Utility is a key concept in the economics of individual decision-making. However, utility is not measurable in a straightforward way. As a result, from the very beginning there has been debates about the meaning of utility as well as how to measure it. This book is an innovative investigation of how these arguments changed over time. Measuring Utility reconstructs economists' ideas and discussions about utility measurement from 1870 to 1985, as well as their attempts to measure utility empirically. The book brings into focus the interplay between the evolution of utility analysis, economists' ideas about utility measurement, and their conception of what measurement in general means. It also explores the relationships between the history of utility measurement in economics, the history of the measurement of sensations in psychology, and the history of measurement theory in general. Finally, the book discusses some methodological problems related to utility measurement, such as the epistemological status of the utility concept and its measures. The first part covers the period 1870-1910, and discusses the issue of utility measurement in the theories of Jevons, Menger, Walras and other early utility theorists. Part II deals with the emergence of the notions of ordinal and cardinal utility during the period 1900-1945, and discusses two early attempts to give an empirical content to the notion of utility. Part III focuses on the 1945-1955 debate on utility measurement that was originated by von Neumann and Morgenstern's expected utility theory (EUT). Part IV reconstructs the experimental attempts to measure the utility of money between 1950 and 1985 within the framework provided by EUT. This historical and epistemological overview provides keen insights into current debates about rational choice theory and behavioral economics in the theory of individual decision-making and the philosophy of economics.

Provides a detailed discussion of the adjustment of risk references and how to go about making such adjustments to a common scale. By adjusting all information to this common scale, results across studies can be easily summarized and compared, and the body of information concerning risk aversion can be examined as a whole

There are not enough resources in health care systems around the world to fund all technically feasible and potentially beneficial health care interventions. Difficult choices have to be made, and economic evaluation offers a systematic and transparent process for informing such choices. A key component of economic evaluation is how to value the benefits of health care in a way that permits comparison between health care interventions, such as through costs per quality-adjusted life years (QALY). Measuring and Valuing Health Benefits for Economic Evaluation examines the measurement and valuation of health benefits, reviews the explosion of theoretical and empirical work in the field, and explores an area of research that continues to be a major source of debate. It addresses the key questions in the field including: the definition of health, the techniques of valuation, who should provide the values, techniques for modelling health state values, the appropriateness of tools in children and vulnerable groups, cross cultural issues, and the problem of choosing the right instrument. This new edition contains updated empirical examples and practical applications, which help to clarify the readers understanding of real world contexts. It features a glossary containing the common terms used by practitioners, and has been updated to cover new measures of health and wellbeing, such as ICECAP, ASCOT and AQOL. It takes into account new research into the social weighting of a QALY, the rising use of ordinal valuation techniques, use of the internet to collect data, and the use of health state utility values in cost effectiveness models. This is an ideal resource for anyone wishing to gain a specialised understanding of health benefit measurement in economic evaluation, especially those working in the fields of health economics, public sector economics, pharmacoeconomics, health services research, public health, and quality of life research.

The fifth edition of the classic text Thinking and Deciding updates the broad overview of the field of judgments and decisions offered in previous editions. It covers the normative standards used to evaluate conclusions, such as logic, probability, and various forms of utility theory. It explains descriptive accounts of departures from these standards, largely in terms of principles of cognitive psychology, emphasizing the distinction between search processes and inferences. Chapters cover decisions under risk, decision analysis, moral decisions and social dilemmas, and decisions about the future. Although the book assumes no particular prerequisites beyond introductory high-school algebra, it is most suited to advanced undergraduates, early graduate students, and active researchers in related fields, such as business, politics, law, medicine, economics, and philosophy.

Valuing Health provides a philosophically sophisticated overview of generic health measurement systems, which clarifies their value commitments and criticizes their dependence on preference surveys to assign values to health states. In it, philosopher Daniel M. Hausman argues that the public value of health states depends on the activity limits and suffering that health states impose.

Under the title 'Information, Inference and Decision' this volume in the Theory and Decision Library presents some papers on issues from the borderland of statistical inference philosophy and epistemology, written by statisticians and decision theorists who belonged or are allied to the former Saarbriicken school of statistical decision theory. In the first part I make an attempt to outline an objective theory of inductive behaviour, on the basis of R. A. Fisher's statistical inference philosophy, on the one hand, and R. Carnap's inductive logic, on the other. A special problem arising in the context of the new theory, viz., the problem of vagueness of concepts (in particular in the social sciences) is treated separately by H. Skala and myself. B. Leiner has contributed some biographical and bibliographical notes on the objective theory of inductive behaviour. Part II is concerned with inference philosophy. D. A. S. Fraser, the founder of structural inference theory, characterizes and compares some inference philosophies, and discusses his own and the arguments of the critics of his structural theory. In my opinion, Fraser's structural infer ence theory is suited to complete Fisher's inference philosophy in some essential points, if not to replace it. An interesting task for future re search work is to establish the connection between Fraser's theory and Carnap's ideas in the framework of an objective theory of inductive behaviour.