Mexican society is becoming militarized due to the increased use of the Mexican military in domestic affairs. This militarization is the result of three factors: the internal focus of the military, the drug war, and corruption. The internal focus of the Mexican military is based on doctrine. Mexico's drug war began in 1986 when U.S. President Reagan convinced their government that the trafficking of drugs constituted a National security threat. Corruption is pervasive in Mexico due to the combination of seven decades of authoritarian rule by the hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the associated effects from transnational drug trafficking. The army represents the last publicly respected institution in Mexico. During the past three years, almost the entire law enforcement apparatus to combat drug trafficking has been replaced with military soldiers and numerous key political appointees and governmental positions have been filled with Mexican generals and colonels. There are few national interests more profoundly consequential to the United States than the political stability and general welfare of Mexico. The militarization and changing civil military relations in Mexico is an important aspect in U.S. Mexico relations and must be considered impossible policy changes.

Forced Marches is a collection of innovative essays that analyze how the military experience molded Mexican citizens in the years between the initial war for independence in 1810 and the consolidation of the revolutionary order in the 1940s. The contributors—well-regarded scholars from the United States and the United Kingdom—offer fresh interpretations of the Mexican military, caciquismo, and the enduring pervasiveness of violence in Mexican society. Employing the approaches of the new military history, which emphasizes the relationships between the state, society, and the “official” militaries and “unofficial” militias, these provocative essays engage (and occasionally do battle with) recent scholarship on the early national period, the Reform, the Porfiriato, and the Revolution. When Mexico first became a nation, its military and militias were two of the country’s few major institutions besides the Catholic Church. The army and local provincial militias functioned both as political pillars, providing institutional stability of a crude sort, and as springboards for the ambitions of individual officers. Military service provided upward social mobility, and it taught a variety of useful skills, such as mathematics and bookkeeping. In the postcolonial era, however, militia units devoured state budgets, spending most of the national revenue and encouraging locales to incur debts to support them. Men with rifles provided the principal means for maintaining law and order, but they also constituted a breeding-ground for rowdiness and discontent. As these chapters make clear, understanding the history of state-making in Mexico requires coming to terms with its military past.

At the end of the Mexican Revolution in 1920, Mexico's large, rebellious army dominated national politics. By the 1940s, Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was led by a civilian president and claimed to have depoliticized the army and achieved the bloodless pacification of the Mexican countryside through land reform, schooling, and indigenismo. However, historian Thomas Rath argues, Mexico's celebrated demilitarization was more protracted, conflict-ridden, and incomplete than most accounts assume. Civilian governments deployed troops as a police force, often aimed at political suppression, while officers meddled in provincial politics, engaged in corruption, and crafted official history, all against a backdrop of sustained popular protest and debate. Using newly available materials from military, intelligence, and diplomatic archives, Rath weaves together an analysis of national and regional politics, military education, conscription, veteran policy, and popular protest. In doing so, he challenges dominant interpretations of successful, top-down demilitarization and questions the image of the post-1940 PRI regime as strong, stable, and legitimate. Rath also shows how the army's suppression of students and guerrillas in the 1960s and 1970s and the more recent militarization of policing have long roots in Mexican history.

This innovative social and cultural history explores the daily lives of the lowest echelons in president Porfirio Díaz’s army through the decades leading up to the 1910 Revolution. The author shows how life in the barracks—not just combat and drill but also leisure, vice, and intimacy—reveals the basic power relations that made Mexico into a modern society. The Porfirian regime sought to control and direct violence, to impose scientific hygiene and patriotic zeal, and to build an army to rival that of the European powers. The barracks community enacted these objectives in times of war or peace, but never perfectly, and never as expected. The fault lines within the process of creating the ideal army echoed the challenges of constructing an ideal society. This insightful history of life, love, and war in turn-of-the-century Mexico sheds useful light on the troubled state of the Mexican military more than a century later.

The power of the military in Latin America has become well known in recent decades, as coups have brought numerous military regimes into office since 1960. Yet too often it is assumed, for example, that the region's armed forces have had no legitimate defence functions, or that military professionalism is only a recent development.

This book examines the unique role a revolutionary army plays in the politics of Mexico. It discusses the political process which characterizes revolutions and revolutionary regimes in the twentieth century. The general problem to which the author directs his analysis is that of introducing civilian control into a political structure still dominated by the generals who successfully brought about the Revolution and who supposedly represent its ideals.

Militarizing Culture is a rousing critique of the increasing infiltration of military culture into American society by leading cultural commentator. Despite its pervasiveness, González insists that warfare is not an inevitable part of human nature, and charts a path toward the decommissioning of culture.