to develop successful selection procedures, training materials, and management policies for military assistance program (MAP) advisers, the conditions under which they work were analyzed, including identifying the culturally determined preferences counterparts have for the people with whom they wish to work, and the extent to which advisors and counterparts satisfy what each regards as critical role behaviors of the other. U.S. Army advisory personnel assigned to the U.S. Army Advisory Group, Korea (KMAG) and counterparts in the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) were surveyed in the summer and fall of 1966. Through rating scales and questionnaires, observations were made of the kinds of personalities with whom advisors and counterparts most preferred to work. In addition, advisors and counterparts judged one another in terms of a large number of role behaviors previously identified as important.

In order to identify the human factors that affect the achievement of the military assistance program (MAP) objectives and from them define personnel selection criteria, training objectives, and management policies, a conception of advisor proficiency and a method with which to study it were developed. Results presented in this report are based upon a questionnaire survey conducted in 1966 among U.S. Army advisor personnel assigned to the Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG) and their counterparts in the Republic of Korea Army. A rationale for conceiving of proficient advisor-counterpart transactions in terms of their stated willingness to continue working together in the future is presented. Construction of an assessment technique to obtain estimates of these intentions is described, as are the results of tests of the validity of the concept and method.

The Army has recently embarked on massive advisory missions with foreign militaries in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the globe. This historical study examines three cases in which the U.S. Army has performed this same mission in the last half of the 20th century, In Korea during the 1950s, in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and in El Salvador in the 1980s. The Army thought it learned: The need for U.S. advisors to have extensive language and cultural training, the lesser importance for them of technical and tactical skills training, and the need to adapt U.S. organizational concepts, training techniques, and tactics to local conditions. These lessons are still important and relevant today. This is a print on demand report.

The Will to Win focuses on the substantial role of US military advisors to the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) from 1946 until 1953 in one of America’s early attempts at nation building. Gibby describes ROKA’s structure, mission, challenges, and successes, thereby linking the South Korean army and their US advisors to the traditional narrative of this “forgotten war.” The work also demonstrates the difficulties inherent in national reconstruction, focusing on barriers in culture and society, and the effects of rapid decolonization combined with intense nationalism and the appeal of communism to East Asia following the destruction of the Japanese empire. Key conclusions include the importance of individual advisors, the significance of the prewar advisory effort, and the depth of the impact these men had on individual Korean units and in a few cases on the entire South Korean army. The success or failure of South Korean government in the decade following the end of World War II hinged on the loyalty, strength, and fighting capability of its army, which in turn relied on its American advisors. Gibby argues that without a proficient ROKA, the 1953 armistice, still in effect today, would not have been possible. He reexamines the Korean conflict from its beginning in 1945—particularly Korean politics, military operations, and armed forces—and demonstrates the crucial role the American military advisory program and personnel played to develop a more competent and reliable Korean army.

In order to identify the human factors that affect the achievement of the military assistance program (MAP) objectives and from them define personnel selection criteria, training objectives, and management policies, a conception of advisor proficiency and a method with which to study it were developed. Results presented in this report are based upon a questionnaire survey conducted in 1966 among U.S. Army advisor personnel assigned to the Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG) and their counterparts in the Republic of Korea Army. A rationale for conceiving of proficient advisor-counterpart transactions in terms of their stated willingness to continue working together in the future is presented. Construction of an assessment technique to obtain estimates of these intentions is described, as are the results of tests of the validity of the concept and method.