Max Stirner on the Path of Doubt examines Stirner's incisive criticism of his contemporaries during the period from the death of Hegel, in 1831, to the 1848 German Revolution. Stirner's work, mainly the Ego and His Own, considered each of the major figures within that German school known as “The Young Hegelians.” Lawrence S. Stepelevich argues that for Stirner, they were but “pious atheists,” and their common revolutionary ideology concealed an ancient religious ground – which Stirner set about to reveal. The central doctrine of this school, that Mankind was its own Savior, was initiated in 1835 by the theologian, David F. Strauss's in his Life of Jesus , and it progressed with August von Cieszkowski's mystical recasting of history, followed by Bruno Bauer's absolute atheism and Ludwig Feuerbach's statement that “Man is God.” This soon found reflection in the “Sacred History of Mankind” declared by Moses Hess. Within a decade, the result was the secular reformulation of this theological ideology into the “Scientific Socialism” of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Although linked to it, Max Stirner was the most relentless and feared critic of this school. His work, never out of print, but largely ignored by academics, has inspired countless “individualists” set upon rejecting any form of religious or political “causes,” and finding Stirner's assertion that he had “set his cause upon nothing” took this as their own cause.

A reassessment of the controversial, yet still influential nineteenth-century German philosopher that explores the contentious issue of whether he was, as his critics frequently claim, a nihilist.Max Stirner (1806-1856) is often regarded as an enfant terrible of nineteenth-century German philosophy, but he has continued to exert an influence despite his marginalization as a nihilist. This study is the first to tackle head-on the question of whether Stirner can indeed reasonably be described as a nihilist. Although he is not known ever to have used the word "nihilism" or any of its derivatives, he was first accused of being a nihilist immediately after the publication of his magnum opus Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (translated in most English editions as The Ego and His Own) in 1844. Since then, the allegation has been repeated by well over a hundred writers and critics, with the result that it has become something of a truism. The book aims, first, to establish a clear understanding of the multifarious meanings of the term nihilism; second, to examine the accusations leveled at Stirner in the light of those meanings; and third, to assess not only the fairness and accuracy of the imputation of nihilism but also its usefulness in understanding Stirner as a thinker. It thus provides new insights into Stirner's thought, challenges the orthodox view of him as a philosophical pariah, reassesses his ideas and their place in the history of philosophy, and addresses the recurrent issue of his contemporary relevance.ngs of the term nihilism; second, to examine the accusations leveled at Stirner in the light of those meanings; and third, to assess not only the fairness and accuracy of the imputation of nihilism but also its usefulness in understanding Stirner as a thinker. It thus provides new insights into Stirner's thought, challenges the orthodox view of him as a philosophical pariah, reassesses his ideas and their place in the history of philosophy, and addresses the recurrent issue of his contemporary relevance.ngs of the term nihilism; second, to examine the accusations leveled at Stirner in the light of those meanings; and third, to assess not only the fairness and accuracy of the imputation of nihilism but also its usefulness in understanding Stirner as a thinker. It thus provides new insights into Stirner's thought, challenges the orthodox view of him as a philosophical pariah, reassesses his ideas and their place in the history of philosophy, and addresses the recurrent issue of his contemporary relevance.ngs of the term nihilism; second, to examine the accusations leveled at Stirner in the light of those meanings; and third, to assess not only the fairness and accuracy of the imputation of nihilism but also its usefulness in understanding Stirner as a thinker. It thus provides new insights into Stirner's thought, challenges the orthodox view of him as a philosophical pariah, reassesses his ideas and their place in the history of philosophy, and addresses the recurrent issue of his contemporary relevance.

To date, the philosophy of Max Stirner (1806-1856) has not attracted much academic attention. An early critic of Karl Marx and precursor of existentialist thought, he is nevertheless remembered as a radical Young Hegelian engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to move ‘beyond Hegel’. Arguing that this image of Stirner is based on a faulty interpretation of his relationship to Hegelian philosophy, this book proposes an entirely new reading of his philosophical magnum opus Der Einzige und sein Eigentum. In this work, traditional philosophy, epitomized by Hegel, is reduced to the property of the unique or single individual. This move must not only be seen a refusal to keep traditional philosophy alive by criticising it, but also entails an ‘existentialist’ inversion of the traditional relation between thinker and idea. This exciting new interpretation, which is demonstrated here by a detailed analysis of Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, clears the way for a philosophical rehabilitation of Stirner’s ideas.

History is replete with false and unfulfilled promises, as well as singular acts of courage, resilience, and ingenuity. These episodes have led to significant changes in the way people think and act in the world or have set the stage for such transformations in the form of rational expectations in theory and the hopeful anticipations of dialectical imagination. Negative Dialectics and Event: Nonidentity, Culture, and the Historical Adequacy of Consciousness revisits some of Theodor W. Adorno’s most influential writings and theoretical interventions to argue not only that his philosophy is uniquely suited to bring such events into sharp relief and reflect on their entailments but also that an effective historical consciousness today would be a consciousness awake to the events that interpellate and shape it into existence. More broadly, Vangelis Giannakakis presents a compelling argument in support of the view that the critical theory developed by the first generation of the Frankfurt School still has much to offer in terms of both cultivating insights into contemporary human experience and building resistance against states of affairs that impede human flourishing and happiness.

This book frames the mission of the Continental Philosophy and History of Thought series at Lexington Books. International leading scholars contribute essays that explore and redefine the relationship between received arguments in contemporary Continental philosophy and various influential figures and arguments in the history of thought. By bringing Continental philosophy and the histories of thought into dialogue, editors Christian Lotz and Antonio Calcagno broaden the standard canon of what is considered Continental philosophy by including important yet understudied figures and arguments in the tradition; the chapters also deepen and contextualize significant movements and debate in the field by showing their rich historical underpinnings, thereby establishing new viewpoints in specific constituent subfields of philosophy. Reading Continental Philosophy and the History of Thought shows the growing richness of Continental philosophy via unexplored rethinking of the history of thought. The contributors expand Continental philosophy with and through the recovery of important historical developments, figures, and lines of thought.

In Rethinking Philosophy with Borges, Zambrano, Paz, and Plato, Hugo Moreno argues that in Ficciones, Claros del bosque, and El mono gramático, Jorge Luis Borges, María Zambrano, and Octavio Paz practice a literary way of philosophizing—a way of seeking and communicating knowledge of reality that takes up analogical procedures. They deploy analogy as an indispensable and irreplaceable heuristic tool and literary device to convey their insight and perplexities on the nature of existence. Borges’ ironic approach involves reading and writing philosophy as fiction. Zambrano’s poetic reason is a mode of writing and thinking based on an imaginative sort of recollection that is ultimately a visionary’s poetizing technique. Paz’s poetic thinking relies on analogy to correlate and harmonize an array of worldviews, ideas, and discourses. In the appendix, Moreno shows that Plato's Republic is a forerunner of this way of philosophizing in literature. Moreno suggests that in the Republic, Plato reconciles philosophy and poetry and creates a rational prose poetry that fuses argumentation and narration, dialectical and analogical reasoning, and abstract concepts and poetic images.