This volume provides an essential overview of one of the most important developments in economics, finance and law of the past generation: the growing realization of how the market for corporate control functions and why its operation is of crucial importance. Presenting seventeen seminal contributions, the book illustrates the importance of corporate control changes - mergers, acquisitions and other takeovers - in helping to align the interests of corporate shareholders and their managers. The mechanics of various takeover techniques (poison pills, greenmail and other gambits) are also explored alongside empirical research concerning the functioning of the market for corporate control.

This book brings together classic writings on the economic nature and organization of firms, including works by Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, and Michael Jensen and William Meckling, as well as more recent contributions by Paul Milgrom, Bengt Holmstrom, John Roberts, Oliver Hart, Luigi Zingales, and others. Part I explores the general theme of the firm's nature and place in the market economy; Part II addresses the question of which transactions are integrated under a firm's roof and what limits the growth of firms; Part III examines employer-employee relations and the motivation of labor; and Part IV studies the firm's organization from the standpoint of financing and the relationship between owners and managers. The volume also includes a consolidated bibliography of sources cited by these authors and an introductory essay by the editors that surveys the new institutional economics of the firm and issues raised in the anthology.

The financial crisis that began in 2008 and its lingering aftermath have caused many intellectuals and politicians to question the virtues of capitalist systems. The 19 original essays in this handbook, written by leading scholars from Asia, North America, and Europe, analyze both the strengths and weaknesses of capitalist systems. The volume opens with essays on the historical and legal origins of capitalism. These are followed by chapters describing the nature, institutions, and advantages of capitalism: entrepreneurship, innovation, property rights, contracts, capital markets, and the modern corporation. The next set of chapters discusses the problems that can arise in capitalist systems including monopoly, principal agent problems, financial bubbles, excessive managerial compensation, and empire building through wealth-destroying mergers. Two subsequent essays examine in detail the properties of the "Asian model" of capitalism as exemplified by Japan and South Korea, and capitalist systems where ownership and control are largely separated as in the United States and United Kingdom. The handbook concludes with an essay on capitalism in the 21st century by Nobel Prize winner Edmund Phelps.

This is a reprint of a previously published work. It deals with japanese mergers and acquisitions which reached a zenith in the 1980s.

In this book Neil Fligstein takes issue with prevailing theories of the corporation and proposes a radically new view that has important implications for American competitiveness.

This book presents recent literature on corporate mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, restructuring, and corporate governance as well as discussions of valuation, cost of capital, and strategic financial planning. This book discusses how M&As fit into a company's long-term strategy and how restructuring can unlock values in a company. It presents strategies designed to increase a firm's value: i.e., joint ventures, ESOPs, LBOs, share repurchases, and international strategies. The book also provides guides on selecting M&As to strengthen a company or increase its value. The second edition of Takeovers, Restructuring and Corporate Governance has been revised to include the latest empirical data and literature. It also now includes 38 important recent case studies: i.e., QVC-Paramount; Boeing-McDonnell Douglas; Ciba-Geigy-Sandoz, Disney-Cap Cities-ABC, and Time Warner-Turner.