A survey of the scholastic debate on the divine Trinity in the period between Aquinas' earliest works and Ockham's death.

Through the use of several illustrations from illuminated manuscripts and other media, Resnick engages readers in a discussion of the later medieval notion of Jewish difference.

How do we judge whether we should be willing to follow the views of experts or whether we ought to try to come to our own, independent views? This book seeks the answer in medieval philosophical thought. In this engaging study into the history of philosophy and epistemology, Peter Adamson provides an answer to a question as relevant today as it was in the medieval period: how and when should we turn to the authoritative expertise of other people in forming our own beliefs? He challenges us to reconsider our approach to this question through a constructive recovery of the intellectual and cultural traditions of the Islamic world, the Byzantine Empire, and Latin Christendom. Adamson begins by foregrounding the distinction in Islamic philosophy between taqlīd, or the uncritical acceptance of authority, and ijtihād, or judgment based on independent effort, the latter of which was particularly prized in Islamic law, theology, and philosophy during the medieval period. He then demonstrates how the Islamic tradition paves the way for the development of what he calls a “justified taqlīd,” according to which one develops the skills necessary to critically and selectively follow an authority based on their reliability. The book proceeds to reconfigure our understanding of the relation between authority and independent thought in the medieval world by illuminating how women found spaces to assert their own intellectual authority, how medieval writers evaluated the authoritative status of Plato and Aristotle, and how independent reasoning was deployed to defend one Abrahamic faith against the other. This clear and eloquently written book will interest scholars in and enthusiasts of medieval philosophy, Islamic studies, Byzantine studies, and the history of thought.

CATEGORIES by Aristotle translated by E. M. Edghill 1 Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only. On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. A man and an ox are both 'animal', and these are univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other. Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and the courageous man from the word 'courage'.

In Medieval Theories of Divine Providence 1250-1350 Mikko Posti presents a historical and philosophical study of the doctrine of divine providence in 13th- and 14th-century Latin philosophical theology. In addition to offering a fresh and engaging reading of Thomas Aquinas’s ideas concerning providence, Posti focuses on Siger of Brabant, Peter Auriol and Thomas Bradwardine, among others. The book also provides an extended treatment of the relatively little-known 13th-century work Liber de bona fortuna, consisting of Latin translations of chapters found originally in Aristotle’s Ethica Eudemia and Magna moralia. In their treatments of Liber de bona fortuna, the medieval theologians provided philosophically interesting explanations of good fortune and its relationship to divine providence. See inside the book.

Negligent omissions, cases in which an agent unintentionally forgets to fulfill an obligation, are philosophically problematic. They are problematic because they are considered blameworthy despite the fact that the conditions for voluntariness often appear unfulfilled. In an attempt to explain how they may be voluntary, this book delves into the action theories of Aristotle, Anselm, Aquinas, Scotus, and Suárez. In doing so, not only is the philosophical (and theological) importance of negligent omissions demonstrated via new and insightful interpretations, but a complex model for explaining the voluntariness of negligent omissions is constructed. The result is an original solution to the problem of negligent omissions that demonstrates the utility of appealing to historical approaches to solve contemporary philosophical and theological problems.

This book studies medieval theories of free will, including explanations of how angels - that is, ideal agents - can choose evil.